

# Military Personnel Policy: An Untapped Modernization Opportunity

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*Our most valuable asset, our most significant asymmetric advantage inherent in the American military and the United States Army: we come from a society of improvisers, a society of innovators, tinkers, problem-solvers, techno-savvy at [an] early age, and independence of action comes [naturally] to all Americans.*

General Mark A. Milley  
*Breaking Defense*, 5 October 2016<sup>1</sup>

## ■ Introduction

With the creation of Army Futures Command and a concerted effort to advance its six modernization priorities, the Army has made weapons development its primary focus in fulfilling the *2018 National Defense Strategy* (NDS). Supporters point to the capabilities of the near-peer adversaries on which the NDS focuses—China and Russia—and the Army’s need to reestablish technological overmatch, or superiority, in all domains. Purchasing new equipment is tangible, is measurable, increases the lethality of each Soldier and is in the comfort zone of senior Army leaders. Although there are some specific areas—missile defense, long-range precision fires and network defense—that require rapid updating, the Army remains the most lethal, best-equipped fighting force in the world. And certainly, over the past 17 years of armed conflicts, **it is not the Army’s equipment that has failed to achieve overmatch.**

A 2019 study on the Iraq War, published by the Army War College and requested by former Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Raymond T. Odierno, identifies leadership failures as one of the main reasons that the Army lacked enduring success in the region. The study says, “It seems that the most successful innovators were actually inverting policy rather than operating within policy, most notably in the case of the brigade and battalion-level COIN [counterinsurgency] approaches of 2005–2006.” It also highlights that “this is a fact the Army has not really confronted, and it seems possible that the Army in the Iraq War actually tended to penalize successful leaders who challenged their commanders.”<sup>2</sup>

The military’s outdated personnel management system could be one reason that the Army holds back its most successful leaders. In 2009, Casey

## ISSUE

The U.S. Army should fully leverage recent changes in personnel management legislation to develop, promote and retain officers with the skills required to lead a modernized force that can defeat near-peer adversaries.

## SPOTLIGHT SCOPE

- Describes opportunities provided by the *2019 National Defense Authorization Act* (NDAA) to address limitations of the *Defense Officer Personnel Management Act* (DOPMA);
- encourages the Army to not be satisfied by simply fulfilling the provisions of the 2019 NDAA; and
- advocates adapting policies to reflect generational changes in workforce behavior or risk skilled-labor imbalances with the private sector.

## INSIGHTS

- Over the past 17 years of armed conflicts, the U.S. Army’s equipment has been superior to that of other nations, but the service seems to have focused more on equipment modernization than on modernizing some of its legacy personnel policies.
- The 2019 NDAA provides the secretary of the Army more freedom to shape the Army’s personnel practices than any secretary in the past 40 years.
- The Army should take advantage of the provisions included in the 2019 NDAA, present evidence to Congress of its ability to identify, manage and cultivate its talent and push Congress to remove the restrictions of DOPMA in the 2020 NDAA.

Wardynski (now Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and his team wrote a series of manuscripts on officer talent management that found “compelling evidence that the U.S. Army’s Officer Corps will be unequal to future demands unless substantive management changes are made.”<sup>3</sup> The Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis found the **Army’s personnel management system fails to effectively differentiate its officers’ performance, does not adequately prepare its officers for enterprise-level leadership roles and inhibits institutional adaptability through poor succession planning and insufficient tenure.**<sup>4</sup>

Tim Kane’s book *Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for a Revolution* garnered much attention in 2010 due to his indictment of the military’s personnel system. He described a military with “a deeply anti-entrepreneurial structure” operating “more like a government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce than a cutting-edge meritocracy.”<sup>5</sup> In 2015, Brad Carson, then Acting Defense Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness and former Undersecretary of the Army, said of the personnel system: “What once worked for us has, in the 21st century, become unnecessarily inflexible and inefficient.” He said, “There is a revolution going on in human resources today, and we [the Department of Defense] are not taking part in it.”<sup>6</sup>

