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Making the Grade

Integration of Joint Professional Military
Education and Talent Management in
Developing Joint Officers



For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR473-1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-0700-9

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

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Preface

In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff codified and published their shared vision and guidance for integrating professional military education and talent management. The vision stated that “our collective aim is the development of strategically minded joint warfighters, who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change,”¹ indicating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to adapt and evolve leadership development in the military to help it become a more agile and responsive enterprise.

To operationalize and implement this vision, the Joint Staff wanted to collect and frame personnel performance requirements from the joint stakeholder community and develop appropriate outcome measures that would be indicative of the existing joint education and talent management processes. The overall objective of this study was to assist the Joint Staff by collecting and analyzing the perspectives of key joint stakeholders regarding (1) the transition to an outcomes-based joint education approach, (2) the specification and assessment of officer performance to be successful joint operators, and (3) the understanding of any perceived challenges associated with the interface of joint education with service talent management. The analytical results reflect the contemporary joint education–talent management enterprise and serve as the basis for recommending a more effective and more responsive future system.

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management*, May 1, 2020a, p. 1.

The research reported here was completed in March 2021 and underwent security review with the sponsor and the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review before public release.

This research was sponsored by the Joint Staff J-7, Director for Joint Force Development, and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise.

For more information on the RAND Forces and Resources Policy Center, see <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/frp> or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage).

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Summary

In recent years, senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials have placed increasing emphasis on how military leaders are developed to serve not only in their individual services but also in joint environments; this has become increasingly important to the execution of the United States' military strategy. Professional military education (PME)—of which joint professional military education (JPME) is a subset—has been critically debated as being out of date, not being focused on the right attributes, not being responsive to an evolving security environment, and being disconnected from the military services' talent management processes.

In response to these issues, in 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published a vision for developing officers for joint assignments that calls for an “outcomes-based approach [that] emphasize[s] ingenuity, intellectual application, and military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting.”¹ Such an outcomes-based military education (OBME) approach focuses on what students must accomplish rather than traditional metrics of evaluating education, such as curriculum content or the amount of time spent learning specific material. To some degree, this outcome-oriented perspective (and the accompanying focus on authentic assessments) better connects education and experience, both of which are essential to leadership development.

Talent management (TM) processes broadly govern officers' experience. We use *talent management* to mean the full range of per-

¹ JCS, *Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management*, May 1, 2020a, p. 5.

sonnel management processes and systems related to managing officers' careers, which is consistent with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision. JPME is a subsystem under TM that prepares officers to meet joint warfighting requirements that are addressed through joint assignments. The provision of JPME to officers therefore necessarily intersects with TM processes because educational prerequisites, in part, influence officer assignment, promotion, and developmental opportunities as managed by the services.

JPME is a career-long endeavor based on a progressive continuum of both formal and informal and institutional and individual programs that contribute to joint officer development. The formal portion of the joint educational system is based on a three-phase approach and offered at both joint institutions and some service schools. JPME, in general, provides the education needed to develop service officers to be proficient in "joint matters."

As DoD begins the process of transitioning to an outcomes-based approach for JPME, the Joint Staff commissioned the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute to undertake research to support DoD's efforts by examining the following four broad questions:

1. How are joint educational institutions that offer JPME, Phase II (JPME-II) transitioning to an outcomes-based approach that can prepare officers to be successful joint operators?
2. How does the joint community consider performance expectations and the qualities needed to be effective joint officers?
3. How is joint performance specified and measured? To what extent does aggregate performance information provide enterprise feedback?
4. How might challenges from TM systems and processes affect implementation strategies for OBME in JPME-II?

To answer these questions, we conducted a review of education literature that is associated with outcomes-based education, previous related RAND studies, and DoD guidance documents; conducted 55 semistructured interviews with senior representatives throughout the department's military education and talent management organizations;

and analyzed personnel data and information on joint officer positions. In this report, we focus specifically on officers in the grades of O-5 and O-6 and on requirements for and delivery of JPME-II.

Interface of Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education for Leadership Development


We learned from our initial literature review and interviews that successfully implementing OBME requires close coordination with TM and JPME processes. TM and JPME entities tend to be viewed and analyzed as having independent processes, not functioning as a holistic interdependent enterprise. Because the study team was unable to find a holistic representation of the integrated TM-JPME enterprise, we developed one.

Figure S.1 depicts the notional enterprise TM-JPME Interface Model, which is derived from a review of policy documents, interviews with service detailing offices, and our professional knowledge of the service and joint processes developed through years of analytical experience. The model depicts current relationships among the various entities and aspirations detailed in the Joint Chiefs' vision. In other words, not all of the connections depicted in the notional model currently exist, but they do reflect linkages, processes, and expectations that we believe are essential for preparing officers to successfully deliver joint outcomes, as dictated by OBME.

At the center of the enterprise is the matchup between officers and joint positions. This matching of individual officer qualifications and preferences to unfilled assignment requirements is a complex process, but it is a critical intersection within the TM-JPME enterprise that requires the greatest attention and collaboration to improve enterprise outcomes.

As shown in Figure S.1, the officer-position match reflects the intersection of position requirements (in the horizontal shaded "Assignments" box) with the supply of personnel (shown by the vertical shaded "Individual" box). In the model, the assignment process reflects the demand for officers in the form of position descriptions and prerequi-

Figure S.1
Interface of TM and JPME for Joint Leadership Development



NOTE: The blue boxes indicate service functions, the purple boxes represent joint elements, and the blended boxes reflect areas where service and joint functions overlap.

sites, which are compared with the experience and education gained throughout an officer’s career. Other inputs to and outputs of the assignment entities include respective laws and leadership guidance, the talent management process, and future management considerations.

One component of the enterprise is the assessment of joint assignment performance that is conducted as part of the assignment process once a joint assignment is complete. Feedback from these assessments is intended to be used in the service talent management process and provided to the institutions that deliver educational programs: specifically, JPME-II programs for the purposes of our study. This feedback should be used to improve delineation of requirements or adjust educational curricula to ensure the best match between officer and posi-

tion and to ensure that officers are being adequately prepared to meet service and joint requirements.

The TM-JPME Interface Model provides a comprehensive framework in which to visualize the complexity associated with the overall enterprise and facilitate understanding of the individual components and their interrelationships. It served as a guide for addressing the questions outlined in our study objectives.

Summary of Findings

How Are the Practices of Joint Educational Institutions Offering JPME-II Transitioning to an Outcomes-Based Approach That Can Prepare Officers to Be Successful Joint Operators?

We examined other educational settings that adopted outcomes-based methods and identified practices that have applicability to joint educational institutions; these practices include defining measurable outcomes and soliciting input from community members. We found that joint educational institutions are working to define measurable outcomes and appropriate linkages to curricula; these are important practices in OBME.

Measuring student performance using authentic assessments—that is, assessments that simulate real-world applications of desired outcomes—is critical to the successful implementation of OBME. Although joint educational institutions are working to develop some of these assessments, it is essential that they emphasize this development further.

In terms of soliciting input from community members, some joint educational institutions told us that they have such mechanisms but that they are generally underdeveloped. In considering how to develop these mechanisms further, we observed significant interest among both joint educational institutions and joint stakeholders for greater communication on desired outcomes. There was wide agreement that the structure and content of the newly adopted Joint Learning Areas

(JLAs) provide a promising framework to organize this communication and engagement.²

Institutions of higher education typically use their institutional research functions to support processes of systematic measurement and communication about outcomes, but interviewees noted that joint educational institutions do not have the empowered and well-staffed institutional research functions that are needed to support these processes. Such methodological capabilities are essential to fully implementing OBME and to addressing the inevitable challenges associated with joint performance specification, measurement, and process evaluation.

Outcomes-based systems require significant flexibility in teaching delivery and pacing because they are based on achieving specific outcomes rather than time spent in various content areas. This sort of flexibility appears challenging for joint educational institutions to implement and assess with their current procedures. We note that certification processes are changing to enable the transition to OBME. The recently revised process for JPME program certification can serve a valuable role in guiding and monitoring the steps needed to successfully implement OBME and thereby aid in ensuring the quality and responsiveness of joint institutions in producing officers capable of delivering the necessary joint outcomes.

How Does the Joint Community Consider Performance Expectations and the Qualities Needed to Be Effective Joint Officers?

We examined how performance is specified, in terms of expectations, in Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) positions at the grades of O-5 and O-6. Across these JDAL positions, we found that prior experience forms the dominant prerequisites for these positions and in only a few examples is joint education consistently demanded. Furthermore, the periodic JDAL validation process focuses almost exclusively on determining whether the duties of a position are primarily joint matters and rarely considers what, if any, joint education might be required

² JLAs are broad categories of joint knowledge approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). JLAs are based on high-level DoD guidance from authoritative sources, such as the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, to summarize the learning areas to be covered across a continuum of professional military education.

for successful performance. Our interviews and process reviews identified that joint stakeholders struggled to convey performance expectations and did not have systematic processes to communicate such expectations.

How Is Joint Performance Specified and Measured? To What Extent Does Aggregate Performance Information Provide Enterprise Feedback?

We found that joint stakeholders measure individual performance during JDAL assignments using the established performance feedback processes of the individual services. Stakeholders also provide informal on-the-job feedback. But joint stakeholders told us that they do not aggregate this performance information into overall themes or lessons that can inform joint educational institutions as they consider how to modify their curricula, instruction, and authentic assessments to improve future joint outcomes. Similarly, there is a lack of systematic feedback that is provided to the services that characterizes the quality and value of their TM processes and decisions.

How Might Challenges from Talent Management Systems and Processes Affect Implementation Strategies for Outcomes-Based Military Education in Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II?

Significant challenges at the intersection of TM and JPME have the potential to constrain strategies that can help implement OBME. First, we observed that academic performance in JPME-II (in the current system) is weakly linked to JDAL assignments and career progression. (There are some signs of change on this front, however, such as the Army and Air Force efforts to make educational performance more visible in promotion processes and assignment decisions.)

Because of such disconnects, efforts to enhance JPME-II might have limited effects if organizations and officers do not invest seriously in the enhancements that OBME can deliver. This observation fits with a broader understanding of the limited power that the joint community can exercise in a TM-JPME system, in which most personnel decisions are the province of the services. The services value most joint assignments somewhat less than those within their services. Service

TM decisions can result in several undesirable consequences for joint stakeholders, such as poor assignment fit, unfilled positions, or officers pulled early from JDAL assignments with no replacements.

Based on their experiences with substandard staff work, a small but vocal number of interview respondents lamented the quality of assigned joint officers. The Goldwater-Nichols Act required the reporting of promotion rates for joint serving officers to their counterparts on respective service headquarter staffs. This provision was intended to motivate the services to assign high-quality officers to JDAL positions and protect the officers from being adversely considered within the service promotion process. But the services successfully lobbied to remove this reporting provision, reintroducing this vulnerability.³

Furthermore, despite a number of comments that we received indicating that completing a JPME-II program was valuable prior to entering a JDAL assignment, our analysis of personnel data concluded that just 40 percent of O-5 and O-6 JDAL-assigned officers (as of January 2020) completed JPME-II prior to assignment, and another 7 percent completed it sometime during their assignment. Although this is not part of this study's focus, we inquired whether this result—which is a reflection of the current TM-JPME process—was sufficient for effectively accomplishing the joint organization's mission.

We found that the various stakeholders in the TM-JPME enterprise do not have clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for supporting OBME. We also observed that the structures designated to oversee the enterprise generally lack power and purpose, reflecting the lack of sufficient policy guidance and delineation of stakeholder roles and responsibilities. For example, the Joint Staff formerly established the Joint Leader Development Council, a body intended to bring together the TM and JPME communities. Through our interviews, we learned that the council previously struggled in this difficult integration role. Clarifying roles and responsibilities in new TM-JPME policy and empowering such oversight structures will be critical to

³ Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986.

guiding and adjusting the implementation of OBME, which necessarily requires a holistic rather than fragmented approach.

Recommendations

The findings from our investigation of the four study questions led to numerous specific recommendations for DoD and the services that will further DoD's goal of better integrating TM and JPME entities and implementing OBME. These recommendations fall into four groups, summarized here, and the text box that follows details the 17 specific recommendations within these groups.

- **Address TM-JPME integration from a comprehensive enterprise perspective.** Historically, DoD and the services have segregated TM and JPME functions—both organizationally (in terms of how tasks are managed) and via distinct governance policies. Past actions and decisions most often have been independently debated and resolved within DoD, and decisionmakers consider the implications for the other function infrequently. Such a separation has created distinct challenges for all stakeholders. As DoD and the services take steps to enhance TM and JPME integration, an enterprise perspective, such as the one provided by the RAND-developed TM-JPME Interface Model, should guide decisions.
- **Delineate and clarify TM-JPME roles and responsibilities in policy.** Existing policy guidance documents do not clearly establish the roles and responsibilities for stakeholders to implement OBME. DoD also needs a clear leadership development policy that articulates senior department goals; establishes roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders with the aim of ensuring that joint and service initiatives are sufficiently comprehensive, cohesive, and coordinated to achieve OBME; and identifies oversight and enforcement mechanisms that can adjudicate areas of disagreement or competing equities. Such policy clarifications also should address the empowerment of existing TM, JPME, and leadership development governance bodies—not create new

bureaucracy—to ensure that dynamic oversight and sufficient investments are provided to prepare future officers.

- **Implement OBME through coordinated actions.** The largest group of recommendations comprises a series of coordinated actions that are needed for successful implementation of OBME. These actions start with developing stronger relationships among joint stakeholders, the military services, and joint educational institutions to deepen engagement about outcomes and direct authentic assessments. Interactions among all TM-JPME stakeholders can benefit from a common foundation and vocabulary, which the JLAs can provide. We also recommend several actions to improve the match between officers and joint positions that will help realize the benefits of OBME: specifically, establishing requirements for JPME-II and expectations of its completion prior to assignment for a set of especially complex or strategic assignments.
- **Consider more-complex actions requiring further development.** Throughout our interviews, we heard persistent references to fundamental concerns about the purpose and audience for JPME-II. Addressing these concerns will require significant additional effort beyond this report, but we offer several suggestions that DoD could explore along these lines, such as increasing joint stakeholder responsibility in TM decisions within their organizations and developing shorter, more-modular JPME-II offerings.

Conclusion

With the publication of their vision statement, *Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War*, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have spoken about the importance of integrating officer talent management and professional military education. Past processes and systems in these areas have operated somewhat independently and focused predominantly on inputs rather than outcomes. Given the prominence of and demand for jointness in current and future military operations,

as well as continued uncertainty in national security environments, this research, including formulation of the enterprise-level TM-JPME Interface Model, contributes to a better understanding of the complexity associated with joint officer development and provides recommendations for better positioning DoD and the services for “making the grade.”

Recommendations to Facilitate Transition to OBME

Address TM-JPME integration from a comprehensive enterprise perspective

- DoD and service deliberations and decisions should be guided by a comprehensive TM-JPME enterprise perspective.

Delineate and clarify TM-JPME roles and responsibilities in policy

- The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, should address the lack of a leadership development policy that details the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance for integrating and prioritizing the often-competing dimensions of TM and JPME.
- The Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should empower TM, JPME, and leadership development governance bodies by providing sufficient guidance and investment for preparing future officers.

Implement OBME through coordinated actions

- DoD, service, and joint leadership should commit to creating stronger and mutually beneficial relationships among joint stakeholders, services, and joint educational institutions.
- The Joint Staff should promote the JLAs as a basis for structuring interactions among all TM-JPME stakeholders on joint prerequisites, performance expectations, and performance outcomes.
- The joint educational institutions and the Joint Staff J-7 should continue to redesign education using OBME best practices, includ-

ing authentic assessments with feedback provided to TM-JPME stakeholders.

- Joint educational institutions should enhance their institutional research and outcome-tracking capabilities.
- The Joint Staff J-7 should incorporate OBME principles into established JPME certification processes.
- OSD and the Joint Staff should extend the JDAL validation process to establish and validate educational prerequisites for select JDAL positions that demand more-strategic or -complex joint responsibilities.
- OSD and the Joint Staff should reestablish the standard of joint education preceding joint assignment for high-value positions, allowing few, if any, waivers.
- OSD should eliminate the service practice of withdrawing officers prior to them completing the JDAL tour (or should require the services to replace such officers with no gap in joint service).

Consider more-complex actions requiring further development

- DoD and service leadership should consider revising their policies so that the Joint Qualified Officer designation is required before officers can assume leadership of an O-6-level command.
- OSD and the Joint Staff should consider revising their policies to reinstate promotion rate comparisons and congressional reporting.
- The services should investigate giving joint stakeholders greater freedom to manage some TM decisions within their organizations.
- Joint educational institutions, with coordination by the Joint Staff, should seek efficiencies under OBME to place greater emphasis on student achievement of outcomes through shorter, more-modular, and episodic JPME-II offerings.
- The services should better link educational performance to joint assignment and promotion talent management decisions.
- Over time, DoD should consider even more-ambitious restructuring to realize the full promise of OBME.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the many people who were involved in this research. In particular, we thank LtGen Daniel O'Donohue, director for joint force development, for his guidance and support throughout the study. Similarly, we are indebted to Jerry West, who serves as the education advisor to the Joint Education and Doctrine Division of the Joint Staff J-7. Dr. West was very gracious with his time and frequently provided his professional counsel and expertise. Our team and this report greatly benefited from his thoughtful critique and extended discussions on essential background and joint context, as well as his willingness to link us with joint stakeholders.

We appreciate Jerry Lynes, deputy director of joint education and doctrine of the Joint Staff J-7, and COL Mark Schreiber, also of the J-7, for their knowledge of joint officer development and openness to sharing that information with others. CDR Mark Moran and Paul Paim, both of the Joint Staff J-1 Human Capital division, were instrumental in providing us with access to and understanding of data from the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System and the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System.

We also acknowledge the pivotal roles played and contributions made by leaders and staff of all offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all directorates within the Joint Staff, sampled combatant commands, military service officer detailing organizations, and all colleges of the National Defense University. Their strong commitment and dedication to the development of joint officers was evident and primary in all interviews. We also appreciated the broad perspectives and wisdom provided by a number of former senior defense offi-

cials and joint leaders: David Chu, Bernie Rostker, Gen (Ret) Joseph Dunford, and VADM (Ret) Ann Rondeau.

This research benefited from helpful insights and comments provided by several RAND colleagues, including Lisa Harrington, Molly McIntosh, and John Winkler; their thoughtful comments greatly improved this report. Matthew Stafford provided very helpful comments and suggestions as an external reviewer. We also thank Barbara Bicksler for her tremendous contributions to making this report concise, logical in its story, and consistent in its messaging.

Abbreviations

CCMD	combatant command
CIC	College of Information and Cyberspace
CISA	College of International Security Affairs
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
ES	Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Research Strategy
FMTS	Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
JAWS	Joint Advanced Warfighting School
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCWS	Joint and Combined Warfighting School
JDAL	Joint Duty Assignment List
JDAMIS	Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System
JFSC	Joint Forces Staff College
JLA	Joint Learning Area

JLDC	Joint Leader Development Council
JOM	joint officer management
JPME	joint professional military education
JPME-II	joint professional military education, phase II
JQO	joint qualified officer
MEAAC	Military Education Assessment Advisory Committee
NCLB	No Child Left Behind
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NDU	National Defense University
NWC	National War College
OBE	outcomes-based education
OBME	outcomes-based military education
OPMEP	Officer Professional Military Education Policy
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAJE	Process for Accreditation of Joint Education
PLO	program learning outcomes
PME	professional military education
SJDA	standard joint duty assignment
TM	talent management
TMCC	Talent Management Coordination Council
TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

Changes Needed in Joint Professional Military Education

Developing leaders is essential to the capability of America's military services. Leadership development is a multifaceted process that takes place over an entire career. At its most basic level, this development occurs through professional experiences and a progressive series of professional military education (PME)—of which joint professional military education (JPME) is a subset. The military's talent management system encompasses both experience and education, which complement and reinforce each other to build knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes in leaders.