The need for change has not eluded current Army leadership. In November 2018, Secretary of the Army Mark Esper said, “We owe them [Soldiers] a modern personnel system that breaks from our traditional adherence to timelines and cookie-cutter career models and allows for multiple paths to success, accounting for an individual’s knowledge, skills, behaviors and preferences.”<sup>7</sup> Congress has also been listening, and the 2019 NDAA takes the first substantial steps toward adopting a more modern approach to managing the military’s talent. It provides slightly more career flexibility, allows service control of the promotion order of boarded officers, restores temporary promotion authority to the service secretaries and it places a higher value on private sector experience and education in determining initial appointment rank.<sup>8</sup>

With momentum building in the Army, in Congress and in society at large over the past 10 or more years, a transition from personnel management to talent management seems imminent. Although Congress has made some concessions in the 2019 NDAA, it has not entirely relinquished control of human capital management, as **most of the key tenets of DOPMA, passed almost 40 years ago in 1980, remain in place.** Currently, the Army’s realignment of \$31 billion to support weapons development and procurement has captured most of Congress’ attention.<sup>9</sup> Any decrease in the defense budget or a weapons program failure could further absorb Congress and the Army’s attention, leaving its talent reforms for another administration, which could be detrimental to the long-term health and success of the Army and its Soldiers.



U.S. Army Officer Candidate Kory Bromley sits with his Officer Candidate School (OCS) classmates during a rehearsal for their commissioning ceremony at Camp Rapid, Rapid City, South Dakota, 17 August 2018. The five candidates received their commission and rank of second lieutenant during the ceremony, marking the end of OCS and the beginning of their careers as commissioned officers (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Daniel Ward, 129th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment).

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#### THE 2019 NDAA ADDRESSES:

- Career flexibility;
  - promotion board changes;
  - temporary promotion authority; and
  - alternative promotion authority.
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Dr. Mark T. Esper  
Secretary of the Army

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**The Army must take advantage of the provisions included in the 2019 NDAA, present evidence to Congress of its ability to identify, manage and cultivate its talent and push Congress to remove the restrictions of DOPMA in the 2020 NDAA.**

## ■ Background

In 1940, CSA General George C. Marshall attempted to reform the service’s personnel system to ensure that he had the best leaders, not just the officers currently holding rank. In the interwar period, an officer often held the same rank for the majority of his career (e.g., a lieutenant for 17 years).<sup>10,11</sup> Advocating for change, General Marshall wrote the following to Senator Morris Shephard in support of what became the officers’ promotion bill (H.R. 9243): **“The difficulties of leadership which existed in 1917–18 have been enormously multiplied today by the increased mobility and fire power of modern armies, and the necessity for vigorous commanders is greater now than it has ever been before.”**<sup>12</sup>

The goal of the officers’ promotion bill was to help eliminate the bloat in the midcareer ranks resulting from the post-World War I drawdown and make way for talented, younger officers.<sup>13</sup> For example, despite early signs of promise, Dwight D. Eisenhower was only promoted, with peers, to Lieutenant Colonel in 1936. Due to the reforms pushed through by Marshall, however, Eisenhower was promoted on a temporary status to Brigadier General in 1941 and permanently to General of the Army in 1945.<sup>14</sup> The promotions were based on talent and performance rather than time in grade. These initial reforms at the outset of World War II were later codified in the *Officer Personnel Act of 1947* (OPA) and the *Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954* (OGLA); they were also refined in DOPMA.<sup>15</sup>

In 1980, DOPMA solidified the Army’s “up or out” closed-form system of personnel management. Congress passed DOPMA to solve two primary issues: 1) the stagnation of the peace-time Army, most vividly experienced between world wars;<sup>16</sup> and 2) the equitable career progression of a now All-Volunteer Force, solidified only seven years prior, in 1973. To ensure fairness and alleviate stagnation, DOPMA dictated that “officers move through the system in ‘cohorts’ originally determined by the year of commissioning and compete for promotion to the next higher grade against other members of the group at set years-of-service points.”<sup>17</sup>

This management system does guarantee turnover, albeit slowly, in all officer ranks, but its methods are costly. Since the system’s implementation, the Army has not needed to know detailed information about its officers’ abilities and talents because another “qualified” officer, by age and experience, would soon be along to fill the required position. Further, there has been no need to incentivize performance beyond cohort-based promotions. As long as the machine brings in newly-commissioned officers, the system continues to operate—no matter the cost of attrition. It is a cost that can be quite high when factoring in undergraduate education, military training and on-the-job experience.