Within leadership development, military education faces a number of demands for change. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) claimed that "PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity."¹ The 2018 NDS called for greater emphasis on intellectual leadership and military professionalism; education would be used as a strategic asset to build trust and interoperability across the joint force and with allied and partner forces. The NDS also directed that military education must reflect and be responsive to an ever-changing security environment that is characterized by the return of great-power competitors, challenges to international rules and order, the activities of nonstate actors, the effects of rapid advancements in technology, and the chang-

¹ Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 8.

ing character of war. Military education must be sufficiently agile and reflect the context in which its graduates are required to operate:

The evolving and dynamic security environment . . . demands immediate changes to the identification, education, preparation, and development of our joint warfighters . . . adapting our leadership development enterprise and not shying away from fundamental change, where appropriate.²

Motivated by these concerns, in May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) signed and issued *Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management*.³ (We will refer to this document as the *JCS Vision* throughout this report.) The *JCS Vision* states the overall objectives of leader development as follows:

Our collective aim is the development of strategically minded joint warfighters, who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.⁴

The *JCS Vision* also explains that the leader development system needs to change to meet the following objectives:

To succeed in deterring or winning conflicts of the future we must similarly adapt our leader development enterprise and not shy away from fundamental change, where appropriate. . . . These emerging intellectual requirements have not been the focus of our current leader development enterprise.⁵

² Mattis, 2018, p. 8.

³ JCS, *Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management*, May 1, 2020a.

⁴ JCS, 2020a, p. 1.

⁵ JCS, 2020a, p. 3.

In contrast with the traditional model, which emphasized such educational inputs as coverage of subject matter, the *JCS Vision* argues for an outcomes-based approach in PME:

Initially we must shift our PME curricula from a predominately topic-based model to an outcomes-based approach and emphasize ingenuity, intellectual application, and military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, while deepening knowledge of history.⁶

This transition—from an emphasis on educational input measures to an outcomes-oriented emphasis—has strong precedent within the Department of Defense (DoD); it closely tracks the same progression and evolution of unit readiness assessments. With the introduction of the Defense Readiness Reporting System, DoD and the services recognized the value of measuring “ready for what.” This approach shifted the discussion from what resources a unit might have available (inputs) to the more fundamental subject of what missions the units are able to accomplish (outcomes) with the resources that they have. The challenges that DoD experienced in developing and implementing the Defense Readiness Reporting System are similar to the challenges faced when instituting similar outcome approaches to JPME.

Overview of Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education

We next provide a basic overview of talent management (TM) processes, how and at what career stages JPME is delivered, and the interface between JPME and other aspects of TM.

Talent Management

As we noted at the start of this chapter, leadership development is a product of both education and experience. The system for managing this experience and education is broadly known as *talent management*.

⁶ JCS, 2020a, p. 5.

In the joint context, the experiential domain is sometimes referred to by a more specific and more limited term: *joint officer management* (JOM).⁷ These terms are often used interchangeably in government and policy documents but might mean different things. That being said, TM has a broad range of possible applications, as a 2019 RAND Corporation report described:

In some contexts, talent is equated with general ability; hence, talent management is equated with development and utilization of high-performing or high-potential individuals. In other contexts, talents are equated with specific combinations of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes (KSAOs) . . . In still other contexts, talent management is used as a synonym for human resource management in general, or perhaps the more strategic aspects of human resource management, with a goal of producing desired long-term personnel outcomes.⁸

The *JCS Vision* and Joint Staff policy on PME both use the term *talent management* in its broadest application. In line with this interpretation, we use *talent management* in this report to mean the full range of personnel management processes and systems related to managing officers' professional development, not only those aspects specifically tailored to maximize development and use of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes.

Joint Professional Military Education Requirements

JPME is a career-long endeavor (from precommissioning to general and flag officers) that is based on a progressive continuum of both

⁷ JOM is defined as “[o]fficer management through the continuum of joint experiences, including developmental and joint assignments, along with joint training. JOM provides the mechanism for tracking joint experiences and qualifications” (DoD Instruction [DoDI] 1300.19, *DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, April 3, 2018, p. 45).

⁸ Albert A. Robbert, Katherine L. Kidder, Caitlin Lee, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and William H. Waggy II, *Officer Career Management: Steps Toward Modernization in the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2875-OSD, 2019, p. 47.

formal and informal and institutional and individual programs contributing to joint officer development. The formal portion of the joint educational system primarily is based on a three-phase approach. JPME institutions (and some service schools) offer programs in JPME, phase I (JPME-I, typically offered to officers in the grade of O-4); JPME, phase II (JPME-II, typically offered at the grade of O-5); and capstone (focused on general and flag officers). JPME, in general, provides the education needed to develop service officers to be proficient in “joint matters.”⁹

JPME is required for officer career progression following the framework laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), referred to as GNA. JPME-II completion is required to be designated joint officer-qualified, which is a requirement for promotion to O-7. We discuss these requirements further in Chapters Two and Three, and their implications are discussed throughout this report. This report focuses on JPME-II at the request of our research sponsors in the Joint Staff.

Joint Learning Areas

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is in the process of implementing aspects of the *JCS Vision*. One of the first actions taken was to issue an updated *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (OPMEP), to include an instruction (CJCS Instruction 1800.01F).¹⁰ The OPMEP provides considerable detail on how the *JCS Vision* is to be implemented for military education and further policy requirements.

⁹ *Joint matters* are defined in 10 U.S.C. § 668 as “matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, air, space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; command and control of operations under unified command; national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; and combined operations with military forces of allied nations.”

¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01F, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 15, 2020.

The OPMEP instruction outlines six Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) that an officer should master over their career by completing a progressive instructional continuum of PME and JPME. The JLAs were developed based on comprehensive consideration and analysis of the most recent NDS, the National Military Strategy, the Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations, desired leader attributes, special areas of emphasis, a variety of legislative requirements, and the *JCS Vision*. The resulting six areas are (1) strategic thinking and communications; (2) profession of arms; (3) continuum of competition, conflict, and war; (4) security environment; (5) strategy and joint planning; and (6) globally integrated operations. The JLAs are intended to guide PME and JPME institutions in the design, development, and delivery of instructional programs. The JLA definitions are included in Appendix A.

Interface Between Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education

The assignment and career management systems that comprise the TM system for developing officers necessarily interact with JPME. The title and approach of the *JCS Vision* reflect the Joint Chiefs' understanding that PME and the broader TM system are closely linked. For these reasons, we cannot consider JPME-II (or any element of PME) separately from the rest of TM; specifically, we refer to the processes and systems that the services use to manage officer careers and assignments. These processes include deciding which officers to place in which assignments, which officers to select for promotions and specific developmental opportunities, and which officers to send to residential JPME. The interface between JPME-II and the rest of the TM system is thus an important theme of this report. In Chapter Three, we explore these systems and connections in more depth.

Adopting an Outcomes-Based Military Education Approach

The OPMEP articulates broad guidance that the JPME system should be guided by *outcomes-based education* (OBE), which is an educational

theory designed around outcomes instead of inputs. This means that education focuses on what students must accomplish in their future roles and responsibilities rather than curriculum content or the amount of time spent learning specific material. The OPMEP terms this approach *outcomes-based military education* (OBME), citing this foundational definition and explanation:

Outcome-Based Education means clearly focusing and organizing everything in an educational system around what is essential for all students to be able to do successfully at the end of their learning experiences. This means starting with a clear picture of what is important for students to be able to do, then organizing curriculum, instruction, and assessment to make sure this learning ultimately happens. The keys to having an outcome-based system are: 1) Developing a clear set of learning outcomes around which all of the system's components can be focused. 2) Establishing the conditions and opportunities within the system that enable and encourage all students to achieve those essential outcomes.¹¹

OBE, as this definition suggests, could seem straightforward: Education *should* serve students after they graduate, support the services in their development and management of talent, and enable joint forces in their conduct of complex operations. Indeed, OBE systems in certain contexts are well-established: Technical education programs, scuba instruction, and flight schools, for example, all have clearly defined performance standards. However, traditional education systems rely on the “calendar and the clock” and prioritize curriculum coverage and scheduling instead of student mastery.¹² Traditional education prioritized “how” and “when” instead of “what” and “whether”

¹¹ William G. Spady, *Outcome-Based Education: Critical Issues and Answers*, Arlington, Va.: American Association of School Administrators, 1994, as cited in CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020, p. GL-6.

¹² Gwennis McNeir, “Outcomes-Based Education: Tool for Restructuring,” *OSSC Bulletin*, Vol. 36, No. 8, April 1993.

students learned the material.¹³ Since the early 1990s, several countries have used outcomes-based approaches to reform their education systems with varying degrees of success, as reviewed in Chapter Four.

Using our review of the literature that is documented in Chapter Four, Figure 1.1 illustrates best practices for OBE (and, by extension, OBME) in a framework. The figure shows that defining outcomes is central to all other components of OBE and, furthermore, that all other components inform the outcomes. For example, these outcomes will guide the curriculum development, assessments, and other activities, which are sometimes referred to as a *framework of learning*. All educational activities should support these outcomes to ensure that students are making progress toward mastery. Additionally, community members—in our case, the administrators and faculty at educational institutions, officers (the students), and joint organizations (the employers)—should help define these outcomes to ensure that they meet the needs of all stakeholders. One challenge with OBE is that students learn at different paces; as a result, OBE should incorporate sufficient flexibility to ensure that all students are able to achieve the outcomes. These OBME best practices guided the development of our study approach.

Objectives and Approach


As the *JCS Vision* and OPMEP were being issued, the Joint Staff commissioned the RAND National Defense Research Institute to undertake this report, which is intended to support the Joint Staff, the services, and other joint stakeholders in implementing the *JCS Vision* for JPME-II.

Objectives

To help the joint community enable sound OBME practices for JPME-II, we aim to answer four broad questions:

¹³ Spady, 1994

Figure 1.1
OBE Best Practices for Implementation



1. How are joint educational institutions that offer JPME-II transitioning to an outcomes-based approach that can prepare officers to be successful joint operators?
2. How does the joint community consider performance expectations and the qualities needed to be effective joint officers?
3. How is joint performance specified and measured? To what extent does aggregate performance information provide enterprise feedback?
4. How might challenges from TM systems and processes affect implementation strategies for OBME in JPME-II?

Approach

We answered these questions by analyzing the following three major sources of data:

- **Literature review.** To understand the principles intended to guide JPME-II, we reviewed the foundational documents described previously in this chapter (the *JCS Vision* and OPMEP) along with a selection of other policy and implementation documents. We also reviewed the education literature on practices associated with OBE and previous RAND studies related to this subject.

- **Interviews.** We conducted 55 semistructured interviews with senior representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands (CCMDs), joint educational institutions, and service joint detailing offices, as well as with former defense officials and joint leaders, between June and September 2020. The interview respondents and the interview guides, which were informed by the literature review, are provided in Appendix B.
- **Personnel data and position information.** We obtained and analyzed officer personnel data from the Defense Manpower Data Center. We also obtained and analyzed data on Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) positions, which are designated joint officer positions located primarily in CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and OSD but also in some other elements. Using these sources, we constructed analytic files that represented the active or full-time reserve component O-5s and O-6s who were serving in joint assignments within CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and OSD as of January 1, 2020. Further discussion of the data sources and analytic files is contained in Appendix C.

Limitations of This Report

As with any research, our work has important limitations. Much of our information on how the TM system functions in practice and what might be needed for the future comes from stakeholder interviews. Although we made a careful effort to include a wide variety of senior military and civilian joint stakeholders as participants in these discussions, our results are limited by the people with whom we spoke and the perspectives that they shared.

This research effort, by design, focuses specifically on O-5s and O-6s; thus, our conclusions are applicable only to JPME-II. Although our analysis did not intend to cover JPME or even PME more broadly, some of our findings might have relevance for these broader systems. Furthermore, although we examine TM in some detail, we are analyzing TM to help us frame effective and implementable recommendations specifically related to JPME-II. In Chapter Eight, we propose

some ideas that affect broader TM considerations, but this is not the main focus of our research. Therefore, these proposals must be examined further for their effects on TM and other interests if DoD has interest in pursuing them.

Finally, our quantitative analysis of officers and their JDAL assignments is limited by the data available to us. As we note in Chapter Two, data from some of the available sources are incomplete for various reasons, including differential application of data standards across commands and security classification of certain groups of positions. Because we rely on these analyses primarily to explore general trends and to complement other sources of information, these data limitations do not, in our view, undermine the value of the analyses.

Organization of This Report

In Chapter Two, we provide more-detailed background on several of the topics that we introduced in this chapter, including the delivery of JPME-II, how JDAL assignments are filled, policy that governs joint officer development, and additional historical context for the recent shift in emphasis for TM and JPME. In Chapter Three, we present a notional TM-JPME Interface Model that provides a framework for the analysis described in Chapters Four through Six. Chapter Three also raises some fundamental questions about TM and JPME and presents data on the JPME-II completion status of currently serving JDAL officers.

The following three chapters present analysis for the four study questions. In Chapter Four, we present analysis of the practices of the joint educational institutions in implementing OBME. We examine how joint stakeholders manage and measure performance in JDAL positions in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six, we consider the challenges that arise at the intersection of TM and JPME, all of which have the potential to constrain (or in some cases enable) implementation strategies for OBME in JPME-II.

In Chapter Seven, we summarize key findings from the preceding three chapters and lead into the presentation of recommendations in Chapter Eight; these recommendations are focused on the feedback

processes needed to implement OBME and other actions that can sustain the implementation of OBME for JPME-II.

The appendixes provide supporting details. In Appendix A, we reproduce the definitions of the six JLAs. We explain the methods used to collect and analyze the interview data, including the interview protocols, in Appendix B. In Appendix C, we give details of the data sources and methods used to analyze personnel and position information, along with detailed analyses of these sources that complement the higher-level findings that are presented in the main body of the report. In Appendix D, we summarize the mission statements of relevant joint educational institutions. Finally, in Appendix E, we provide detailed options to support one of the important recommendations in Chapter Eight: specifically, enhancing relationships among stakeholders in the TM-JPME enterprise.

Foundations and Changes in Joint Officer Development

Although one of our primary research tasks was to support the Joint Staff in refining and implementing OBME, we learned from our initial literature review and interviews that implementing OBME is inextricably linked to TM and JPME and vice versa. Successfully transitioning to OBME requires that any changes to TM and JPME processes result in corresponding alterations in expectations for or measurement of outcomes. This interconnectedness among OBME, TM, and JPME is a consistent theme throughout this report and is reflected in our notional TM-JPME Interface Model, as presented in Chapter Three. Before we turn to discussion of the model, we describe the foundational elements of joint officer development in this chapter. We also provide historical context that motivated interest in developing more-integrated TM and JPME processes.

Joint Educational Institutions

JPME-II Delivery

JPME-II is delivered through the four service war colleges and five National Defense University (NDU) institutions.¹ Their programs that grant JPME-II certification offer a breadth of options to the JPME

¹ The Army has JPME-II offerings at two locations—one at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania and another at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

enterprise. For the purposes of this report, we focus solely on NDU's schools that offer JPME-II credit.

NDU has two schools at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) and four other institutions that provide JPME-II credit. A list of these institutions, the delivery format of JPME-II courses, and the number of military graduates from academic year 2020–2021 is contained in Table 2.1. The respective mission statement for each institution is provided in Appendix D. Except for the Joint and Combined Warfighter School (JCWS), all programs are 10-month residence programs. JCWS has three options: a 10-week residence course, a 10-week satellite course, and a 40-week hybrid course that includes three weeks in residence. JCWS provides four satellite courses each year to the CCMDs. Each CCMD is visited once every two years. The hybrid course is primarily aimed at providing a flexible option for Reserve Component officers. This option includes “approximately 252 hours of Web-based collaborative distance learning (DL), research and writing for publication . . . [and] 136 hours of face-to-face time in two temporary duty assignments to JFSC.”²

Although all schools provide JPME-II credit, each school has a particular emphasis that might best position its graduates for certain assignments.³ For example, College of Information and Cyberspace (CIC) students would theoretically be most effective in positions focused on cyberspace, such as at U.S. Cyber Command, in the J-6 directorates (command, control, communications, or computers/cyber) on the Joint Staff or CCMDs. Although not every CIC graduate should go into a cyber-oriented position, enough of them should so that there is a logical alignment between school and position. We discuss this alignment issue in later sections.

Civilian Education Options in Conjunction with JPME-II

In addition to attending JPME-II institutions, some service members receive fellowships to complete graduate-level civilian education pro-

² Joint Forces Staff College, “Joint Combined and Warfighting School - Hybrid (JCWS-H), Overview,” webpage, undated-a.

³ See Appendix D for detail on each NDU college's mission statement.

Table 2.1
JPME-II Granting Programs Within National Defense University

JPME-II Program	Delivery Format	Students per Year		
		U.S. Military	Other Students	Total
National War College (NWC)	Resident	118	92	210
CIC	Resident	19	22	41
Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (ES)	Resident	159	124	283
College of International Security Affairs (CISA)	Resident	14	41	55
JFSC				
JCWS	In-person, satellite, hybrid	866	55	921
Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)	Resident	29	14	43
Total, NDU		1,205	348	1,553

SOURCE: Table summarized from an October 2020 report that was provided by Joint Staff J-7 to our team. The total number of military students (both active and reserve components) and other students is for academic year 2020–2021.

NOTE: Other students include Coast Guard service members, international officers, and DoD, interagency, industry, and international civilians.

grams. Because these civilian programs have not been certified for joint education purposes (i.e., to grant a JPME-II degree), attendees must also complete JPME-II separately. These civilian programs can satisfy senior-level education requirements and are often attended by high-performing officers.⁴ Furthermore, DoD has begun to develop specialized programs that combine the broadening benefits of a civil-

⁴ Kimberly Jackson, Katherine L. Kidder, Sean Mann, William H. Waggy II, Natasha Lander, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4347-OSD, 2020. 1

ian education with a tailored military focus. One example is the Strategic Thinkers Program, a relatively new program designed to further develop officers who demonstrate a high level of strategic understanding. The *JCS Vision* clarifies the need for this type of specialization and desired types of joint outcomes:

A select number of the students in our PME programs will demonstrate the potential to be more than applied strategists; they will also have the skills to creatively design holistic and integrated political-military and cross-domain strategies or develop new doctrinal concepts. Consequently, we must create and preserve opportunities in our curricula for specialization. We must identify those potential strategists and tailor programs for them to develop their thinking and contributions.⁵

In the Strategic Thinkers Program, individuals demonstrating “strategic talent” are identified, developed, and tracked by the services. Although the services still retain control of these individuals, the expectation is that they will fill strategic positions in OSD, the Joint Staff, CCMDs and other four-star headquarters, the Department of State, and other federal agencies on graduation. It is the responsibility of these receiving organizations to identify positions that have a requirement for strategic thinking and would benefit from individuals with strong skills in this area.

The Strategic Thinkers Program is offered at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies for up to 12 individuals, in grade O-4 and above, each year. An interview with OSD revealed that the office had a desire to keep the program small and a willingness to forgo reaching class capacity if not all applicants meet the requirements of the rigorous application and selection process. Additionally, the Army Research Institute has conducted and is continuing to provide annual assessments of program outcomes. Although it does not yet confer JPME-II credit, DoD officials are exploring options to achieve program certification (which will require statutory changes). Although the program is only in its second

⁵ JCS, 2020a, pp. 9–10.

year, the Strategic Thinkers Program might serve as a generalizable model for refining other JPME-II programs.

Validating and Filling Joint Duty Assignments

Joint Duty Assignments Overview

Joint duty assignments are positions that provide significant experience in joint matters. Standard joint duty assignments (SJDA) are listed on the JDAL, a Secretary of Defense–approved compilation of positions that is maintained and validated by the Joint Staff.⁶ Each JDAL position must undergo a revalidation process every five years “to ensure joint positions continue to meet the joint matters definition standards.”⁷ The Joint Staff J-1 holds at least one JDAL Validation Board each year for some portion of the existing JDAL positions, and it considers new positions for validation as they are nominated by the joint community.

For an individual to receive joint duty credit, they must serve in an SJDA for at least 24 months. Alternatively, officers can receive joint credit for Experience-Based Joint Duty Assignments—assignments that are less than the 24-month minimum or an assignment not on the JDAL—which the board has determined confers knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint matters. For this report, we focus on SJDA positions in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the CCMDs.

Filling Joint Assignments

Per GNA and a range of policy directives, the services are required to follow specific requirements when filling joint assignments. First, promotion to O-7 requires that a service member be joint officer–qualified (Level III), which entails the Secretary of Defense’s approval of the individual’s joint education and experience accomplishments. Furthermore, 50 percent (plus one) of the JPME-II graduates from any NDU

⁶ CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020.

⁷ CJCSI 1330.05B, *Joint Officer Management Program Procedures*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 6, 2020, p. D-6.

institution (but not senior service schools) are required to be assigned immediately to a JDAL position. For the JAWS program, all graduates are directly placed into an immediate joint assignment, though there are rare exceptions.⁸ However, these requirements do not change the fact that the joint consumers are still mostly subject to the services' assignment policies. This tension between the services and joint stakeholders will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

Beyond legal and policy requirements, joint positions generally have various prerequisites, including job skill, rank, education, and certain experiences. Joint positions also might require that officers be from a certain service for a position. Some prerequisites might be mandatory, while others might just be desired. Position owners must be careful not to overspecify prerequisites and risk a position being left unfilled or underspecify prerequisites and risk receiving an unqualified officer. Additional analysis on how prerequisites are specified is detailed in Chapter Five.

Motivation for More-Integrated Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Processes

The passage of GNA established the basic parameters for how JPME and JOM programs and processes (and their associated criteria) define, track, and designate joint officers. In the nearly 40 years since GNA's implementation, many DoD entities, independent analytical organizations, and congressional committees have conducted research on and assessments of how well this legislation has achieved its goals. A prior RAND report examined the findings from this past body of research, which we summarize as follows:⁹

⁸ Per CJCSI 1801.01E, *National Defense University Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 20, 2019, p. D-2, "JAWS military graduates are subject to being direct placed in designated Joint Duty Assignment List positions upon graduation."

⁹ Paul W. Mayberry, William H. Waggy II, and Anthony Lawrence, *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trends*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3105-OSD, 2019.

- A tension exists between the needs of the services and the joint community for officer education, assignments, and career progression. Joint commitments, for example, can be viewed as detrimental to an officer's career, while service-specific education and assignments are often perceived to be more valuable to promotion. Officers are increasingly challenged to complete required JPME, which is even more difficult when faced with continuous operational requirements.
- Nothing in law or policy specifies the sequencing of JPME-II and a joint duty assignment. That being said, in 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced his perspective on this topic, he was "convinced that the benefits of completing JPME-II prior to a joint duty assignment are a force multiplier for the services and the gaining joint organization."¹⁰ As we will explore later in this report, officers are frequently assigned to joint positions without completing appropriate joint educational coursework in advance, in spite of the chairman's stated position.
- Because JPME-II does not always precede joint assignments, officers might lack certain critical abilities necessary to perform their jobs effectively.¹¹ Some operational joint commanders reportedly consider their joint officers lacking in certain critical abilities (e.g., ability to synthesize volumes of complex material into concise senior-level recommendations) that are necessary to perform their jobs effectively. A lack of critical skills results in not only lower performance but also increased time and resources needed for an officer to complete JPME-II during the joint tour assignment—both of which are costly to CCMD commanders.

¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 1081-10, *Joint Qualified Officer (Level III) Requirements*, June 8, 2010, p. 1.

¹¹ In Kirby et al., 2006, the authors offer one of the most comprehensive reports on joint officers and their workload, supervision, preparations, and perceptions. In this census survey, almost 92 percent of officers in JDAL positions reported that "JPME-II is required or desired for the assignment" (Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Al Crego, Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, Kimberly Curry Hall, and Michael S. Tseng, *Who Is "Joint"? New Evidence from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Survey*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-349-OSD, 2006, p. 88).

Joint Professional Military Education Changes

In light of such findings, DoD has continued to reform and refine its JPME-II offerings through both policy and legislative changes. For example, DoD expanded the designated institutions that are eligible to provide JPME-II instruction and confer graduation status and created options for JPME-II curriculum to be completed at satellite locations or via distance learning. Other changes have strengthened individual incentives to invest in one's own education by offering accredited master's degrees for JPME-II completion at all senior joint schools and senior service schools.

Joint Officer Management Changes

Policy changes have also allowed greater flexibility in matching officers to follow-on joint assignments while managing individual career paths and service-specific requirements. A revised joint qualification system was implemented in 2010 that emphasizes joint experience as a pathway to joint qualification by giving credit for operational assignments that satisfy the criteria for "joint matters."

After extensive coordination among affected stakeholders, OSD implemented a host of changes to JOM procedures in a 2018 policy update.¹² These changes lessened joint requirements and shifted emphasis away from joint considerations and imperatives to greater service and individual officer prerogatives. The changes included reducing the duration of JDAL assignments needed to achieve joint duty credit (from 36 to 24 months, with a similar reduction for joint qualification system points), removing the specification for joint education to precede joint assignment, and eliminating congressional reports of promotion rate comparisons.¹³

¹² DoDI 1300.19, 2018.

¹³ An original GNA provision established statutory benchmarks to compare officers serving on the Joint Staff with similar officers serving in their respective service headquarter staffs. The requirement was extended by DoD policy to include OSD staff. The benchmarks required within-service comparisons for these officer groups in terms of promotion rates. Results were reported to Congress annually. At the prompting of the services through the DoD legislative review process, OSD requested and received legislative authorization to forgo annual congressional reporting of promotion rate comparisons.

These changes reinforce the services' predominant influence in refining and prioritizing significant aspects of JOM policies and procedures within their respective TM programs. Other RAND research confirms that the services place a relatively low emphasis on the value of joint experiences for developing their officers for promotion to general and flag officer.¹⁴ Although adjustments to the services' officer development processes can and do occur, the institutional traditions and cultures of each service are strong and slow to evolve.

Greater Emphasis on Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Across the Services

Despite the independent changes to TM and JPME policies within the services, the Joint Staff, and OSD, all appreciate the need and have stressed the importance of better integrating and aligning the tenets of both systems. The strongest statements and guidance have been provided by the eight generals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Achieving our leader development aim requires a new trajectory for our professional military education that must include associated talent management systems. Our vision is for a fully aligned PME and talent management system that identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically minded, critically thinking, and creative joint warfighters skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal military power.¹⁵

Similarly, each of the services has undertaken the following exploratory efforts to better coordinate and associate TM and JPME:

- The Army created an O-8-led Army Talent Management Task Force that implements a variety of initiatives, such as more-flexible career paths, a market-style assignments system that accounts for officer preferences, commander assessment programs, and creation of an academic evaluation report.¹⁶

¹⁴ Jackson et al., 2020.

¹⁵ JCS, 2020a, p. 2.

¹⁶ U.S. Army, "Talent Management," webpage, undated.

- The Navy developed an Education for Seapower strategy and proposed several related initiatives.¹⁷ It also revised officer fitness reports to incorporate a separate category for learning achievements; this category is intended to rely on education as a criterion for career advancement.¹⁸
- The Air Force emphasized General David Goldfein’s second of three initial focus areas on his assumption of the role of Chief of Staff of the Air Force, “strengthening joint leaders and teams” by expanding joint development to both officers and enlisted corps and integrating and optimizing all components and capabilities in the conduct or leading of joint task forces for joint campaigns.¹⁹
- The Marine Corps released the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance* in 2019; it heavily emphasized the need to adjust TM practices and place greater weight on education, among other personnel-centric priorities.²⁰

Because of the services’ dominant roles in balancing their needs and interests for (1) officer assignments and development for their respective warfare areas, (2) similar and increasing manpower demands in the joint community, and (3) individual preferences expressed by officers, these independent service initiatives highlight shortfalls and difficulties in the critical interaction between TM and JPME. The services’ actions and initiatives could hold promise to meet challenges and demands experienced in the joint arena, as we will explore later in this report.

¹⁷ At the time of writing, the status of the Education for Seapower program was unclear. See, for example, Sam LaGrone, “Navy ‘Education for Seapower’ Program Under Review by New SECNAV,” *USNI News*, June 29, 2020.

¹⁸ J. D. Simkins, “Higher Education Just Became a Much Bigger Factor on NAVY FITREPs,” *Navy Times*, May 8, 2020; Department of the Navy, *Education for Seapower*, Washington, D.C., December 2018; and Richard V. Spencer, “Education for Seapower Decisions and Immediate Actions,” memorandum, Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Navy, February 5, 2019.

¹⁹ Defense Media Activity, “Commander’s Call Topics,” Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, September 22, 2016.

²⁰ David H. Berger, *Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps*, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2019.

The Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Enterprise

As we began our research, we were unable to find a holistic representation of an enterprise model that represented the interface between TM and JPME. The respective TM and JPME entities often are portrayed independently but are not depicted in a way that reflects their interface. To fill this gap, we developed a framework highlighting the interplay between the two entities—one that represents, in as simple a way as possible, the intricacies among stakeholders' interactions and charts how the inputs and outputs of these interactions affect current and future joint performance of both individuals and organizations.

In this chapter, we begin by detailing the policy and participants involved in joint officer development. Next, we describe a notional TM-JPME Interface Model that we developed to simply and visually frame this enterprise. We use this model in subsequent chapters to guide our analysis and frame our findings. The model is not intended to be inclusive or to reflect every process; instead, it is a notional presentation of the two processes that also captures aspirational aspects of the *JCS Vision*.

Using this notional model in conjunction with our literature review, interviews, and data analysis, we identified a set of persistent and fundamental concerns. These overarching concerns reflect issues that have implications for interpreting our research findings, so we highlight them here. Finally, we present a snapshot of officers currently serving in JDAL assignments to discern outcomes associated with a contemporary cycle of the TM-JPME enterprise.

Policy and Participants in Joint Officer Development

The *JCS Vision* notes that “the development of leaders requires an enterprise-wide and holistic approach.”¹ Indeed, an integrated officer development approach is contingent on a foundation of relevant policies for the respective stakeholders across the joint enterprise and necessarily relies on the participation and oversight of a multitude of stakeholders.

Joint officer development has historically been bifurcated into JPME and JOM. This distinction is reflected generally in the separation of policy and more specifically in terms of organizational oversight for both OSD and the Joint Staff.²

The officer development enterprise is composed of three predominant institutional participants: joint stakeholders,³ joint educational institutions,⁴ and the military services, all of which operate from strong foundations of defining and guiding policies. Each of these players have distinct roles and valuable contributions to make in the development of joint officers. The interplay between these participants is complex and the outcomes are interdependent. As the *JCS Vision* explains,

Our collective talent management enterprise, based on individual service personnel processes, must likewise continuously assess, adapt, and innovate. The positive benefits of adaptation and

¹ JCS, 2020a, p. 4.

² OSD does not have an overarching military education DoDI (a working draft has been prepared but not approved, but the DoDI for joint officer management covers some aspects of military education); Joint Staff J-7 has published CJCSI 1800.01F. For JOM policy, OSD has DoDI 1300.19, 2018. Joint Staff J-1 has published CJCSI 1330.05B, *Joint Officer Management Program Procedures*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 6, 2020. Regarding organizational oversight, OSD has two separate offices: OSD (Personnel and Readiness/Force Education and Training) for JPME and OSD (Personnel and Readiness/Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management) for JOM; the Joint Staff has two separate directorates: J-7 for JPME and J-1 for JOM.

³ For the purposes of this study and as is explained in a later section, joint stakeholders are limited to the CCMDS, Joint Staff, and OSD.

⁴ For the purposes of this report, and as is explained in a later section, joint educational institutions are limited to the colleges of NDU.

innovation in our PME enterprise are suboptimized if we do not wisely identify and nurture the development of the human talent in the Joint Force.⁵

The final contributor to the joint officer development enterprise is the individual officer—the ultimate factor in determining the efficacy of outcomes sought by policies and procedures as implemented by all stakeholders. Officers and their families generally have a “vote” in how their career proceeds, a vote that is based on their perceptions of the benefits and risks associated with future opportunities.


Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Interface Model

Our notional TM-JPME Interface Model primarily reflects the foundational OSD and Joint Staff policies. The notional concepts of the model are refined and derived based on interviews with service assignment and detailing offices and our professional knowledge of the service and joint processes developed through years of analytical experience. As we created preliminary concepts of the key steps and relationships within the TM-JPME enterprise, we solicited feedback from experts in the joint force development community, policymakers responsible for military education and officer management, and former defense officials and joint leaders. Using the feedback from these interactions, we shaped, tested, and refined our model.

The final model, as shown in Figure 3.1, depicts current relationships among the various entities and the aspirations that are detailed in the JCS vision. In other words, not all of the connections depicted in the notional model exist, but they reflect linkages, processes, and expectations that we believe are essential for preparing officers to successfully deliver joint outcomes that are dictated by OBME. As will be discussed later, such missing connections include improving the measurement of joint educational performance to influence joint assign-

⁵ JCS, 2020a, p. 6.

Figure 3.1
Interface of TM and JPME for Joint Leadership Development



NOTE: The blue boxes indicate service functions, the purple boxes represent joint elements, and the blended boxes reflect areas where service and joint functions overlap.

ments and providing feedback from on-the-job performance to inform service talent management mechanisms and the curriculum taught at joint educational institutions.

Before discussing the model, we note that there are a number of federal laws that guide and constrain how OSD and the military departments manage, promote, and educate officers—for both the individual services and the joint community. Such laws include comprehensive statutes, such as the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, the GNA, U.S. Code Title 10’s section on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Program of Instruction, and specific provisions within

annual National Defense Authorization Acts.⁶ These statutes are further codified in cascading levels of OSD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and instructions and are supplemented by policy guidance issued by the respective military departments.

DoD often seeks changes to TM and JPME statutes that it does not have the jurisdiction to sufficiently effect through policy that falls within DoD's authority. Each year, DoD conducts a legislative review cycle that results in requests that Congress consider as select issues for statutory revision. Although such revisions are possible, the process required to receive approval to revise federal laws is complex and time-consuming; processes to change OSD or service policies and service or joint instructions are similarly challenging. For our study, we considered the laws and guiding principles of the TM-JPME Interface Model as relevant input and generally fixed, but we recognize that, in reality, these laws and principles can be changed if sufficient justification and prioritization can be established.

We now describe the elements of the TM-JPME Interface Model and follow with connections and implications that are the most relevant to this report.

Service and Joint Warfighting Context

The primary context for the application of the TM-JPME Interface Model, as an overall model for joint leadership development, must be specified. In the context of this report, the ultimate goal is to prepare officers for warfighting (the full range of military operations), from both the perspective of the services and the joint force. The full range of actual military operations becomes the best proving ground for leadership development conceptions and requirements. Although lessons learned from all military operations certainly feed into leadership development, the more standard and traditional approach is to engage the services and joint communities and then infer the necessary requirements. As such engagements are conducted (including this report), we must always realize that the context and purpose of lead-

⁶ Public Law 96-513, Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, December 12, 1980; Pub. L. 99-433; and 10 U.S.C. § 2155.

ership development is to properly prepare officers for the full range of their military responsibilities, both service and joint. The primary goal cannot—and should not—be to simply develop officers for their next job or to help them become more-effective staff officers. Successfully executing the full range of service and joint military operations is the preeminent and driving objective for leadership development. The remainder of this report will focus on and characterize this goal from the joint perspective, which is joint military operations.

Current Officer Inventory

The current officer inventory serves as the starting point for the talent management processes, which are owned by the service personnel organizations. As noted in Chapter Two, TM processes operate somewhat independently of JPME programs and are even managed by separate organizations within the services, OSD, and the Joint Staff. These TM processes influence all of the remaining elements of the model, either as direct or indirect inflows or outputs. This high degree of interconnectedness within talent management and the entire TM-JPME enterprise highlights a key theme that will be discussed throughout this report: Service TM has significant leverage on how joint assignments are filled.

The *JCS Vision* explains that “service talent management systems must provide officers opportunities to refine their existing knowledge and develop increasingly agile intellectual skills.”⁷ Within our model, TM ensures that officers receive these opportunities through both experiences and education, as shown by the green arrows that depict career path and educational progression in Figure 3.1. Overall, the service TM systems ensure that these progressions and linkages are adequately specified, serve as drivers to scope and frame other key elements of the system, and ensure that personnel resources are properly allocated and sufficiently prepared to accomplish the respective missions for organizations to which individuals are assigned.

In a larger sense, service assignment officers and career managers are responsible for matching individuals to assignments (represented

⁷ JCS, 2020a, pp. 4–5.

by the two dashed vertical and horizontal boxes, respectively). These assignment teams compare position descriptions and prerequisites with an individual's experience and education to guide the team's decisions in matching officers to positions. As a basis for continuous process improvement, the expectation is that the service TM processes benefit from feedback from multiple sources relative to the quality and performance of the service members assigned.

Position Description and Prerequisites

Position descriptions must be generated by position owners in sufficient detail to reflect their fundamental requirements (preferably in terms of performance outcomes) for accomplishing joint military operations. However, current prerequisites reflect the types and numbers of specific skills (expressed more in terms of experiences than education) needed by organizations and operationalized through their position structure. The position description specification serves as the demand function to initiate the service TM processes and, accordingly, serves as the primary driver to both the experiential and educational systems.

Understandably, the *JCS Vision* does not provide much specificity on position prerequisites. However, throughout the document, senior leaders stress the need for officers to be strategic, critical thinkers, and creative. Such general characteristics do not provide sufficient guidance to the services. Therefore, it is a fundamental responsibility of joint organizations to conduct the necessary mission analysis and adequately specify personnel requirements for their organization so that the services can deliver against clear specifications. Otherwise, if this element is missing, the TM process breaks down.

Experience

Experience is gained throughout an officer's career and entails the accumulated training, exercises, deployments, and proficiencies achieved across all assignments. Although education is also part of one's career path, we highlight it separately. The experiences of individual officers follow general and very broad templates within their chosen career field. To be successful and advance in rank, individuals must successfully perform certain types of assignments. The determination of

such pivotal assignments to achieve successfully service and joint mission outcomes reflects decisionmakers' analysis of qualities across all position descriptions and requisitions. Such general career paths are designed, implemented, and tracked by the service TM systems and are refined over time based on feedback related to ultimate career advancement and mission accomplishment. It follows that officers' experiences are a key consideration in determining their future assignments.