*U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Bryant, 961st Engineer Battalion commander, places rank insignia on newly-promoted Chief Warrant Officer 3 John Buchanan, 961st Engineer Battalion survey and section design officer, during a promotion ceremony at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, 1 February 2019 (U.S. Army National Guard photo by First Lieutenant Leland White).*

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Ultimately, DOPMA’s regulatory requirements have ensured a regular rotation of personnel through the officer ranks, but due to its one-size-fits-all approach, the ideas and guiding principles of the organization have stagnated, just as officers’ careers did between the two world wars.

## **The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act**

The following is a brief review of the major changes in the 2019 NDAA and the implications for the Army’s personnel management system.

### *Career Flexibility*

#### **Section 505: Authority for Officers to Opt Out of Promotion Board Consideration**

Section 505 shows how Congress views the path to senior leadership in the military. The path is for generalists on operational tracks; if there is something nonstandard about an officer’s work history, education or talents, their advancement potential may be limited. Section 505 allows those nonstandard officers to self-identify and purposefully set their career back until their work experience matches that of their peers. This is an explicit endorsement of uniformity of thought and experience.

In *Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering Institutional Adaptability*, the authors outline the most damning evidence of how backward this line of thought is. In the Army, at the grade of O-1 to O-3, only 15 percent of the billets are nonoperational. However, at the grade of O-6 and above, a full 80 percent of the billets are nonoperational.<sup>18</sup> When officers on operational career paths reach the senior ranks, the Army only needs a handful to fill positions for which their career experience has prepared them. The rest must learn on the job—not what one would expect from the most senior leader in an organization.

#### **Section 710: Career Flexibility to Enhance Retention of Members**

For a servicemember to use the program in Section 710 of the 2019 NDAA, they must know that they want to return to the military and be willing to serve for an extended period after returning (two days of service for every one day spent away). The program does not account for current generational trends in workforce longevity and engagement and could only marginally assist young families, as someone leaving the military must know, unequivocally, that they want to return.

A 2016 Gallup report found that 21 percent of millennials polled changed jobs that year—three times the number of non-millennials.<sup>19</sup> Section 710 acknowledges this trend but does not ease a former servicemember’s return to service. The military invests a tremendous amount of capital and time in training each Soldier, and it is naive to operate under the assumption that the value of that training is eliminated when a servicemember separates. Contingent on passing physical fitness standards, the military must be more adaptable to generational workforce trends and embrace the burgeoning fluidity of America’s workforce.



Army Specialist Kenneth Safford, 184th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Mississippi Army National Guard, graduated Camp Buehring, Kuwait’s, Basic Leader Course, 19 March 2019. This leadership course helps develop and prepare future noncommissioned officers to sustain and maintain readiness within the Army (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Specialist Arielle Lugtu).

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**Section 501: Repeal of Requirement for Ability to Complete 20 Years of Service by Age 62 as Qualification for Original Appointment as a Regular Commissioned Officer**

Section 501 appears to be the most useful provision focused on career flexibility as it recognizes that military careers do not always start at age 18 or 22, and it allows for officers with private sector experience and a desire to serve the ability to do so. It is especially useful when combined with the increased constructive credit allowed for education or private sector experience (discussed below).