Education

Education entails career-long learning that is achieved through service and joint PME schools and programs at civilian institutions. Self-initiated study is also a component of an officer's continued education. Specification of educational paths and progressions is detailed by the service TM processes, which are based on leadership development requirements that have been honed over time with receiving organizations and educational institutions. An officer's success in academics should play a prominent role in determining the match of their educational credentials with the educational prerequisites needed by open assignments. The collective content presented by educational institutions is determined by the assessment and assimilation of (1) qualities needed to successfully perform joint mission requirements and become joint leaders, (2) prerequisites specified across all position descriptions, and (3) an iterative process of constantly reviewing the performance of graduates in assignments.

Officer-Position Match

Even if the prior elements of the TM-JPME Interface Model have been properly specified and executed, the matching of individual qualities to open assignment requirements still involves a complex calculus. It is at this critical intersection within the TM-JPME enterprise that the *JCS Vision* speaks so forcefully about requiring greater attention, enhanced collaboration, and improved outcomes. All interviewees acknowledge that the services own the TM dynamic of this intersection and that they face complex challenges in balancing multiple and competing criteria when generating assignment solutions. Accordingly, the *JCS*

Vision offers a number of aspirations for desired end states in joint talent management and the JPME learning continuum.

Although the ultimate solution might seek an ideal alignment of needed skills with individual characteristics, it is evident that a considerable portion of match recommendations involve administrative considerations. An example might be the joint organization's desire to have face-to-face turnover without a gap in coverage. Such an outcome requires coordination of schedules for the arriving and departing joint officers, to the point that this objective could override the formality of a "best" match. Again, this example reflects the art as well as the science associated with the task of matching officers and open assignments.

Joint Assignment Performance

As specific officers are selected for and report to joint organizations, it is essential to assess and aggregate their performance to provide meaningful feedback to evaluate and improve the TM-JPME enterprise. Such summative feedback needs to be tailored to the recipient because the service TM systems and joint educational institutions need different evidence and levels of detail to assess and refine their respective processes.

Performance by an officer in a specific joint position is assessed through the services' standard performance review systems and forms: officer evaluation reports, fitness reports, and officer performance reports. These individual evaluation systems are tailored for service purposes and do not necessarily measure the joint aspects of an officer's performance in a joint duty role. Although such individual data can be combined and summarized, the need for aggregate programmatic indicators that can be used for process evaluation purposes remains. Specifically, systematic joint performance feedback needs to be collected along dimensions and factors that are relevant to the service TM processes and to the joint educational institutions. Nonspecific, informal, or inconsistent feedback is not sufficient.

Future Officer Inventory

The TM-JPME Interface Model culminates in a future officer inventory when information from an individual's joint assignment is added

to their record for future TM-JPME considerations. Such information will influence the assignments and promotions that shape an officer's prospective career.

In conclusion, we believe that the TM-JPME Interface Model provides a comprehensive framework in which to visualize the complexity associated with the overall enterprise, facilitates understanding of the individual components and their interrelationships, and serves as a guide for addressing the questions outlined in our study objectives.


Snapshot of Currently Serving Joint Officers

Even though the TM-JPME Interface Model offers a visualization of its respective components, it does not change the fact that the process is complex. Perhaps a simpler way of visualizing the process is to look at the outputs that the model produces via a snapshot of officers serving in JDAL assignments as of this writing; we display these data in Figure 3.2. The figure captures the 3,035 officers in the grades of O-5 and O-6 who are serving in approved joint assignments in OSD, the Joint Staff, and CCMDs as of January 2020. These numbers do not reflect class size or production capacity for the respective JPME-II programs but simply represent the officers who were the product of the current TM-JPME enterprise processes, policies, and decisions.

As of January 2020, the TM-JPME enterprise yielded and placed 1,439 joint officers who have completed a JPME-II program, or 47 percent of those in JDAL assignments. Fifty-three percent of officers in JDAL assignments have not graduated from a JPME-II program. Officers could have completed their JPME-II education prior to the assignment or during their current assignment (this will be shown in Chapter Six). Some of the nongraduates could also be enrolled in programs while serving in their current assignment, but our data do not have sufficient fidelity to make this determination.

Of the 1,439 officers serving who have JPME-II designations, 18 percent attended service senior colleges; the remaining 82 percent attended joint colleges. Of those serving officers who attended joint college JPME-II, 69 percent were graduates of JCWS in one form of

Figure 3.2
TM-JPME Interface Outcomes for Staffing of JDAL Positions, as of January 2020



SOURCE: O5 and O6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, from the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) and the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (FMTS); these data exclude classified position descriptions and any positions that have not been filled by services since January 2000.

its multiple educational options. The remaining 31 percent of JPME-II graduates from joint programs participated in programs at one of the five joint colleges under NDU. Appendix C contains additional details about this sample of officers, including detailed breakouts of the assignments of JPME-II graduates and the data sources used.

Fundamental and Persistent Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Concerns

The TM-JPME Interface Model provides a useful way to connect the central processes for executing TM and JPME across the services and a framework for analyzing the questions addressed in this research effort. But our literature review, data analysis, and interviews repeatedly identified different points of view on the fundamental goals and purposes

of TM and JPME. In the context of our study, these differences understandably arise from the complexity and diversity of JPME-II offerings, the differences among service TM approaches, and the variety of opinions for what officers need to know and be able to do in joint assignments. Nonetheless, these concerns run throughout our analysis.

The following four fundamental concerns were raised frequently during the course of our research:

- **Intent:** What is the purpose of JPME? Should it focus specifically on preparation for an officer's next joint assignment or orient toward continual development processes for future leaders?
- **Audience magnitude:** Who should JPME serve? Should it address all officers, specific skills or functional areas, or only individuals considered to have high potential?
- **Scope of content:** Should JPME focus on general or tailored education? Do all students in all joint assignments need the same type, level, and duration of joint education?
- **Risk tolerance:** What should be the justification and drivers for change? Should they be maintaining the status quo, investing for program extension or improved effectiveness, or pressing for system efficiency? How are programmatic outcomes of joint education assessed and prioritized against current and future probability states?

These overarching issues have significant implications for all elements of JPME and TM discussed in this report. Using the model of Figure 3.1 as a guiding structure, the next three chapters present our analyses along the lines of the four study questions. We then summarize the main findings of the study and return to these four fundamental concerns in Chapter Seven.


The Evolving Practices of Joint Educational Institutions in Outcomes-Based Military Education

As we explained in Chapter One, the *JCS Vision* calls for a transition to OBME as a core strategy in making JPME responsive to modern warfighting needs. In this chapter, we review best practices for successfully implementing OBME and examine how the joint educational institutions are positioning themselves to implement such practices. Joint education, as illustrated by the red circle overlaying the lower part of the TM-JPME Interface Model in Figure 4.1, is one of several key inputs to the officer-position matching process. However, educational institutions do not operate independently. As the arrows pointing toward the education box illustrate, the content of curricula and other aspects of the education process are informed by position descriptions and prerequisites (which define the educational requirements) as well as the feedback obtained from assessments of officer performance in assignments. The topics covered here correspond to the first study question.

Best Practices for Implementing Outcomes-Based Military Education

Implementing OBME is challenging because it requires broad consensus from multiple stakeholders and frequent evaluation (both of students and the program more generally) and is a significant depart-

Figure 4.1
The Role of Joint Education in the TM-JPME Interface Model



NOTE: The blue boxes indicate service functions, the purple boxes represent joint elements, and the blended boxes reflect areas where service and joint functions overlap.

ture from traditional education systems. The largest and arguably most well-known examples of OBE reforms have generally occurred in K–12 education, although similar reforms have recently attracted interest in higher education. Australia and South Africa implemented outcomes-based education approaches in K–12 education to varying degrees during the 1990s.¹

In the United States, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the 2002 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,

¹ Kevin Donnelly, "Australia's Adoption of Outcomes Based Education: A Critique," *Issues in Educational Research*, Vol. 17, 2007; and N. Mouton, G. P. Louw, and G. L. Strydom, "A Historical Analysis of the Post-Apartheid Dispensation Education in South Africa (1994–2011)," *International Business and Economics Research Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 11, 2012.

increased federal oversight in school accountability and student assessment. As a result of the act, students were tested in third grade, eighth grade, and one grade in high school to ensure that schools were meeting student achievement targets. NCLB was largely replaced in 2015 with the Every Student Succeeds Act after it was clear that many students were not succeeding under NCLB.² Although NCLB did not mark a full transition to an OBE system, greater emphasis was placed on student achievement, assessment, and accountability—all of which are important facets of OBE.

William Spady wrote a seminal work in the field of OBE, and many of the above reforms reference principles described in that book.³ Since Spady published his 1994 book, the field and literature have evolved; recently, the notion of competency-based education is seen much more frequently than OBE. Although the two terms are not equivalent, they share many of the same guiding principles.

We reviewed more-recent works, including one RAND study, that derived guiding principles for these types of education reforms that were specifically applied to higher education settings.⁴ That study drew on a number of guidebooks and papers with design principles that were oriented to higher education.⁵ From this review of the literature, we derived four best practices that are necessary to implement an OBME system. These practices are listed and illustrated in Table 4.1,

² Alyson Klein, “No Child Left Behind: An Overview,” *Education Week*, April 10, 2015.

³ Spady, 1994.

⁴ Lindsay Daugherty, Van Davis, and Trey Miller, *Competency-Based Education Programs in Texas: An Innovative Approach to Higher Education*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1239-CFAT, 2015..

⁵ The most notable references are Allison C. Bell, “What Is Competency-Based Education?” Washington, D.C.: HCM Strategists, September 2013; David A. Bergeron, *A Path Forward: Game-Changing Reforms in Higher Education and the Implications for Business and Financing Models*, Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, December 2013; Sally M. Johnstone and Louis Soares, “Principles for Developing Competency-Based Education Programs,” *Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2014; and Bonnie Ordonez, “Perspectives in AE—Competency-Based Education: Changing the Traditional College Degree Power, Policy, and Practice,” *New Horizons in Adult Education and Human Resource Development*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2014.

following the diagram summarizing the practices (shown earlier in Figure 1.1).

As Table 4.1 shows, first, leaders must define outcomes that are clear and actionable. Community members—in our case, the administrators and faculty at educational institutions, officers (the students), and, especially, joint organizations (the employers)—should help define these outcomes to ensure that outcomes represent the desired achievements for graduates. These outcomes should guide the framework of learning—that is, curriculum development, learning activities, and assessments. In particular, OBE calls for leveraging authentic assessments that are aligned to outcomes as the means of determining proficiency. Finally, OBE should incorporate sufficient flexibility, such as variations in content coverage, time allocations, and pacing, to ensure that all students are able to achieve the desired outcomes in view of their differences in learning styles, prior preparation, and speed of progression.

Joint Educational Institutions' Transition to Outcomes-Based Military Education

As mentioned earlier, the *JCS Vision* called for the transition to OBME. Since then, the OPMEP provided additional guidance on the transition to OBME, calling on educational institutions to focus curriculum and program learning outcomes (PLOs) around the JLAs.⁶ It also specified that JPME institutions should create a plan to assess learning against those PLOs. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing a reference manual for policies and procedures for the OPMEP. To contribute to our analysis, the Joint Staff provided us with a February 15, 2021, draft of this manual (which we will call the “draft OPMEP Reference Manual,” to be published as Chairman of

⁶ Our review of 10 U.S.C. § 2155, Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Program of Instruction, found that JPME-II requirements dictated by law are largely operational in nature versus strategic (despite the strategic intent of the provision). The six JLAs can also offer opportunities to better frame the curriculum content required of JPME-II from a more encompassing and strategic perspective.

Table 4.1
Best Practices to Implement OBE

Best Practice	Description
Define clear and actionable outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcomes involve “doing” rather than “knowing.” As a result, outcomes should use action words, such as “describe, explain, design, or produce” (Spady, 1994). • In a traditional education system, not all students are required to learn the same material (i.e., some students are tracked into different curriculum levels).
Solicit input from community members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Input from the full community—services, commands, educational institutions—on these outcomes will help ensure that they reflect the needs of the community and that they are manageable to implement.
Establish a clear framework of learning, including assessments aligned to outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organize and implement curriculum, activities, and assessments around this framework (the outcomes). • Determine proficiency using assessments that are aligned to outcomes.
Build flexibility into the outcomes-based system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flexibility allows for different learning speeds and styles. • Inevitably, outcomes and more-traditional aspects of education, such as time or curriculum, might conflict. When this happens, learning outcomes should take precedence over traditional aspects of education. • “What” and “whether” students learn material are more important than in a traditional education system, where “when” and “how” students learn are most important.

SOURCES: Spady, 1994; Daugherty, Davis, and Miller, 2015; Bell, 2013; Bergeron, 2013; Johnstone and Soares, 2014; and Ordonez, 2014.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 1800.01). The draft manual provides a six-milestone plan for educational institutions as they transition to OBME. This plan anticipates that it will take approximately six years before educational institutions can be certified under OBME.

In the following section, we describe how the draft OPMEP Reference Manual encourages activities that will reinforce these best practices and show examples of activities that educational institutions are doing or considering that appear consistent with sound OBME implementation. We also note areas in which OBME implementation might be challenging.

Educational Institutions Are Working to Define Measurable Outcomes and Linkages to Curriculum

Of our four best practices for OBME implementation, the draft OPMEP Reference Manual provides a large amount of guidance relating to the first and third practice (defining clear and actionable outcomes and establishing a clear framework of learning including assessments aligned to outcomes). Similarly, educational institutions already have been doing several activities relating to these two best practices that could help them implement OBME. In contrast, the draft OPMEP Reference Manual focuses less on the second and fourth best practices (soliciting input from community members and building flexibility into the outcomes-based system). In the remainder of this section, we provide examples for each best practice.

Regarding *defining clear and actionable outcomes*, the draft OPMEP Reference Manual devotes one of its six milestones to developing PLOs. The draft OPMEP Reference Manual specifies that the outcomes must be measurable and consider guidance from a variety of sources, including the JLAs, academic and accreditation requirements, and other policies (e.g., OPMEP). Since 2016, one NDU educational institution has encouraged faculty to consider similar principles in defining clear and actionable outcomes; specifically, to embrace the SMART framework, which encourages faculty to develop outcomes that, as the acronym would suggest, are “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-limited,” all of which are important characteristics to aid in creating outcomes on which the framework of learning can be based.⁷

The draft OPMEP Reference Manual and several NDU educational institutions have also made important inroads in *establishing a clear framework of learning, including assessments aligned to outcomes*. These practices include designing curricula, assessments, and other activities that are linked to desired outcomes. In particular, the draft OPMEP Reference Manual and several NDU educational institutions

⁷ NDU College of Information and Cyberspace, “Academic Program Assessment Handbook: Guidelines and Best Practices,” internal document provided to RAND authors, August 1, 2017.

recognize the importance of authentic assessments.⁸ Authentic assessments closely resemble the outcome in practice; unlike traditional examination (such as multiple choice or short answer examinations), authentic assessments are better positioned to measure how a student will perform an activity while on the job.⁹ Examples of authentic assessments include writing memos or presenting an oral analysis on a complex topic.¹⁰ In an interview, one leader at a joint educational institution explained that they have incorporated current events into their curriculum:

We also took advantage of some real-world activities in this past year: (1) in January after the strike on the Iranian general [Qassim] Soleimani, in which we debated the pros/cons of the strike in the classroom. . . . (2) We also used [coronavirus disease 2019] COVID-19 and talked about all the things [threats to national security] we could likely face because of it and asked [students] to write a paper talking about how COVID-19 could impact strategy in the next two to four years.

Additionally, one institution, in its faculty handbook, referred to the importance of mapping assessments to outcomes and not the other way around.¹¹ This might seem obvious; nonetheless, it is important to center the framework of learning on previously defined outcomes.

Although educational institutions are working to define measurable outcomes and have already incorporated several practices into their curricula that will lend themselves well to the transition to OBME, such as authentic assessments, the transition might still be difficult.

⁸ NDU College of Information and Cyberspace, 2017; JFSC, “JFSC TMRB: COAs, Recommendations, and Requirements,” internal document provided to RAND authors, June 16, 2020. This also refers to the forthcoming draft reference manual.

⁹ Grant Wiggins, “The Case for Authentic Assessment,” *Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation*, Vol. 2, November 1990, article 2; and Jan Herrington and Anthony Herrington, “Authentic Assessment and Multimedia: How University Students Respond to a Model of Authentic Assessment,” *Higher Education Research & Development*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1998.

¹⁰ Wiggins, 1990; and Indiana University Bloomington, Center for Innovative Teaching and Learning, “Authentic Assessment,” webpage, undated.

¹¹ NDU College of Information and Cyberspace, 2017

One leader at an educational institution believes that the transition is “one of the greatest challenges we confront” and that, among joint leaders, “there is still great uncertainty on what OBE means.” Continued focus on developing and implementing authentic assessments is critical to the successful implementation of OBME.

Some Educational Institutions Have Mechanisms in Place to Solicit Input from Community Members, but These Are Underdeveloped

The draft OPMEP Reference Manual specifies that PLOs should incorporate requirements, such as JLAs, academic and accreditation requirements, and legal requirements. By incorporating these requirements, educational institutions will partially *solicit feedback from community members*, but a concerted effort to incorporate other perspectives (i.e., student, alumni, employer) is also important because it ensures that all stakeholders have aligned views, increasing the likelihood of success in an OBME environment.

Some, but not all, NDU educational institutions have structured mechanisms in place (or want to develop them) to solicit feedback from joint stakeholders. In our interviews, we heard that several NDU educational institutions have mechanisms in place to solicit feedback from alumni or employers (e.g., combatant commands or OSD) or would like to incorporate them into their work. For example, in an interview with one leader at an NDU educational institution who described relevant experiences, the leader said,

Typically, I would take a small team with me . . . and we had a systematic way of doing this [conducting focus groups and meetings]. This is engagement at the combatant commands. I would meet with students enrolled in satellite programs, conduct focus groups with graduates, meet with leadership up to the deputy commander or chief of staff level. We had a list of questions that we would pose at all levels. I would get common feedback at every combatant command, and we built that feedback into the revised curriculum.

However, not all NDU educational institutions have mechanisms in place to solicit feedback. For example, one other leader at an NDU

educational institution said that the institution did not have a formal process in place but hoped to survey alumni and employers in the future. However, because DoD regulates and limits formal surveys of its members and commands, it could be challenging to obtain approval to conduct such surveys.

Joint stakeholders described some informal relationships with educational institutions in which they could discuss their educational priorities or offer feedback on how educational institutions could meet the performance needs of stakeholders. Many of these informal relationships seem to depend on specific leaders at commands and educational institutions establishing connections that can be used to carry on such conversations. Because these conversations are not systematic or consistent, educational institution leaders told us that the information conveyed was often too abstract to provide clear guidance for their curricula and teaching methods and frequently concerned only a specific command or career field. Many of the joint stakeholders whom we interviewed agreed that it was worthwhile to develop more systematic opportunities for stakeholders to communicate their needs to educational institutions.

Leaders of joint educational institutions told us that they valued stakeholder feedback and generally welcomed a more systematic approach to soliciting it. However, they also expressed a few concerns. Some leaders said that feedback might conflict with formal guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs (which they presumably consider more authoritative). In addition, different commands or organizations will have somewhat different needs, and the educational institutions might not have the ability to satisfy everyone's ideal preparation for graduates. Indeed, conflicts between demands from various organizations might make it difficult for educational institutions to make decisions about which competencies to emphasize.

OBME requires more-systematic efforts to solicit feedback that can inform an institution's educational programs and teaching meth-

ods.¹² Often, college or university institutional research offices play a strong role in developing and carrying out structured methods to obtain information about the performance of graduates after they graduate. From our interviews, we learned that such functions might be less developed at joint educational institutions than they would be at a typical civilian college or university. Because the success of OBME depends, in part, on maintaining such structured information collection for systematically assessing outcomes, this is a capability that appears to warrant increased attention in the future.

Joint Learning Areas Are Promising for Engagement Between Joint Stakeholders and Educational Institutions

Overall, our interviewees appreciated the comprehensive approach taken to develop the JLAs. Joint stakeholders generally viewed the JLAs as a suitable description of what is required to understand joint matters. They saw the JLAs as useful for describing joint work and tasks, framing expected joint outcomes, and facilitating more-focused feedback to services and educational institutions.

Joint stakeholders said an important reason that they were satisfied with the JLAs is that the JLAs are broad and comprehensive. As one interviewee said, “I think they’re broad enough [that] they capture what needs to be included. I think there’s room for anything in this.”

Several joint stakeholders said that, although different positions called for different emphasis across the JLAs, it would still be difficult to categorize positions systematically according to the JLAs they should emphasize. Several respondents made the point that some JLAs warrant development earlier in officers’ careers.

As we indicated previously, joint stakeholders and institutions alike agreed that they ought to have greater levels of interaction, espe-

¹² The Military Education Assessment Advisory Committee (MEAAC) conducted a study and developed interview protocols used in conducting JPME-II stakeholder focus groups. Such instruments, as detailed in the draft OPMEP Reference Manual, may be useful in this regard. Laura Barron was principal investigator for this work and published *Joint Qualified Officer Recommendations for Aligning JPME-II Outcomes with Joint Duty Assignments*, internal report provided to RAND authors, Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff J-7 Military Education Assessment Advisory Committee, Technical Report 20-01, May 15, 2020.

cially at lower organizational levels, and that the structure of JLAs could serve as a basis for these engagements. Joint educational institutions are working to link their learning outcomes to the JLAs. Therefore, we see the JLAs as a promising structure to organize feedback between joint stakeholders and educational institutions.

Incorporating Flexibility into an Outcomes-Based System May Prove Challenging for Educational Institutions

Few educational institutions mentioned actively *building flexibility into their planning* (although we also did not ask about this specifically). Building flexibility into an outcomes-based system is important to ensure that all students have the time and support to achieve each outcome. Students' variation in backgrounds and experiences call for differentiated approaches, which can be challenging in JPME because the residential course length is fixed, with no variation allowed for responding to different student needs. But even within the fixed length, there are productive strategies for addressing these needs. One leader at an educational institution explained how the institution responded to the challenge arising from different student backgrounds:

Some students have different starting points: For example, some students who were struggling were reservists or NG [National Guard]. It was clear that they were at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts. To their credit, we know they stepped it up and did what they needed. The bottom line is that we need to be aware that not everyone has the same background.

We noticed that several joint institutions are taking steps to address this challenge, but given the somewhat regimented nature of military careers, adding flexibility is likely to be a persistent challenge. One approach could involve educational programs having greater selectivity of students or involvement in the admittance decision process. Similarly, requiring reading assignments or supplemental materials prior to program matriculation may level the knowledge base for all incoming students. One way in which educational institutions are building flexibility into their curriculum is using *formative assessments*, which monitor progress and are conducted incrementally. One faculty handbook

and the draft OPMEP Reference Manual encourage using formative assessments in courses and programs. For example, using formative assessments could alert a faculty member that a student is struggling well before the end of the course. As a result, the faculty member could tailor future activities for that student and could provide the student extra time to achieve a successful outcome.

One education leader noted that they “leave no student behind,” which suggests that they might already have strategies in place to account for different backgrounds. The draft OPMEP Reference Manual offers several strategies that educational institutions can consider to engage more-advanced learners in deeper or supplementary learning, but it has more-limited coverage on methods to support students who need longer to master the core material. But because the residential program length in the military system is fixed, there are limits to how much differentiation can be provided if all students are in the program for exactly the same length of time. These challenges are only poised to increase with an internal 2020 DoD decision (based on the 2018 NDS) to increase enrollment of international students in PME courses significantly, which will likely bring even more diversity in terms of backgrounds and learning styles.

Accreditation and Certification Process Are Changing to Accommodate Transition to Outcomes-Based Military Education

Representatives of joint educational institutions and a review of their documents informed us that these institutions use course and program measures for several purposes. Performance in courses and in the program as a whole is used to rank graduates and identify distinguished graduates. This information also is used for a variety of programmatic purposes, such as accreditation reviews and assessments of how the institution is doing in meeting its goals.

The accreditation and certification process for OBME plays an important role in implementation and could offer educational institutions additional flexibility, at least during the transition period. Educational institutions are accredited or certified through either (1) the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) or (2) institutional accreditation bodies. The PAJE is a body that is appointed by the J-7.

It focuses on joint education and provides oversight, assessment, and improvement.¹³ According to the draft OPMEP Reference Manual, with the transition to OBME, the PAJE will focus on ensuring that the PLOs are relevant and measurable. The PAJE also gives educational institutions about six years to become fully certified so that institutions have time to create PLOs and an assessment plan and provide several years' worth of student assessment data to the J-7.

JPME institutions are also accredited, typically every ten years, through an institutional accreditation body. Through this accreditation, educational institutions are held to the same standards that the U.S. Department of Education sets for civilian degree-granting institutions.¹⁴ These criteria include standards related to curricula, faculty, and facilities.¹⁵ The PAJE and institutional accreditation serve different purposes, but they are linked. For example, the PAJE oversees the transition to OBME, but institutional accreditation serves a broader function, especially by maintaining the educational institution as a master's degree-granting institution and verifying that a minimum expected level of resources is provided for teaching and learning, which, as a result, could attract or retain faculty or students.

¹³ Brenda S. Farrell, *Professional Military Education: Programs Are Accredited, but Additional Information Is Needed to Assess Effectiveness*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-20-323, February 2020.

¹⁴ Farrell, 2020.

¹⁵ U.S. Code, Title 20, Chapter 28, Section 1099b, Recognition of Accrediting Agency or Association.


Managing and Measuring Joint Performance

Using our analysis of official documents, interviews with subject-matter experts, and personnel data, we examined the processes within the TM-JPME Interface Model that were associated with managing and measuring joint performance. In this chapter, we describe the shortfalls in these processes through the lens of OBME. Many of these shortfalls were emphasized during our discussions with stakeholders across the joint force. The topics addressed correspond to the nodes and linkages in the TM-JPME Interface Model that are highlighted by the red circles in Figure 5.1: how joint prerequisites are specified, how performance expectations are conveyed, and the various ways that performance is measured. These topics generally correspond to the second and third study questions.

Specifying Joint Prerequisites

Joint prerequisites are educational or experiential attributes that are specified by the joint organization as either required or desirable for selection into a position. The organization sometimes states additional characteristics that it believes are needed for successful performance on the job—which could include such items as military service, rank, job specialty, and unique specialized training. The intent is for the services to use joint prerequisites to assess their inventory of available officers and offer the most-qualified candidates who match an organization's requirements.

Figure 5.1
Joint Prerequisites and Performance in the TM-JPME Interface Model



NOTE: The blue boxes indicate service functions, the purple boxes represent joint elements, and the blended boxes reflect areas where service and joint functions overlap.

Experience Is Dominant Prerequisite with No Consistent Demand for Joint Education

Through interviews and analysis, we found that experience is the dominant driver overall in determining assignments. We found no consistent prerequisites for joint education in JDAL specifications or habitual assignment of graduates from particular colleges to relevant assignments. Furthermore, we learned that joint stakeholders generally do not believe that they have substantial involvement in joint leader development.

With this preference for experience, stakeholders noted that their highest priority is often to fill the position within their organization rather than having the position remain vacant. This preference might motivate many stakeholders to frame their prerequisites in rather

ambiguous language. Their fear is that position descriptions that are too detailed might prevent the right person from being able to fill the job or that descriptions that are too narrow might mean no officers can meet the specifications. Other JDAL position prerequisites, such as service or job skills, could unnecessarily eliminate top contenders as well.

Job Skill Prerequisites

To understand how JDAL position prerequisites vary, we looked specifically at job skill prerequisites. We examined 3,733 O-5 and O-6 JDAL positions, each of which specifies a primary job skill (e.g., for Army positions, a Military Occupational Specialty code). We grouped the skills specified in the JDAL positions into four categories concerning the “specificity” of a job skill: any career field, multiple career fields, single career field, or specialty. (See Appendix C for additional details.)


Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of joint positions in our data set, according to this categorization. We found that joint stakeholders require a variety of job skills across their JDAL positions, from very general to very specific. About one-third of positions have more-general requirements: 12 percent will accept service members from any career field, and 23 percent will accept those from multiple career fields. About two-thirds of positions are more specialized: 51 percent require candidates to be in a single career field, and 14 percent require the service member to have a specialty skill that is finer than a single career field. Different categories of job skills may have different requirements, which we examine with respect to education later in this chapter.

Position Descriptions

To understand more-specific JDAL position prerequisites, we analyzed position descriptions. Of the 3,733 O-5 and O-6 JDAL positions, only 267 had position descriptions with clearly defined job requirements (not including less-career-relevant requirements, such as passports, security clearances, and ability to travel). The first section of Appendix C reports our full analysis, which we summarize briefly here.

Overall, within these 267 positions, the descriptions expressed requirements for experience about 10 percent more often than for education. In terms of experience, functional (e.g., a skill in a technical topic or weapons platform), joint, and staff experience appear

Figure 5.2
Distribution of O-5 and O-6 JDAL Positions, by Job Category



SOURCE: Data presented include O5 and O6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, obtained from JDAMIS and FMTS, and exclude any positions that have not been filled by the services since January 2000.
 NOTE: Job categories reflect career field prerequisites for JDAL positions.

most often in these position descriptions, stressing that these position owners strongly value these experiences. Some joint stakeholders specifically highlighted the need for individuals in these positions to have expertise in one’s career field, which aligns with this heavy emphasis on functional experience. In terms of education, JPME-II is the most frequently mentioned prerequisite, and intermediate-level education (the staff college level) is the second-most mentioned. For grades O-5 and O-6, intermediate-level education is expected. As we discuss in Chapter Six, joint stakeholders often would like O-5 and O-6 officers to have completed JPME-II prior to arrival on the job, although they recognize that it frequently does not happen.

Because of the limited number of position descriptions with sufficient details to analyze in this way, these findings might not be gen-

eralizable to the large set of JDAL positions and thus should be treated only as indicative of a potential trend. To supplement this analysis, we examined other, more-comprehensive sources of data that shed further light on the relationship between education and positions prerequisites.

Views Regarding Educational Requirements Vary Considerably

Our interviews suggested that there were a variety of views on the value of JPME-II as a position requirement. Some interviewees view joint education as having considerable value, especially for certain specialties. According to one interviewee, “for planning, I would like [JPME-II] to be a requirement. For strategy, I would like to see it a strong recommendation. For policy, still important. For logistics, it’s not needed as much.” Conversely, others see joint education as “checking a box.” The lack of emphasis on education might not be surprising because it appears, in some cases, to have little effect on joint performance. Multiple interviewees suggested that stakeholders cannot routinely distinguish performance differences between JPME-II graduates and nongraduates (while noting that nongraduates typically are not serving in more-strategically demanding positions).

To explore the diversity of perceptions on educational requirements in greater detail, we examined the educational requirements database within JDAMIS. Although this data set did not include every JDAL position, it did include 1,214 positions (of the 3,733 total positions). Like the sample of position descriptions containing prerequisites, this data set was not representative of the larger population. Some CCMDs were missing entirely, and the distribution by directorate or organization within CCMD was not consistent. The distribution of positions by services was relatively consistent, however.

The unique educational requirements included in the data set ranged from week-long training courses to months-long educational requirements. Overall, there were 158 different entries for the type of education or training requirement. Some positions had multiple requirements. Sometimes a distinction was made between whether the requirement was merely desired or actually required.

Furthermore, we examined positions that specifically required JPME-II. Within these data, no positions required education from

the JPME-II granting institutions of CIC, CISA, or NWC. Only one position required the individual to have education from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, now known as ES. JAWS, JCWS, JFSC, and senior service colleges (either the specific school or generalized as “Senior Service College”) were the primary JPME-II options.

The lack of educational specificity further highlights the lack of importance that joint stakeholders put on the specific educational institution. The number of requirements (of the 2,796 total) associated with JPME-II programs is shown in Table 5.1. It is possible for a position to have multiple JPME-II educational requirements.


We hypothesized that jobs with different job skill specificity levels (as described earlier) do not require the same amount of JPME-II education. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of all 3,733 O-5 and O-6 JDAL positions with at least one known JPME-II education requirement, no JPME-II education requirement, and unknown education requirements. We observed known JPME-II requirements in relatively few positions. The necessity of JPME-II education is relatively

Table 5.1
JDAL Positions with Specific JPME-II Educational Requirements

JPME-II Institution	Count
Senior Service College	271
JFSC	238
JAWS	62
JPME-II	24
JCWS	7
NWC	7
Air War College	6
Army War College	2
ES	1
Marine Corps War College	1

SOURCE: Data from JDAMIS’s educational module.

Figure 5.3
Education Requirements Across Job Skill Specificity Categories



SOURCE: Data presented include O5 and O6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, obtained from JDAMIS and FMTS, and exclude any positions that have not been filled by the services since January 2000.
 NOTE: Job categories reflect career field prerequisites for JDAL positions.


constant across job skill categories. However, a larger percentage of specialty job skills are specified with no JPME-II requirement. This might suggest that JPME-II education is potentially less important for more-specialized career fields (i.e., Foreign Area Officers with specific regional training).

JAWS Offers Model of Comprehensive Approach

We also examined educational requirements for advanced schools (JAWS and the four service advanced schools). Figure 5.4 displays the directorates and CCMDs where education from these schools is generally required. Some positions only specify graduates of JAWS, some only specify a service advanced school, and some include a requirement for either. Advanced schools are highly desired in the J-3, the J-5, and U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM's) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Although the J-3 and J-5 are also the most populous directorates, it is still clear that advanced school graduates typically are matched within these types of units.

The education provided at JAWS provides a good model that could possibly be extended to how educational requirements are defined, managed, and assessed in other JDAL positions. For example, JAWS content is constantly reviewed for relevancy and effective educational delivery, is linked to current and future joint challenges and national security objectives, and benefits from joint stakeholders providing focused and detailed feedback. Similarly, to ensure graduates are best matched with joint assignments, joint job requirements are continually assessed, job incumbents are solicited for their perspectives on the relevance of educational materials, and graduates immediately receive a joint duty assignment. As Figure 5.4 shows, JAWS graduates are largely aligned with the J-3 and J-5 sections in the Joint Staff and CCMDs. Such common linkages between joint programs and joint assignments offer direct opportunities to immediately apply joint educational lessons in relevant joint experiential assignments. The JAWS example holds promise in application to other joint positions if the approach were promoted in a more-comprehensive manner in the TM-JPME enterprise.

Figure 5.4
Education Requirements of CCMDs and Directorates



SOURCE: JECC = Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Data presented include O5 and O6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, obtained from JDAMIS and FMIS, and exclude any positions that have not been filled by the services since January 2000.

Conveying Performance Expectations

Effectively communicating performance expectations for JDAL assignments is critical for several reasons.¹ It ensures the “right” individual characteristics can be selected for each position, that appropriate preparations can be made to best position individuals for success (e.g., education), and that feedback on performance outcomes can be provided to organizations responsible for these dimensions as well as to the individual assigned to each position. As noted in our discussion of the notional TM-JPME Interface Model, well-articulated expectations for joint performance (e.g., “what does success look like?”) by joint stakeholders are critical drivers for essentially all TM-JPME elements: determination of position requirements, basis for educational curricula, assessment of TM selection decisions, and others. Finally, joint stakeholders must provide performance expectations as a necessary first step in implementing OBME. A fundamental understanding and statement of performance expectations is needed to state and assess outcomes that are required in the performance of any JDAL position. A lack of definitive performance expectations has implications for viable OBME implementation.

Stakeholders Struggle to Express Performance Expectations

Our interviews and process reviews identified that joint stakeholders struggled to convey performance expectations, did not have systematic processes to communicate such expectations, and did not have measures that determined the degree to which such performance expectations were satisfied (other than the currently implemented service evaluation reports). We found these findings to be robust across all

¹ This section focuses exclusively on performance expectations, which are distinct from the earlier section dedicated to joint prerequisites. Prerequisites reflect the characteristics of the positions that should be considered in the selection of potential job candidates. For this study, we have limited prerequisites in the areas of education and experience. Conversely, performance expectations are specified independent of any given job incumbent and reflect the qualities of what success in a position looks like (e.g., an individual capable of synthesizing and analyzing large volumes of complex concepts to develop a limited set of recommendations that consider military, political, and cultural perspectives effectively communicated in both written and oral formats for senior leader decisions).

stakeholders. That being said, there has been some preliminary work conducted by MEAAC to aid the JPME enterprise in conducting external assessments of JPME-II graduates; this work involves developing interview protocols and conducting data analysis.²

Throughout our interviews, joint stakeholders were not able to systematically specify their performance expectations for officers serving in JDAL positions—whether the focus was on all of the organization’s joint positions or a smaller subset. Their descriptions of performance expectations tended to be exceptionally vague or tended toward broad generalizations that captured expectations needed of all officers in any role (e.g., capable leaders, smart staff officers) rather than expectations distinctly related to joint position performance. Interviewees also suggested universal individual qualities (e.g., strong communications, critical thinking, and ability to condense large amounts of information into concise documents, write at a policy level, and brief senior military leaders) that are important skills and abilities but not distinctively related to joint needs.

We heard repeatedly that the skills needed to succeed in a joint position are often difficult to measure. One interviewee summarized this notion as follows:

We do not have a list of outcomes—we do not even think in those terms [expectations]. I want staff officers coming in the door who will respond to a broad issue set, maybe issues outside their expertise. We are looking for energy and aggressiveness, and those sorts of factors. I do not have a core document of key tasks and/or even a mental checklist of performance measures.

Using our interview analysis, we found that joint stakeholders do not detail—to any degree of specificity or consistency—their organizational performance expectations for job incumbents. This is a critical shortfall in the TM-JPME process because such fundamental information is essential to assess and improve the overall TM-JPME processes.

It is also evident that any potential dialogue among the key participants of the TM-JPME enterprise concerning performance expecta-

² Barron, 2020.

tions lacks structure, process, or even a lexicon that is consistent across all organizations. Such deficiencies result in limited to no information exchange or indiscriminate conversations that cannot appropriately effect organizational change. One joint stakeholder summarized the process as follows:

If we have any performance expectations, they are implied, not definitive. We like officers to be JPME-II–certified, competitive, and upwardly mobile. Yet our process is informal. When we do not adequately express expectations, I appreciate that there are instances for mission impact. I signed my third waiver allowing people to leave without doing a face-to-face turnover. Such is [the] disconnect between us and the services and it is affecting our overall staff performance.

Finally, our interviewees described considerable ambiguity over who within joint stakeholder organizations had “ownership” for performance expectations. We found confusion about who or what staff entity is responsible for specifying, reviewing, modifying, and communicating performance expectations. Overall, we found that, if a joint organization made any statement regarding performance expectations, it was cast as a general responsibility of the personnel group (e.g., J-1, staff secretariat, or their equivalents) without systematic involvement, contributions, or review by the directorate that owns the joint positions. Occasionally, some joint organizations referenced a Chief of Staff–like position taking an integrating role between the JDAL-owning directorates and the respective personnel group, but this approach was typically the exception. Accordingly, throughout our interviews, we found that no responsible party or consistently strong voice within joint organizations has the responsibility to collect, validate, and communicate this primary function associated with performance expectations.