*Promotion Board Changes*

**Section 504: Authority for Promotion Boards to Recommend Officers of Particular Merit Be Placed Higher on a Promotion List**

Section 504 begins to reduce the rigidity of the officer promotion system. Currently, centralized promotion boards are convened at set points in an officer’s career. Board members individually score each eligible officer’s board file—which includes administrative information, a full-length color photo and annual performance evaluations. The sum of scores from all board members determines whether an officer is promoted or not. Previously, the order in which they were promoted was determined by the date of their last rank; earlier dates were promoted first. Now, however, Section 504 allows boards to determine the promotion order.

This is a slight improvement, but it does not address the primary shortcomings of the current promotion system. Promotions are backward-looking, are based on little information about an officer’s talents and do not reliably measure an officer’s ability to serve in a role of increased responsibility. Being a great infantry platoon leader does not necessarily translate into being a great assistant operations officer (a typical next step in an operator’s career), just as a former division commander might not be the best senior human resources officer or materiel manager.

To ensure the promotion of the officers whom the military needs, the military must first discover its officers’ talents. Then, it can either attempt to centralize its demand for different talent dimensions or, preferably, allow a marketplace of employers within the military force structure to decide through their hiring behavior. If Section 504 is the only change to the promotion system, board members are likely to continue to select officers whose careers have been like theirs; the military will continue to promote officers with similar experiences and skills; and the nation will not be optimally prepared to fight and win future, complex conflicts against sophisticated, technically adept adversaries.

*Temporary Promotion Authority*

**Section 605: Promotion to Certain Grades for Officers with Critical Skills: Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain; Captain, Commander, Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant**

This provision allows the services to promote officers temporarily to the grade of O-6 in designated critical skills gaps. Interpreted liberally, this authority could be exercised to circumvent the current system in which promotions are



U.S. Military Academy Class of 2022 conducted a 12-mile road march as family and former graduates cheered them on, concluding six weeks of Cadet Basic Training, 13 August 2018 (U.S. Army photo by Matthew Moeller).

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almost completely separate from job placement. Interpreted strictly, this authority is merely a return to the flexibility provided by OPA and OGLA for times of military expansion—flexibility that DOPMA eliminated in 1980. This new authority is severely limited in its scope (e.g., the Army could only have 100 temporary colonels) and echoes the message of the rest of the NDAA. Congress wants to provide additional flexibility for those officers who are “different” from the operators the military usually generates, but it does not recognize those different talents as continuously valuable to the armed services. **To fully explore the usefulness of putting an officer with the right talent in the right job, the Army should interpret Section 605 liberally.**

### *Higher Value on Private Sector Experience and Education*

#### **Section 502: Enhancement of Availability of Constructive Service Credit for Private Sector Training or Experience upon Original Appointment as a Commissioned Officer**

Section 502 is the most forward-thinking section of the 2019 NDAA. It changes a program that only allowed medical or dental professionals to join the military at up to the grade of O-4. This rewrite allows any professional whose training or experience is directly related to an operational need to join the military at up to the grade of O-6. This section provides services with the ability to rapidly respond to changing demands for specialized skills, such as cyber or directed energy capabilities, by hiring experts and paying them closer to the salary that they would command in the civilian sector.

Although this seems innocuous—the services have the authority to hire the employees they need—Section 502 acknowledges that the military’s current model of career progression is not sufficient to develop the officers whom it needs to be competitive in the future. The military has been operating a pyramid-shaped officer career model (in which all of the future generals of 2040 are currently captains, commissioned around 2010) with no meaningful lateral entry. Section 502 allows that the military does not know what expertise or background will be needed to lead the military of 2040, and, with this new authority, that is okay. If the military realizes it needs more autonomous-vehicle or satellite-targeting experts in 2035, it can hire them—not to junior leader positions, but to mid- and senior-level positions. This is a welcome addition.

### *Wildcard: Open-Ended Promotion Authority*

#### **Section 507: Alternative Promotion Authority for Officers in Designated Competitive Categories of Officers**

Section 507 is the closest Congress comes to asking the services what they would like to do to improve the promotion system. It gives the services the opportunity to designate certain competitive categories for their officers and then provide Congress with details on their plans for the career progressions of those categories. Ideally, the Army will work toward implementing a promotion system more focused on the fit of a given officer’s talents and the Army’s projected demand for those talents. The Army may recognize



Army Chief Warrant Officer 3 Thomas E. Perry III, mobility officer with the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) (TSC), assists Army Sergeant First Class Jace V. Morman, sustainment cell non-commissioned officer with the 1st TSC, with her warrant officer packet (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sergeant First Class Naurys Marte).