Stakeholders Propose Providing Greater Definition to Joint Learning Areas

In a previous section, we noted that the JLAs could serve as a basis for more-detailed interactions among the joint stakeholders, services, and educational institutions. That being said, we also heard during our

interviews that the six topics defining the JLAs (presented in Appendix A), while comprehensive, are viewed as very broad areas and require further specification if they are to have greater application to the TM-JPME enterprise. We note that the draft OPMEP Reference Manual's Appendix G provides greater details for capabilities under each JLA, and it includes a protocol for conducting focus group engagements with joint stakeholders using a common lexicon.

Many interviewees highlighted the need for strategic and critical thinking acumen in joint positions. One CCMD interviewee described why these skills are essential (and rare) in positions in which individuals are required to advise senior officers:

A lot of what I saw was a lack of critical thinking. I sat in so many briefings with colonels briefing GOs [general officers] and it was hard for them to put it in larger context of policy and command decisions. It was like, "sir/ma'am, you are the genius, here is the information; you figure it out." . . . Being able to reach back into your education and [being] able to apply it to your current situation is important.

Other interviewees added that, although strategic thinking skills are critical, they cannot replace mastery of one's own career field and one's own service. Most interviewees, however, stressed that both are required areas of expertise and are not mutually exclusive. One interviewee highlighted this requisite balance when reflecting on which skills are most valuable in a joint environment:

Outside subject-matter expertise, skill at being able to assemble varied and complex material weighed against the strategic and political backdrop, and forming that into a product that informs the commander with a series of options. That probably falls under the military art side as opposed to military science.

Furthermore, interviewees also stressed that understanding strategic-level processes and organizations—throughout DoD—is extremely important to work successfully in a joint environment. Specifically, interviewees felt that officers need to understand the implica-

tions of national-level documents, such as the NDS, Global Employment of the Force, and the National Security Strategy, on tactical- and operational-level actions. We heard that this imperative goes beyond simply understanding that these documents exist or “the mechanics of writing a campaign plan. It’s how does a campaign plan fit into a globally integrated base plan which constrains the resources from the worldwide bin of resources based on the priorities of the NDS.” The same interviewee noted,

I think the greatest understanding I’d like a JPME-II graduate to have is to understand the national security apparatus. What does it look like? How does it work? Who does what to who? What do O-6s in an enterprise-level staff do? They ensure the GOFs [general and flag officers] are prepared for their meetings with the interagency, the chairman, etc.

Finally, interviewees mentioned the importance of certain attributes, such as intellectual curiosity, maturity, motivation, and ability to work well with others—skills that are often difficult to teach and might not necessarily be correlated with academic or previous operational performance. As one interviewee from a CCMD noted,

We want to know: Are they able to function in an environment that they are not comfortable with? I don’t necessarily want the smartest guy, I want to have the guy who is perceptive and who can work with people—not necessarily the extrovert who can speak really well.

Many viewed the ability to work alongside colleagues of different backgrounds, perspectives, and organizations as critical because it helps aid the coordination of policy priorities and improves relationships. The ability to work well with others applies to fostering collaboration, not only across military organizations but also with civilian entities. As one interviewee explained,

The individuals [working in a joint environment] are interfacing with Congress on a regular basis and, at some point, at a very high level with the members themselves. . . . At the same time,

they're interfacing with the staff here as well—the Under Secretaries, Secretary and Deputy Secretary, and we have our offices go in, defend, and present whatever the information might be.

Measuring Performance Outcomes

For educational institutions to adopt OBME, they require information on expected and actual performance of the graduates in their follow-on joint assignment. To inform our analysis, we examined current practices for measuring performance outcomes both within educational institutions (which we discussed earlier in Chapter Four) and during JDAL assignments.

During their JDAL assignments, as with all assignments, officers are evaluated using service-specific evaluation or fitness reports. The current practices for measuring on-the-job performance largely derive from this system, which mostly records qualitative judgements of performance on a variety of factors. Supervisory officers also told us that they regularly provide informal feedback on job performance throughout the assignment, especially after key actions, such as reports, summaries, and briefings.

To make OBME effective in JPME-II, educational institutions need information about the actual performance of graduates in their follow-on joint assignments. Although it might be possible to aggregate ratings from the current service-specific evaluation process into some sort of overall picture of JDAL officer performance, the differences among the service forms and the lack of specific reference to JPME-II outcomes would likely make this aggregation of limited value for OBME implementation and assessment purposes.

More generally, there is a lack of systematic processes to collect, assess, and provide feedback on individual joint performance that would help educational institutions better target their programs to the needs of joint stakeholders. We queried interviewees about developing a common joint evaluation or fitness report to complement and standardize information on performance specifically in the joint environ-

ment.³ Information from that standardized form could then be aggregated in ways that would make it relevant to guide and refine JPME-II evaluations. However, we heard almost no enthusiasm for establishing a joint report of this type. Stakeholders whom we interviewed resisted the idea because it would represent additional effort that would not affect the service promotion processes and thus would likely not be treated seriously enough to be meaningful.

³ Prior efforts within the Joint Staff to consider joint evaluation reports have not been successful. Even before such efforts could be meaningfully considered, joint stakeholders must describe performance expectations and how individual performance of capabilities associated with the JLAs is tied to organizational readiness. Necessary panels of measurement experts and specialists could be assembled to advise joint stakeholders on how to measure performance tied to readiness based on progress in the JLAs. This would contribute to establishing the essential link between joint educational institutions and joint stakeholders.


Challenges Arising from Talent Management Systems and Processes

As we have stressed throughout this report, TM and JPME-II are fundamentally linked. Through our interviews, we found that efforts to improve JPME-II outcomes and increase effective use of JPME-II graduates need to be linked to the services' TM efforts. Specifically, JPME-II must (1) fit into an officer's overall career timeline, balanced against service and joint manpower needs; (2) address GNA requirements for developing joint qualified officers and positioning some officers for O-7 selection; and (3) serve as a consideration in other officer promotion decisions.

Given their historical practices, distinct needs, and individual cultures, the services often execute these efforts using different means, balancing different priorities that reflect their respective requirements and sometimes achieving varying results.¹ This dynamic is exceptionally complex and serves as a strong impetus for developing and disseminating the *JCS Vision*, which spoke strongly about the need for greater TM and JPME integration. This chapter reviews our findings related to the challenges that characterize this intersection, highlighted by the red circle in Figure 6.1, and serves as the basis for specific recommendations in Chapter Eight. The topics generally correspond to our fourth study question regarding challenges from TM systems and processes affecting implementation strategies for OBME in JPME-II.

¹ Jackson et al., 2020.

Figure 6.1
The Intersection of TM and JPME in the TM-JPME Interface Model



NOTE: The blue boxes indicate service functions, the purple boxes represent joint elements, and the blended boxes reflect areas where service and joint functions overlap.

Academic Performance in Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II, Is Weakly Linked to Joint Duty Assignments and Career Progression

On the whole, we heard that information on educational performance does not influence service TM decisions pertaining to follow-on assignments, promotion, or identifying officers for future leadership potential. Leaders with whom we spoke said that performance in experiential assignments was far more important in making these TM decisions. In part, this reflects service cultures,² but it also might reflect the limited

² S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Rebeca Orrie, *Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for*

systematic performance information that educational institutions have provided to date.

That said, there have been some attempts to make educational performance more salient. In 2019, the Army redesigned its academic evaluation reports to make an officer's level of performance in both civilian and military education clearer. The Army's intent is that information on performance in academic settings should be weighted more in promotion decisions and in TM practices.³ As the new form was released, George Piccirilli, then-division chief for the Evaluations, Selections, and Promotions Division, Army Human Resources Command, was quoted as saying,

The new form has more rigor, more structure. We're trying to get a little bit more information so the Army can truly identify those top performers, those critical thinkers it is looking for in the future.⁴

Although the impact of this change (and additional initiatives being contemplated by the other services) remains to be seen, we do see more interest in making educational performance information a greater influence on TM decisions.

Interviewees also consistently raised issues about the relative contributions of joint education and joint experience to an officer's overall success and promotability. These observations contribute to several findings from our interviews.

First, in our interviews, we found limited systematic processes (or poorly executed processes) for differential assignment of talent to joint schools. Although the services conduct selection boards to determine attendance at senior schools (both joint and service), and officers compete to be selected for fellowships at civilian academic institutions, we

Influence Among the U.S. Military Services, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2270-OSD, 2019.

³ Sean Kimmons, "New Academic Evaluation Report Aims to Better Identify Top Performers," Army News Service, June 24, 2019.

⁴ Kimmons, 2019.

learned that the determination of which officers attend which schools largely is based on factors unrelated to TM.

Second, most joint stakeholder interviewees favored experience over educational performance in the individuals filling joint positions. This finding does not appear to be a judgment of the quality of the JPME-II curriculum but rather about the value of and preference for experience. For example, one interviewee said, “No matter how good we make our JPME education, I will always go to experience first.” Another joint stakeholder expressed that “the education is a solid foundation, but not a substitute for actual experience.”

Third, there was little consensus as to whether the skills and characteristics needed to succeed in joint positions are better gained through JPME-II or self-development. A CCMD representative said

It’s hard to attribute to JPME-II qualities which are fundamentally part of the character or work ethic or outside reading and self-studying that the best officers do. Being able to look for causality between joint education and the type of officer you get is really difficult. . . . The best officers who may not have the training [and education] are typically doing outside reading. . . . It’s part of their genetic makeup.

However, others felt strongly that joint educational institutions are fundamental to teaching personnel relevant career-long skills. As a former instructor stated,

I used to say “if you think I am going to educate you to be a good XO [executive officer], you will be disappointed” because that is not why we are here. That’s training, not education. I am educating them to think critically, understand doctrine as a baseline, and be able to apply these concepts to their jobs. We don’t train for specific jobs, but we will introduce them to concepts that they may or may not have seen before.

Fourth, matching an officer’s specific academic focus or performance in education to follow-on joint assignments is not systematic or consistent. Although some attribute this education-assignment mis-

match to the services' career managers, we learned that joint organizations do not place much weight on which JPME-II institution an individual attended. Some limited cases exist in which an organization will request a graduate from a specific college, but this is the exception. Such a lack of deliberate matching between education and assignment might also be partially because limited joint educational performance information is provided to the services. This statement might not apply to all because some services consider being a distinguished JPME-II graduate as having an impact on future promotions and assignments.

Finally, some interviewees expressed a note of caution for the dominant experience-over-education perspective. They thought such consistent prioritization could lead to short-sighted biases and misguided predispositions in the officer corps. A CCMD interviewee stated, "The past 19-plus years have prejudiced an entire generation of military officers to think in a certain way that is going to be antiquated for future warfighting conflicts." Similarly, other stakeholders agreed that alternative educational programs, such as civilian graduate degrees, contribute greatly to broadening leadership development and challenging traditional paradigms. Unfortunately, these opportunities are largely underappreciated by most service TM processes when compared with more-service-specific programs.⁵ One interviewee noted,

It holds true that some of our finest leaders took more risks/had more confidence in taking risks and were able to absorb things off the standard track. It made them better decisionmakers. We should be nurturing those opportunities.

Joint Assignments Are Less Valued by Services

From our interviews, we also found that performance in a joint position is perceived as less important in promotion decisions than performance in service positions. This perception is because of and reinforced by several factors.

⁵ Jackson et al., 2020.

First, interviewees reported that service assignments carried more weight in promotion decisions. The nature of an officer's career pathway is service-centric. This is both shaped by and a product of service culture, among other factors.⁶ Phasing and timing of service assignments at specific points in an officer's career—e.g., major command—are essential to favorable promotion consideration and can conflict with similar joint demands for desirable talent. Therefore, joint assignments are often timed so that they do not adversely affect achieving specific service career gates or chances at promotion. For example, because an officer's most recent evaluation report carries substantial weight in promotion decisions, "if an officer completes joint assignment right before a promotion, they do not get the exposure to the service folks who will promote them." Moreover, some reported a bias against *too much* joint time. An interviewee from the Joint Staff told us that "I'm not sure I'd want an officer the service could afford to lose twice between O-4 and O-6."

Second, service culture also plays a large role in the valuation of service assignments, as officers on promotion boards tend to select officers with similar backgrounds to themselves, perpetuating a cycle in which service-heavy careers dominate.⁷ Promotion boards are simply more familiar with service positions and can thus quickly and more easily judge an officer's potential for greater responsibility. Third, promotion emphasis is tied to interservice competition. To effectively compete for resources and institutional security, the services must prioritize meeting internal goals over broader joint efforts.⁸ However, some respondents felt that this service-dominant perspective might not support broader joint goals. As one interviewee noted,

The services value services. That will never change because the enterprise of the services will always favor themselves over something else. It's tragic, it really is. It's amazing how far you can go when you don't care who gets the credit. It's about warfighting at

⁶ Jackson et al., 2020.

⁷ Jackson et al., 2020.

⁸ Zimmerman et al., 2019.

the end of the day. It's about people in the field and their families and it's about their contract that they signed. That's the part we've seemed to have lost holistically about all of this.

Because joint assignments are generally viewed as less important than service- and/or career-field-centric jobs, the majority of JDAL positions are viewed by the services as generally interchangeable within their allotment of assigned joint positions. However, a small number of JDAL positions are valued by the services. As discussed in this report, the most coveted are high-visibility positions, such as military aides or special assistant roles. These top-tier assignments are closely tracked by certain critical functional fields where an important service interest is implicated, such as placing a bomber pilot with nuclear weapons expertise as the aide to the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

Service Talent Management Decisions Can Result in Poor Fit or Unfilled Positions

As a result of the services' efforts to balance competing priorities, we heard in our interviews that joint organizations are usually those most adversely affected. Specifically, joint stakeholders reported that they faced instances in which positions are poor fits—meaning they are filled, but the incumbent's skills are not aligned with organizational needs—and other instances in which positions are unfilled, or “gapped,” for some period. This appears to be a persistent issue because other research identified these issues well over a decade ago.⁹ In some cases, the joint stakeholder faces the trade-off of accepting a weaker fit to avoid a gapped position. This results in the observation that we heard repeatedly, that joint stakeholders are often the “bill-payers” for the services' decisions about filling joint positions.¹⁰

⁹ Linda Fenty, *The Joint Staff Officer Report*, internal document provided to RAND authors, Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff J-7 and Joint Force Division, 2008.

¹⁰ As discussed earlier, such poor fits typically result from the joint organization not providing sufficient detail into the specification of performance expectations, position prerequisites, or both.

We recognize that not all objectives in filling positions can be met simultaneously because personnel demand will always exceed inventory. However, we consistently heard of costs associated with degraded staff performance, increased workload for others, higher-than-planned turnover in officers, and/or delays in getting officers up to speed in performing their joint duties.

Services Occasionally Pull Officers from Joint Positions Early, with No Backfill

Joint stakeholders in all organizations raised the concern that a considerable number of officers are pulled from their JDAL assignments prior to completing the 24 months of the assignment that is required for joint experience qualification.¹¹ TM policies allow for early departure possibilities, but occurrences are intended to be an exception. Officers who depart prior to tour completion are typically high performers who are transitioning to service command positions. These joint-tour terminations are categorized under the generic “for service needs” rubric so that officers can attend required pre-command education and training and requalify on weapon systems, if needed. Completing such pre-command service-specific requirements can often consume upward of 12 months. Joint stakeholders whom we interviewed were torn in these circumstances because they fully recognized the career-enhancing nature and operational imperative of command selections. However, they felt that they had limited or no recourse in mitigating these situations.

Interviewees also reported that the services often will not backfill early departures, rendering joint organizations as the bill-payer to address service needs.¹² The net result is high staff turnover, gapped

¹¹ As with the previous finding, this result is more TM- than JPME-oriented, but premature staff turnover and associated lack of return on educational investment have implications for the overall performance of joint organizations.

¹² Of course, there are other reasons for officers leaving joint assignments early, e.g., personal matters, family issues, health concerns, and unpredicted vacancies in critical service

positions, increased investment in staff development, or some combination thereof. An interviewee lamented that this early departure trend affects both the joint organization and the professional development of the officer, saying that “it takes about a year for you to get the job and patterns, so sending someone to a joint assignment for 18 months or less will not benefit them much either.”

Interviewees also expressed frustration when transitions occurred very early in the joint tour—around the one-year point. The joint stakeholders felt that the services were aware of such possible transfers during the officer assignment process but were only using the joint assignment as a holding position for the officer. In both of these circumstances—early departures and known placeholding—the joint stakeholders believed that the services should be held accountable by refilling the gapped position or initially providing an officer capable of filling the full 24-month assignment duration.

Assigned Officers Usually Have Not Completed Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II, Prior to Assignment

As shown in Figure 3.2, our analysis of officers currently serving in JDAL assignments as of January 2020 shows that 47 percent have completed JPME-II.¹³ It is notable that some of these officers serving in JDAL positions completed JPME-II during the period of their JDAL assignment. The only way to accomplish this is via one of the multiple nontraditional options that are offered by JCWS. Our analysis showed that 40 percent of currently serving officers completed JPME-II prior to arrival at their joint assignment, and an additional 7 percent achieved the qualification sometime during their assignment (see Table C.8).

assignments. The joint stakeholders are aware of and sensitive to such infrequent, unforeseen, and unavoidable situations.

¹³ See Appendix C for a more-complete description of the officer sample and additional data tables.

Several complex questions emanate from these findings: What is the acceptable order for education relative to serving in a JDAL position, and what are the appropriate percentages of graduates needed by joint stakeholders for successful performance of JDAL positions? These are exceptionally difficult and multifaceted questions that are beyond the scope of this report. But these complexities further reinforce the four fundamental and persistent TM-JPME concerns that we raised in Chapter Three.

That said, we did attempt to collect insights into the sequencing of JPME-II and joint assignments from our interviews. The results were that the vast majority of joint stakeholders agreed that JPME-II should ideally precede joint assignments. One interviewee captured the perspectives of those who felt particularly strong on this position:

I would say yes, absolutely [JPME-II first] is required. The reason why is that you have to know national strategy, where to pull it from, to deep dive into national strategies and defense strategies, which feed into the Secretary [of Defense]'s decisions. All those things are covered at JPME-II, and to come in here cold, it would be tough without those basic fundamentals.

Conversely, a minority of respondents reported no strong preference for JPME-II. In fact, a few interviewees suggested that joint stakeholders cannot routinely distinguish performance differences between JPME-II graduates versus nongraduates (while noting that nongraduates are typically not serving in more-strategically demanding positions). Another interviewee from the Joint Staff noted, "I can't think of a case where I could tell if someone was a war college graduate or not."

Other interviewees qualified their responses by saying that the sequencing of JPME-II before a joint assignment seems to matter more for certain specialties and assignments but not for all combinations. An example included a strategy position in a CCMD J-5 directorate. Similarly, as discussed in an earlier section, other or more-pressing factors can affect the education-joint assignment order determination.

Furthermore, several interviewees felt that joint organizations often preferred to fill a position as soon as possible rather than waiting

for an officer to complete JPME-II en route to the command. As one individual familiar with service assignment detailing stated,

When I would give a combatant command a choice between a JPME-II graduate arriving ten weeks after someone has departed or the same quality officer as contact relief without JPME-II, most combatant commands would rather have the officer [without JPME-II].

Again, this is another illustration of the joint organization, not the service, being the bill-payer for a prepared officer being made available.

Joint Officer Quality Varies and Lacks Objective Measurement

A small but vocal number of interview respondents lamented the quality of assigned Joint Staff officers. Such concerns arise either during the initial assignment process or accumulate over the course of a joint tour. As noted earlier, rarely do joint stakeholders push back on the officers who are offered by the services when the alternative likely is to have a gapped position. A considerable portion of this acquiescence rests with the joint stakeholder's inability to articulate sufficiently or subsequently communicate position prerequisites and performance expectations, as described in the previous chapter.

Likewise, although joint stakeholders might occasionally voice concerns about the performance of an individual joint officer, they do not have a means to aggregate and express summative issues or trends regarding overall officer quality and performance. When asked how they communicate concerns and provide feedback to the services, joint stakeholders typically stated that they had not had such a dialogue. In rare instances of engagement with the services, it was generally very generic and at a very senior level—the deputy commander for a CCMD or the chief of staff for the joint organization. At the staff level, routine means do not exist to provide systematic information to the services regarding the quality of their officers or their joint performance. Comparison of promotion rates was a transparent benchmark that served

this function. Other research on joint qualified officer (JQO) trends showed that such reported metrics provided a strong forcing function to drive service behaviors and policies.¹⁴

As detailed earlier, GNA contained an initial provision that required the reporting of promotion rates for joint-serving officers to officers on their respective service headquarter staffs. The intent of this requirement was to ensure officer quality for joint assignments and to protect such officers from being adversely considered within the service promotion process. At the prompting of the services, OSD received legislative authorization to forgo congressional reporting of promotion rate comparisons.¹⁵ The result was a loss of an objective tool for the joint community to quantify and empirically portray the quality of officers that are assigned by the service TM systems. Other RAND research has shown that such comparative promotion outcomes are generally valid barometers of the quality of officers in various categories; however, validity can be enhanced using refined analysis techniques.¹⁶

One example that could be illustrative of why these rates are useful in driving conversation between joint organizations and the services on TM issues comes from TRANSCOM. In 2018, TRANSCOM examined the promotion rates of officers assigned to that command compared with officers serving on service headquarters staffs and reported a significant disparity.¹⁷ Although a variety of factors can influence promotion rates, TRANSCOM used these analyses to have informed and data-based conversations with the services, arguing for greater consideration in the assignment of quality officers to their JDAL positions.

¹⁴ Mayberry, Waggy, and Lawrence, 2019.

¹⁵ This deletion of annual reporting to Congress of promotion rate comparisons in the GNA was codified in policy by the requirement no longer being included in CJCSI 1330.05A, which was superseded by CJCSI 1330.05B, 2020.

¹⁶ Albert A. Robbert, Tara L. Terry, Paul Emslie, and Michael W. Robbins, *Promotion Benchmarks for Senior Officers with Joint and Acquisition Service*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1447-OSD, 2016.

¹⁷ Internal TRANSCOM communication provided to the authors.

The Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II Enterprise Lacks Empowered Oversight Structure

Given the complexity and competing equities associated with the TM-JPME enterprise, it is imperative to have a structure for authoritative and responsive oversight. Accordingly, as part of the *JCS Vision* Implementation Plan,¹⁸ the Joint Staff and the services constructed a governance mechanism “to provide senior leader guidance, receive assessments, and make decisions for policy changes.” The plan recognized the relationship between TM and education and thereby presented a means to address their intricate challenges.

The oversight construct detailed in the *JCS Vision* Implementation Plan centers on the Joint Leader Development Council (JLDC) as an umbrella body over both subelements of education and TM. Chaired by the Joint Staff J-7, this three-star-level council is composed of representatives from OSD, Joint Staff, and service education/training and personnel. This forum is intended to guide changes, resolve differences, and assist in forming integrated TM and education policies across DoD.

The JLDC was established in 2018. Through our interviews, we learned that the council struggled to oversee and arbitrate TM and education policies from a collective perspective. Except for very broad and consensual issues, the JLDC has essentially been on hiatus and not engaged in specific TM and education TM issues. The direction and prominence given to TM and JPME by the dissemination of the *JCS Vision* offers an opportunity to reinvigorate and empower the JLDC for its approved purposes, as detailed in the Implementation Plan.

The JLDC is intended to be supported by two respective three- and two-star-level sub-bodies: the Military Education Coordination Council, which is chaired by the Joint Staff J-7, and the Talent Management Coordination Council (TMCC), which is chaired by the

¹⁸ JCS, “Implementation Plan for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management,” internal document provided to RAND authors, July 11, 2020b.

Joint Staff J-1. Both of these councils are supplemented by respective O-6–level working groups. These counterpart bodies are expected to collaborate and coordinate on cross-cutting issues and to submit issues and recommendations to the JLDC for decision.

The Military Education Coordination Council has a robust and standing history of addressing key education issues that are of interest to both joint and service institutions. Its membership reflects the broad military education community—both leadership and practitioners—and regularly convenes to consider a formal agenda of issues. For example, the July 2020 revision of the OPMEP was formally debated and coordinated in this forum and in its supporting working group. The Military Education Coordination Council enables cross-service input and unity of effort in seeking to accomplish DoD-wide goals for strengthening education.

Conversely, the TMCC is a nascent structure that is yet to become operational. The *JCS Vision* Implementation Plan states,

Building upon the informal coordination already being conducted in such venues as the Army, Marine, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Space Force (AMNACS) Forum, the TMCC, as appropriate, will augment such efforts by providing a venue to also address Joint Officer Management and serve as an advisory board for the JLDC . . . TMCC serves as a non-directive, collaborative body comprised of key joint, service, and OSD talent managers, which represent the leadership of Talent Management/Service Personnel Systems . . . meets to share best practices and deliberate/recommend changes to joint personnel policies described by the JCS Vision and Guidance that benefit from coordination between services and/or the Joint Staff.¹⁹

From this general charter, it is evident that the TMCC language is attempting to loosely build on an existing informal entity to delicately skirt any authoritative powers required in TMCC missioning, and to emphasize the nondirective nature of TMCC deliberations and recommendations. This is likely to be unsuccessful in addressing the

¹⁹ JCS, 2020b, p 3.

TM and JPME challenges that are raised in the *JCS Vision* and in balancing service and joint equities.

JLDC and its supporting bodies appear to be composed of appropriately senior officials and have the expertise to oversee TM and JPME coordination. However, these structures require proper missioning, empowerment, and engagement by senior leaders to be fully effective. The history of JLDC's start-up and ambiguous TMCC chartering represent important lessons that must be avoided for TM-JPME oversight structures to be successful.

Summary of Findings

We have covered many overlapping topics in the previous chapters, so this chapter synthesizes our findings associated with the four study questions and motivates the recommendations discussed in the next chapter. We also reflect on the fundamental and persistent concerns about TM and JPME introduced in Chapter Three.

Study Question One

How are the practices of joint educational institutions offering JPME-II transitioning to an outcomes-based approach that can prepare officers to be successful joint operators?

OBME is a fundamental strategy in the *JCS Vision*, so we reviewed foundational literature and experiences of other education settings that have adopted outcomes-based approaches. This review generated a set of best practices, and we assessed the prospects for joint educational institutions to adopt these practices.

We found that joint educational institutions are working to define measurable outcomes and linkages to curriculum, which is an important practice. Measuring student performance using authentic assessments is critical to the successful implementation of OBME. Although joint educational institutions are working to develop some of these assessments, it is essential that they emphasize this development further.

Although we heard that some educational institutions have mechanisms in place to solicit input from community members, these mechanisms generally are underdeveloped. In considering how to develop these mechanisms further, we observed significant interest among both educational institutions and joint stakeholders for more-robust communication on desired outcomes, and there was wide agreement that the structure and content of the new JLAs have created a promising framework to organize this communication and engagement.

Institutions of higher education typically use their institutional research functions to support these processes of systematic measurement and communication about outcomes, yet interviewees noted that joint educational institutions do not have the empowered and well-staffed institutional research functions that are needed. Such methodological capabilities are essential to fully implement OBME and to address the inevitable challenges associated with joint performance specification, measurement, and process evaluation.

Because they are based on achieving specific outcomes rather than time spent, outcomes-based systems require significant flexibility in teaching delivery and pacing. This sort of flexibility appears challenging for joint educational institutions to implement and assess with their current procedures. We note that accreditation and certification processes are changing to enable the transition to OBME. The OBME certification plan, which requires reviews at critical milestones, can serve a valuable role in guiding and monitoring the steps needed to implement OBME, while institutional accreditation serves a more general and independent role in maintaining the quality of institutions and their recognition among faculty and civilian educational counterparts.

Study Question Two

How does the joint community consider performance expectations and the qualities needed to be effective joint officers?

JDAL O-5 and O-6 positions are the ones most closely associated with JPME-II, and we examined how performance in these positions

is specified in terms of expectations and measured in terms of outcomes. Across these JDAL positions, we found that prior experience forms the dominant prerequisites, and there are only a few examples in which JPME-II or institutional prerequisites are established. Furthermore, the periodic JDAL validation process focuses almost exclusively on determining whether a position meets the intent of joint matters and rarely considers what, if any, joint education might be required for successful performance.

Our interviews and process reviews identified that joint stakeholders did not recognize the need to formalize performance expectations and did not have systematic processes to communicate such expectations.

Study Question Three

How is joint performance specified and measured? To what extent does aggregate performance information provide enterprise feedback?

We found that joint stakeholders measure individual performance during JDAL assignments using the established performance feedback processes of the individual services. They also provide informal on-the-job feedback. But joint stakeholders told us that they do not aggregate this performance information into overall themes or lessons that can inform joint educational institutions as they consider how to modify their curriculum, instruction, and authentic assessments to improve future joint outcomes. Similarly, there is a lack of systematic feedback provided to the services that characterizes the quality and value of their TM processes and decisions.

Study Question Four

How might challenges from TM systems and processes affect implementation strategies for OBME in JPME-II?

There are significant challenges at the intersection of TM and JPME that have the potential to constrain strategies that can help implement OBME. First, we observed that academic performance in JPME-II (in the current system) is weakly linked to JDAL assignments and career progression. However, there are some signs of change on this front, such as the Army and Air Force's efforts to make educational performance more visible in promotion processes and assignment decisions.

Because of such disconnects, efforts to enhance JPME-II might have limited effects if organizations and officers do not invest seriously in these enhancements that OBME can deliver. This observation fits with a broader understanding of the limited power that the joint community can exercise in a TM-JPME system in which most personnel decisions are the province of the services. The services value most joint assignments somewhat less than those within their services. Service TM decisions can result in several undesirable consequences for joint stakeholders, such as poor assignment fit, gapped positions, or officers pulled early from JDAL assignments with no backfill.

A small but vocal number of interview respondents lamented the quality of assigned joint officers, based on their experiences with sub-standard staff work. GNA had required services to report promotion rates for joint-serving officers to their counterparts on respective service headquarters staffs. This provision was intended to motivate the services to assign high-quality officers to JDAL positions and to protect the officers from being adversely considered within the promotion process. However, the services successfully lobbied to remove this reporting provision, reintroducing this vulnerability.

Furthermore, despite a number of interviewee comments that JPME-II was valuable prior to a JDAL assignment, our analysis of personnel data concluded that just 40 percent of O-5 and O-6 JDAL-assigned officers (as of January 2020) completed JPME-II prior to assignment, and another 7 percent completed it sometime during their assignment. Although this was not part of this report's focus but

was captured in our list of fundamental and perpetual questions, we inquire whether this result—which is a reflection of the totality of the current TM-JPME process—is sufficient for effectively accomplishing the joint organization’s mission.

We found that there is no defining policy among the various stakeholders in the TM-JPME enterprise to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities for supporting OBME implementation. Similarly, we also observed that the structures designated to oversee the enterprise generally lack power and purpose—again reflecting the lack of sufficient policy guidance. For example, the Joint Staff formerly established the JLDC, a body intended to bring together the TM and JPME communities. Through our interviews, we learned that, so far, the council has struggled and has not been able to carry out its anticipated (and challenging) integration role. Clarifying JLDC roles and responsibilities in new TM-JPME policy and empowering such oversight structures will be critical to guiding and adjusting the implementation of OBME, which necessarily requires a holistic rather than fragmented approach.

Fundamental and Persistent Concerns Revisited

As part of our summary of findings, we also take stock of the implications of our research for the four fundamental and persistent concerns that we raised about TM and JPME in Chapter Three.

- **Intent:** Guidance documents and many of our respondents emphasized the educational nature of JPME-II as a broad preparation for future officer development rather than specific job training. Yet joint stakeholders demand that JPME-II provide at least a basic introduction to joint matters because many officers must learn the fundamental joint concepts in their one and only joint assignment.
- **Audience magnitude:** Service culture prioritizes keeping as many officers as possible eligible for future promotions, even when selection rates might be low. As a result, the services are seeking maxi-

imum opportunity for all O-5s and O-6s to attend some form of JPME-II. It might be wise to reconsider this to focus JPME-II resources or tailor JPME offerings to the officers who are most likely to employ the knowledge and skills developed. Conversely, JPME-II offerings could be further expanded.

- **Scope of content:** Although there are different delivery modes and institutions, many officers essentially receive the same content in their joint JPME-II programs. There might be value in greater differentiation in the scope of the content, reducing the time spent on basic, common elements to allow more specialization that meets the needs of individual officer career paths. As discussed in the following chapter, successful implementation of OBME could contribute to accomplishing such goals.
- **Risk tolerance:** The implementation of OBME opens a variety of educational reforms for consideration, such as delivery modes and program duration, and a wide look at the potential futures for JPME-II.

We return to these issues in our discussion of recommendations in the following chapter.

Recommendations

Using the findings summarized in the previous chapter (and the details in earlier chapters), we formulated specific recommendations and divided them into four sections. We begin by offering that all TM-JPME considerations should be managed within the context of a comprehensive enterprise perspective. Next, we examine policy requirements for specifying roles and responsibilities across all participants in the enterprise to include greater empowerment of governance bodies. We then present a series of coordinated actions that are needed for successful implementation of OBME. Finally, we conclude the chapter with recommendations that require additional analysis and development before adoption.

Address Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Integration from a Comprehensive Enterprise Perspective

As DoD and the services address proposals to enhance TM and JPME—including the findings and recommendations of this study—their deliberations and decisions should be guided by a comprehensive TM-JPME enterprise perspective.

Historically, DoD and the services have segregated TM and JPME functions—both organizationally, as to how tasks are managed, and via distinct governance policies. Past actions and decisions most often have been independently debated and resolved while infrequently considering the implications for the other functions. Such separation

has created several distinct challenges, as noted in previous chapters. This is particularly true from the perspective of the joint stakeholders: the ultimate customer that requires prepared officers capable of performing needed joint warfighting skills in the context of their assignments. Yet the same is true of the supply-generating components of these functions—the services and educational institutions—in their need to receive appropriate feedback for guiding continuous process improvement of their respective systems.

The *JCS Vision* offers a departure from these past practices of separation by providing specific justification and direction for integrating TM and JPME. The reconstitution of the JLDC and its oversight of implementation plans offers the necessary structure to dynamically assess and decide critical issues that span service and joint purviews and cross TM and JPME boundaries. The TM-JPME Interface Model, described in Chapter Three, provides a valuable tool to visualize the complexities of system-wide interactions.

Delineate and Clarify Talent Management and Joint Professional Military Education Roles and Responsibilities in Policy

OSD, working with the advice of the Joint Staff, should address the lack of a leadership development policy to detail the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance for integrating and prioritizing the often-competing dimensions of TM and JPME.

Although the *JCS Vision* can provide preliminary direction for future action, it does not delineate the authority or enforcement mechanisms to resolve divergences between TM and JPME or to overcome disparate equities that are strongly held by the joint communities and services. Such a policy omission has significant implications and should be corrected by the respective policy proponents.

This recommendation also involves OSD updating and extending its guidance on professional military education—beyond the limited elements of its JOM policy—to articulate the Secretary of Defense’s

policy requirements and the delineation of responsibilities across OSD offices, military departments, DoD components, and Joint Staff. Such guidance would support and reinforce the educational aspirations of the *JCS Vision* while providing overarching justification to the recently updated CJCSI on education.¹ Such an umbrella declaration would provide guidance in determining whether joint and service educational initiatives are sufficiently comprehensive, cohesive, and coordinated to achieve effective and efficient educational outcomes for both PME and JPME. Also applicable to this recommendation is the greater delineation of roles and responsibilities among the various players of an enterprise.

Within the context of TM-JPME integration and OBME implementation, policy should require that joint stakeholders be responsible for defining the joint work requirements (typically through JDAL position descriptions, position requisitions, or both), providing input on and prioritization of content areas for joint instruction and providing joint performance feedback to other organizations. As previously noted, we found deficiencies in the conduct of all three areas by joint stakeholders—not systematic (lacking appropriate processes and procedures), pro forma (accepting results without meaningful questions), and nonownership (believing such duties were not the stakeholder’s obligation). Although there is a desire for greater interactions between joint educational institutions and services with joint stakeholders, engagements are limited, and there have been few results.

In producing JPME-II graduates, joint educational institutions are primarily responsible for developing and modifying relevant curricula, determining the most-fitting means for content delivery, assessing programmatic outcomes, and accommodating change through agile processes. We do not see specific policy changes needed in these areas, but we believe that these areas could benefit from focused attention. Our interview analysis noted no substantial issues other than the needs to establish authentic assessments and maintain closer relationships with joint customers and military services.

¹ CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020.

Finally, the military services have significant and dominant responsibilities relative to all TM functions. Although there are common joint intentions and concepts across the services, they all operate under their own directives while adhering to the general guidance of joint instructions. These tasks include officer career progressions and joint detailing processes. We do not advocate for a common approach to the services' responsibility of balancing competing priorities and interests in the education and assignment of officers. However, if policy can drive joint stakeholders to better deliver on their demand-specification responsibilities, then we support a stronger and consistent joint voice influencing the TM-JPME integration.

The Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should empower existing TM, JPME, and leadership development governance bodies by providing sufficient guidance and investment in preparing future officers.

The integration of TM and JPME, as intended by the *JCS Vision*, involves considerable challenges in terms of combining and implementing current processes and procedures with still-evolving aspirations and desired outcomes. Accordingly, the Joint Staff J-7 has published an implementation plan to chart a way forward and established the three-star JLDC—a hierarchical governance structure to oversee and provide the accountability required for successfully implementing changes in the TM-JPME enterprise. This recommendation is not a call to establish new bureaucracy but rather a call to effectively empower the existing structure. JLDC is nascent in executing its designated roles and is still unproven in adjudicating the challenges and complexities inherent across joint and service entities as well as across TM-JPME boundaries. Such issues cannot and should not be underestimated: They result from longstanding past practices and highly engrained service cultures.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have spoken strongly about leadership development in their published vision, thereby actualizing the axiom that leadership development is the senior-most leaders' responsibility. But senior defense officials and leaders rarely have used their positions to emphasize the importance of preparing future officers—from both the joint and service perspectives. Such actions would involve dedicating a portion of the annual Secretary of Defense executive forum not

only to the status of TM-JPME implementation but, more importantly, to the challenges remaining for its full and successful implementation. Senior leaders need to stay engaged in refining guidance, resolving areas of conflict, and ensuring that the appropriate resources (time and dollars) are available. Similarly, as JLDC progresses and develops in executing its responsibilities, senior leaders should empower the body to guide, manage, and prioritize TM-JPME implementation actions by being periodically briefed on its progress.