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*To properly prepare Soldiers for a near-peer adversary, the Army should take the best practices from the civilian sector, provide extensive feedback to Congress on Section 507 of the 2019 NDAA and use the most innovative career progression solutions to demonstrate that the Army can and will efficiently manage its talent post-DOPMA.*

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that the talents they need in leadership positions in certain fields are not time-based. Currently, a junior or midgrade officer with the appropriate talents for a senior position is not eligible for consideration for the position for many years. The Army should take full advantage of this provision, run pilots to determine best fits and implement in as many career fields as possible.

## ■ In the Private Sector

Although the military’s personnel policies have not been meaningfully updated in decades, the private sector has taken notice of radical advances in technology and so has an improved understanding of human behavior and tectonic shifts in worker preferences. Innovative companies are: using technologically-advanced solutions to manage large workforces and find optimal talent matches to meet ever-changing demands; continuously updating workflow processes and incentive structures to meet their employees’ needs to be connected, motivated and essential; and adapting their understanding of what it means to be a “career” employee as workers transition more frequently and adeptly between roles, companies and industries. Modern companies are maximizing their workers’ productivity by aligning their workers’ talents with their work.

DOPMA was an appropriate policy for the Cold War era and even closely modeled General Electric’s (GE) management philosophy at the time. Three decades later, GE is eliminating its annual performance review and has repurposed its famed Crotonville, New York, campus to “inspire connection,” rather than separate the top managers from the rest of the workforce. The company that was once famous for its numerical rankings, brutal candor and extremely competitive management culture is no longer focusing on grading their employees but instead on constant improvement.<sup>20</sup> Companies such as Adobe, Deloitte and Netflix have also eliminated annual reviews and taken similar steps to connect, develop and motivate their employees.<sup>21</sup> Congress should allow the military to do the same.

## ■ What to Do

DOPMA has contributed to a risk-averse, path-dependent culture in the military and reduced the willingness of senior leaders—and those on the traditional path upward—to think strategically and undertake efforts that may not succeed during their tenures. To properly prepare Soldiers for a near-peer adversary, the Army should take the best practices from the civilian sector, provide extensive feedback to Congress on Section 507 of the 2019 NDAA and use the most innovative career progression solutions to demonstrate that the Army can and will efficiently manage its talent post-DOPMA.<sup>22</sup>



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Command sergeants major from across the 200th Military Police Command listen to a Soldier answering questions to test his Army knowledge during the final presentation board presided by Command Sergeant Major Craig Owens during the command’s Best Warrior Competition held at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, 19 April 2018. During the competition, Soldiers were tested both physically and mentally in events that include the Army Physical Fitness Test, land navigation, obstacle course, ruck marching, weapon qualification, Army Warrior Tasks, reflexive fire, written exams and the Army appearance board (U.S. Army photo by Master Sergeant Michel Sauret).

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- <sup>1</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Miserable, Disobedient and Victorious: Gen. Milley’s Future U.S. Soldier,” *Breaking Defense*, 5 October 2016, <https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/miserable-disobedient-victorious-gen-milleys-future-us-soldier>.
- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Army War College, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War—Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011*, eds. Joel D. Rayburn, Frank K. Sobchak, January 2019, 621, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1376>.
- <sup>3</sup> Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle and Michael J. Colarusso, *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Based on Talent* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, April 2009), v, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub912.pdf>.
- <sup>4</sup> Michael J. Colarusso and David S. Lyle, *Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering Institutional Adaptability* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, February 2014), 11, 14–16, 48, [https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/pdf\\_uploads/publications/senior-officer-talent-management.pdf](https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/pdf_uploads/publications/senior-officer-talent-management.pdf).
- <sup>5</sup> Tim Kane, *Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for a Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012), 10.
- <sup>6</sup> Anna Forrester, “Brad Carson: DoD Personnel System behind Developments in HR Practices,” *ExecutiveGov*, 25 June 2015, <https://www.executivegov.com/2015/06/brad-carson-dod-personnel-system-behind-developments-in-hr-practices>.
- <sup>7</sup> Mark Esper and Jim Talent, “Back to the (Army’s) Future: A Conversation with Secretary of the Army Mark Esper,” event at the American Enterprise Institute auditorium, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2018, 5, <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/181108-back-to-the-army%E2%80%99s-future.pdf>.
- <sup>8</sup> John S. McCain, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019*, H.R. 5515, 115th Congress (2017–2018), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text#toc-H70477BE0AFCA4C8490B689D96A20381C>.
- <sup>9</sup> Jen Judson, “Army’s ‘Night Court’ Finds \$25 Billion to Reinvest in Modernization Priorities,” *Defense News*, 8 October 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2018/10/08/armys-night-court-finds-25-billion-to-reinvest-in-modernization-priorities>.
- <sup>10</sup> Arther T. Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1900–1990* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, September 2014), 11, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1221>.
- <sup>11</sup> Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Filling the Gaps: Reevaluating Officer Professional Education in the Inter-War Army, 1920-1940,” paper presented at the 1989 American Military Institute Annual Conference, 14–15 April 1989, 2.
- <sup>12</sup> George C. Marshall to Senator Morris Shephard, 5 June 1940, in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941*, eds. Larry I. Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 236–237, <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-morris-sheppard-2>.
- <sup>13</sup> Marshall to Shephard, “We Cannot Delay,” 236–237.
- <sup>14</sup> “Eisenhower Military Chronology,” Eisenhower National Historic Site, accessed 20 March 2019, <https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jranger/chronomil1.htm>.
- <sup>15</sup> Most significantly, OPA formalized the “up or out” policies called for by General Marshall before and during World War II and allowed the continued use of temporary promotions. OGLA revised the authority of the Department of Defense by regulating the number of temporary promotions. DOPMA incorporated most of the tenets of OPA and OGLA while striving to achieve uniformity in career progression, promotion opportunities and retirement. DOPMA was passed less than 10 years after the advent of the All-Volunteer Force and focused on achieving equitable outcomes that would treat every officer fairly but uniformly.
- <sup>16</sup> Coumbe, *History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 10–11.
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- <sup>18</sup> Michael J. Colarusso and David S. Lyle, *Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering Institutional Adaptability* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, April 2009), 37, [https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/pdf\\_uploads/publications/Senior-Officer-Talent-Management.pdf](https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/pdf_uploads/publications/Senior-Officer-Talent-Management.pdf).
- <sup>19</sup> Gallup, “How Millennials Want to Work and Live,” (Washington, D.C.: Gallup, 2016), 6–7, [https://news.gallup.com/reports/189830/e.aspx?utm\\_source=gbj&utm\\_medium=copy&utm\\_campaign=20160512-gbj](https://news.gallup.com/reports/189830/e.aspx?utm_source=gbj&utm_medium=copy&utm_campaign=20160512-gbj).
- <sup>20</sup> Max Nisen, “Why GE Had to Kill Its Annual Performance Reviews after More Than Three Decades,” *Quartz*, 13 August 2015, <https://qz.com/428813/ge-performance-review-strategy-shift>.
- <sup>21</sup> Allen Smith, “More Employers Ditch Performance Appraisals: Disadvantages of Traditional Reviews Are Legion,” *Society for Human Resource Management*, 18 May 2018, <https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/more-employers-ditch-performance-appraisals.aspx>.
- <sup>22</sup> For a detailed plan toward adopting talent management, refer to the publications of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, hosted on talent.army.mil. Also, Tim Kane has published a book titled *Total Volunteer Force* that outlines a number of steps the military should take to implement talent management.