Implement Outcomes-Based Military Education Through Coordinated Actions

The Joint Staff should facilitate engagements among DoD, service, and joint stakeholders to create stronger, persistent, and accountable relationships to address mutually beneficial purposes in OBME implementation.

As previously noted, working relationships between the triad of stakeholders forming the TM-JPME enterprise are deficient to some degree. As a result, joint requirements and expectations are not necessarily stated or addressed, unity of effort is lacking in terms of defining and delivering joint outcomes, and organizational missions are adversely affected. Improvements to these relationships need to be based on proper policy foundations that clearly specify appropriate roles and responsibilities and how they should be executed, as previously recommended.

The Joint Staff should take the lead to facilitate engagement among TM-JPME stakeholders to (1) facilitate responsive communications on joint requirements, performance expectations, and curriculum refinements; (2) establish the basis for broad assignment pipelines linking education and experiential positions, not necessarily on the current one-to-one basis but possibly to include wider associations with some educational programs on some variety of assignments; and (3) foster

collaborative research, analysis, and problem-solving opportunities.² Improved relationships that focus on achieving these goals will put in place a foundation from which to continually reassess and adjust educational outcome measures and authentic assessments, ensure currency and relevancy of joint content offerings, ensure that authentic educational assessments are sufficiently defined and aligned to on-the-job performance, and ensure that service officer placements are better aligned to joint requirements and thereby deliver joint outcomes. These relationships can, and likely should, be structured in multiple ways; we provide further details and offer options in Appendix E.

The Joint Staff should promote the JLAs as the basis for structuring interactions between TM-JPME stakeholders on joint prerequisites, performance expectations, and performance outcomes.

The nominal conversations and feedback between members of the joint triad—if they have occurred at all—have centered on non-descript statements and resulted in limited changes to the enterprise. These statements were very broad: for example, “joint education is stagnant.” A noteworthy contributor to this shortcoming has been the lack of structure for a more-refined level of discourse. Using the JLAs as the basis for structuring stakeholder interactions was suggested by many joint stakeholders as a way to improve lackluster engagement between stakeholders and to shape such interactions toward becoming more action-oriented. To be beneficial, such dialogue should strike the right balance between an individual officer or position and the organization. An appropriate equilibrium likely involves a set of positions grouped either by directorate (e.g., some officers or positions within the J-5) or by function (e.g., some officers or positions involved with strategic planning) or a combination of these two with appropriate commonality among groups. The aim is to identify a subset of positions around which desired outcomes can be identified.

The joint educational institutions and the Joint Staff J-7 should continue to press forward in designing options to deliver

² In our interviews, we heard of mutually supporting partnerships between a school and a CCMD in which lessons about focused attention and critical thinking in persistent or pop-up challenges faced in the area of operation were provided by faculty members.

education with greater flexibility and agility, implementing OBME best practices, and conducting authentic assessments with feedback of results provided to TM-JPME enterprise stakeholders.

The joint educational establishment (e.g., joint institutions and Joint Staff J-7) is taking proactive steps and developing implementation plans within its areas of responsibility to address shortfalls in joint officer development practices. The implementation of OBME as a new guiding educational standard and bellwether needs to be incorporated into these efforts. DoD continues to refine and further detail the concepts of OBE as applied to military institutions. We encourage the continued development and socialization of OBME for joint education because it has considerable implications for reforming the entire educational enterprise. Only when foundational principles are well understood, broadly supported, and continually assessed can OBME achieve its potential promise. This will require that educational institutions participate in understanding, defining, and internalizing OBME concepts and principles as they transform their historical practices to become outcome-centric processes. Educational professionals will need to fundamentally rethink and reassess their ways of operating and not merely repackage their past approaches. This will be a complex cultural transformation that requires considerable intellectual investment.

Joint educational institutions should enhance their institutional research capabilities to develop, monitor, and track authentic assessments and programmatic outcomes.

OBME is a relatively new concept in the military education field. Its application in military institutions will almost certainly face several technical challenges associated with specifying, defining, measuring, linking, and implementing programmatic outcomes. Additional implications and unknown consequences will inevitably crop up as OBME policies and processes are implemented. Such practical issues necessitate dedicated expertise and resources to ensure that critical issues are considered, deliberated, and resolved. Regardless of whether such expertise is resident in educational institutions or accessed via a standing advisory board, it is critical that experts be consulted in the implementation of such transformational OBME concepts. The OPMEP requires an assessment advisory committee to advise Joint Staff and

JPME organizations on OBME and the development of authentic assessments. The MEAAC could be one such body of assessment and measurement professionals from across the JPME programs that could fulfill this requirement.

The Joint Staff J-7 should incorporate OBME principles into the established educational certification processes.

We appreciate that the Joint Staff J-7 is reworking accreditation and certification processes as part of its TM-JPME implementation development. We recommend that OBME fundamentals be explicit considerations in any such sanctioning processes, whether they involve the external institutional accrediting bodies, the PAJE, or any future variants of either process. Such continual emphasis and additional independent perspective on outcomes are essential to guide OBME implementation and its evolution using real-world experiences and feedback.

OSD and the Joint Staff should extend the JDAL validation process to establish and validate educational prerequisites for select JDAL positions that demand more-strategic, -complex, or -preeminent joint responsibilities.

Essential first steps for OBME implementation stem from an understanding of the educational prerequisites for successful JDAL performance. As previously explained, educational requirements are specified for less than 10 percent of JDAL positions—a significant shortfall for the proper and complete enactment of OBME. We recognize the existing JDAL validation process as robust in systematically reviewing all joint assignments, but select JDAL positions need additional scrutiny. We limit this recommendation to select JDAL positions for two reasons. First, interviewees gave the general impression that not all JDAL positions require JPME or require it in equal amounts. These findings need to be empirically determined. Second, respondents were able to describe only informal hierarchies of positions that require JPME; they did not have definitive criteria on which such decisions are based. Similarly, the service-detailing offices were not able to explicitly list the criteria that they used to prioritize joint positions for determining assignments. Such a focused and limiting process already exists for identifying critical JDAL positions—those assignments that are of such importance that they should only be filled by a previously

designated JQO. This recommendation would require the Joint Staff, services, and joint stakeholders to expand the already existing critical JDAL determination process to include broader criteria.

OSD and the Joint Staff should reestablish the standard of joint education preceding joint assignment for high-valued positions, allowing few—if any—waivers.³

This recommendation is not intended to be broadly applied to all JDAL assignments but instead is limited to select positions, as in the case of the previous recommendation. Although this education-then-assignment order is adhered to for some officer-position combinations, it should become the default option for all highly select joint positions. The fundamental premise is that completing JPME-II before key assignments ensures that the officer has the requisite joint knowledge, skills, and abilities to be successful. Similarly, immediate placement into a relevant assignment ensures that joint education is engrained and justifies the investment, in terms of both time and money. The standard for this practice is already applied in direct follow-on assignments for graduates of JAWS. We merely suggest extending this proven concept to additional high-level JDAL positions. As selection boards for residential education programs convene and confer their decisions, the process should be expanded to include the direct follow-on assignment for the graduate.⁴ In this manner, students can appropriately tailor their educational programs by shaping electives, areas of special-

³ Similar to some other current TM policies, the approval authority for waiver requests should be elevated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff level (without delegation) to ensure that circumstances warrant an exclusion, sufficient justification is provided, and no mitigation options are available.

⁴ In exceptional circumstances in which a service's TM process determines that an officer should be assigned to one of the highly select joint roles without having completed either joint or senior service schools (and thereby not having JPME-II graduation status), JCWS is the only available joint education opportunity. We recommend that the service schedule the ten-week JCWS program to be completed as part of the officer's prearrival preparations to the select JDAL assignment. In other words, JCWS graduation should be achieved prior to reporting and not be completed during or after the joint assignment. Again, this recommendation does not apply to all JDAL assignments but only to those determined to be highly select joint roles. Graduation from JCWS could be attained during an officer's tour, just not for those positions deemed to be select.

ization, and research emphasis. Greater returns on educational investments are more likely to be realized as graduates are able to “lock-in” and apply their focused learning via relevant experiential assignments. This approach will also make it easier for educational institutions to track alumni to assess the value and effects of their learning programs, as required in OBME implementation.

OSD should eliminate, through policy clarification, the service practice of withdrawing officers prior to fully completing their JDAL tours (or require the services to replace such officers without creating a gap in joint service).

Both our literature review and our interviews consistently noted the negative effects of officers departing early from joint assignments. Although such departures were justified as a “convenience of the service” or “preparations for command,” they resulted in limited officer contributions to the joint organization, gaps in filling assignments because the departed officer was still on the joint roster, overburdening other officers who assumed greater joint duties, restarting the acculturation cycle for newly arrived officers, and a loss of benefits from face-to-face turnovers, among other implications. The early transfer of an officer often is not an unexpected event (granted, there can be exceptions, but such cases could be addressed via high-level waivers), but there is no joint voice bringing attention to the unfavorable effects and advocating against adverse practices. Such service transfer actions should be abated; when they occur, the services should be responsible for immediately refilling the position.

Consider More-Complex Actions That Require Further Development

A number of previous recommendations address current roles, responsibilities, and structures of TM and JPME, and by adopting these recommendations, DoD can improve TM-JPME integration. However, additional actions to enhance integration extend beyond these boundaries and align with the fundamental concerns associated with the purpose and audience for JPME-II, whether the status quo should change,

and what should be the drivers for change. As a result, these recommendations are likely to be more difficult to implement because of the need for possible changes in TM-JPME roles or structure. In addition, most of these ideas affect other important interests in ways that limit or offset some of the benefits that we are seeking. Because our report does not address the full variety of relevant interests, DoD and the services will need to further examine these suggestions to determine whether the changes are warranted.

DoD and service leadership should consider revising their policies so that JQO designation is required before officers can assume leadership of an O-6–level command.

The JQO criterion for selection to O-7 is an effective forcing function in driving service cultures and their TM-JPME processes to deliver sufficiently educated and experienced joint officers into senior military leadership positions. In the 35 years that the GNA has been in effect, U.S. military operations have significantly evolved. Today, jointness is recognized as crucial to the way that our forces train and operate. This evolution extends down to service O-6–level commands that now function routinely in a joint context. Given the challenging nature of these command assignments, incumbents are acknowledged by the services as high performers who are on track for future leadership roles—both in service and joint areas of responsibility. We concede that there might be limited circumstances in which this JQO requirement cannot always be satisfied by the services, but we advise that waivers should be very limited and only approved by the Secretary of Defense (the same designation authority for achieving JQO status).

OSD and the Joint Staff should consider revising their policies to reinstate promotion rate comparisons and congressional reporting.

Joint stakeholders do not systematically provide feedback to the services regarding either the initial quality of assigned officers or their performances during joint assignment. Although any issues concerning individual officers can be and are addressed via standard military chains of command, the broader system-wide feedback to inform continuous process improvement is missing. Feedback should be based on transparent and objective measures that are aggregated across individu-

als to provide summative trends regarding overall quality of assigned officers. Comparison of promotion rates for officers in equivalent joint and service positions provides important, albeit lagging, indicators of personnel quality. Such specificity and visibility will contribute to the *JCS Vision* goals of enhanced TM-JPME integration, development of relevant OBME assessment measures, and improved and focused dialogue between joint stakeholders and services.

The services should investigate giving joint stakeholders greater freedom to manage some TM decisions within their organizations.

A select number of more-engaged joint stakeholders voiced a desire for a greater role in managing assigned officers under their watch. The concern is that assignment decisions are frequently driven by the syncing of reporting and departing officers' schedules rather than by matching officers' capabilities, education, and experiences with stakeholders' needs. Once an officer is aligned to a specific assignment, the joint stakeholder has limited opportunity to move individuals into more-compatible positions. At the individual level, with so many moving parts, this is a complex dynamic that is coordinated and managed by each service. After giving an individual the appropriate amount of time to assimilate into the staff process and operating rhythm (thought to typically range from two to four months), joint stakeholders believe that they have a reasonable understanding of an individual's knowledge, skills, and abilities based on direct observation of the individual's performance and motivations and can better align officers with their organizational needs. We appreciate that this request is essentially the antithesis of the more-prevalent position of joint stakeholders having little, if any, current involvement in TM matters; however, we believe that this concept has merit if stakeholders execute their responsibilities as recommended earlier in this chapter.

A complementary proposal involves the services creating small cohorts of officers (two to five individuals) who would be managed as a group. The group would be formed based on the decisions of residential education boards and made up primarily of officers selected for each JPME program. After graduation, the individuals in each group would be assigned to positions in the same joint organization. After a

nominal period for onboarding and assimilation, the joint stakeholders would critique individual officers' skills and make informed decisions for specific position alignments. TM would be handled locally (not by the service assignment process), facilitating optimal person-position fit and coordinating arrival-departure dates and face-to-face turnovers. In this manner, educational institutions would be able to tailor instructional programs to the specific needs or context of the organization and the respective cohort to be assigned. For example, members of the cohort could consistently work on practical exercises and assignments related to the missions of their future organizations. Also, members of the cohort would build professional relationships with one another and develop a greater understanding of and connection to their future joint organization.

Joint educational institutions, with coordination by the Joint Staff, should consider developing shorter, more-modular, episodic JPME-II offerings.

We believe JPME benefits all officers at all levels throughout their careers. The challenge is to fit that education into an already full career schedule. Adopting a more flexible approach to JPME could address this issue. Such change in JPME-II offerings could be enhanced by DoD implementing and maturing an outcomes-based paradigm. Intended to augment current JPME offerings and/or expand JPME presentation to underserved audiences, more widely available and shorter JPME modules could be scheduled by capitalizing on technology advancements and educational innovations to yield measurable outcomes rather than satisfy time-based content presentations. The aggregated modules could still impart necessary content and skills for the JLAs. For example, a modularized JPME-II program could offer synchronous or asynchronous seminars with traditional reading and writing assignments. In between seminars, students could critique podcasts, collaborate in designing and conducting competitive wargames, contribute to blogs and wikis, participate in innovation challenges for current military problems, create and participate in relevant communities of practice, and direct modeling and simulation efforts to address real military problems. Such JPME offerings would conclude with major capstone events (possibly involving an in-person component). OBME

would be a central component of such alternative JPME offerings; it would ensure the relevance of the offering's materials and assess programmatic outcomes. Executive education programs and models in the civilian sector could provide insights into the development and management of such additional JPME educational options. The implementation of shorter, more-modular JPME offerings could necessitate statutory changes to address deviations from current JPME-II programs and the basis for JQO designation.

The services should better link educational performance to joint assignment and promotion TM decisions.

To the extent that educational performance is seen as unconnected to either assignment determinations or promotions, there is little incentive for TM or JPME systems to be better integrated or even change or for officers to wholeheartedly invest themselves in the pursuit of JPME knowledge. We noted earlier that the Air Force gives educational performance some consideration in promotion decisions; the other services are somewhat—but not uniformly—progressing in this direction. No service gives strong attention to educational performance in the making of joint assignment decisions.⁵

Over time, DoD should consider even more ambitious restructuring of joint leadership development programs to realize the full promise of OBME.

Achieving the full promise of OBME likely calls for even more changes to the structure of TM and JPME than we have recommended in the previous paragraph. In a fully realized outcomes-based system, officers could develop and demonstrate capabilities through many pathways, including formal education, self-directed learning (perhaps from a library of online resources), planning and conducting a pro-

⁵ An approach that could hold promise in linking educational performance and assignments is a market-style matching mechanism for officers and assignments, a concept currently underway in the Army and Air Force. By allowing officers to rank their preferred assignments and commands to rank their preferred candidates, commands that care about education and educational performance can use that information to determine their rankings. Over time, such behavior is likely to communicate that performance in education is helpful to obtaining certain assignments. We admit this is a somewhat indirect mechanism, but it is worthy of further consideration and analysis.

gressive series of wargames, and on-the-job experience (potentially supported by short just-in-time learning modules on specific capabilities). The potential for any of these pathways would need to be addressed through proper authentic assessments of required future outcomes. If outcomes were assessed such that some officers could demonstrate mastery through their own initiative or by alternative educational means, then the educational communities and services could recognize, value, and incentivize such novel approaches to a greater degree. Such a system would require a great deal of flexibility, including perhaps varying lengths of time spent in formal JPME-II schools. Such changes would need statutory authority, significant adjustments to the TM practices of services, and revisions to JPME courses and institutions.

Although such systemic changes might be too far-reaching to consider now, the joint community should revisit these ideas in the years to come as authentic assessments and outcome measurement capabilities mature so that the benefits of an outcomes-based approach are truly realized throughout the joint warfighting enterprise.

Conclusion

With the publication of their vision statement, *Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War*, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have spoken about the importance of integrating JPME and officer TM. Past processes and systems in these areas have operated somewhat independently and focused predominantly on inputs rather than outcomes. Given the prominence of and demand for jointness in current and future military operations, as well as continued uncertainty in national security environments, this report, including the formulation of the enterprise level TM-JPME Interface Model, contributes to a better understanding of the complexity associated with joint officer development and provides recommendations for better positioning DoD and the services for "making the grade."

Joint Learning Areas

The JLAs are approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intended to guide PME and JPME institutions in the design, development, and delivery of career-long instructional programs to prepare officers to master joint knowledge and expertise. The six JLAs are developed from comprehensive consideration and analysis of the NDS, the National Military Strategy, the capstone concepts for joint operations, desired leader attributes, special areas of emphasis, a variety of legislative requirements, and the *JCS Vision*. JLA definitions are provided in this appendix.

Strategic thinking and communications: Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

Profession of arms: Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demon-

strated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

Continuum of competition, conflict, and war: Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument across the full spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives.

Security environment: Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate inter-disciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

Strategy and joint planning: Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans across the spectrum of conflict. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives across the full spectrum of conflict.

Globally integrated operations: Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.¹

¹ CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020, pp. A-A-1–A-A-2.

Interview Methodology

In this appendix, we discuss the data collection and data analysis methodology that we used in our interviews. We also show the interview protocols used in the study.

Data Collection

We conducted 55 60- to 90-minute, semistructured virtual interviews with current and former joint leaders from June through September 2020. We sent an initial invitation via email and followed up with a phone call if we had not obtained a response. We spoke with four groups of leaders (typically senior executive service members or general and flag officers, but occasionally a General Schedule (GS)–15 or an O-6, depending on the position grade within certain organizations) to gather insight about the following topics:

- **Insight from joint stakeholders:** We talked with leaders from OSD, the Joint Staff, and CCMDs to understand joint requirements, officer performance, and the joint demand perspective. Interview participants included deputy combatant commanders, chiefs of staff, and directors at CCMDs; directors and deputy directors on the Joint Staff; and assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and their deputies in OSD.
- **Insight from educational institutions:** We interviewed leaders from NDU and its respective colleges to understand curriculum development, assessments, and transition plans to OBME. Inter-

view participants included presidents, commandants, provosts, and deans.

- **Insight from service officer detailing sections:** We spoke with frontline officers who are responsible for service and joint detailing operations and policy to understand their perspectives and the challenges around joint detailing. Interview participants included officers in the grades O-4 through O-6 and civilian GS-13s through GS-15s.
- **Insight from former high-level defense officials and joint leaders (e.g., former generals and congressionally confirmed civilians):** These individuals were interviewed at the beginning of the study period to help us gain a holistic perspective on joint education and talent management issues and solicit feedback on our study methodology and approach.

Table B.1 shows the organizations that were represented in our interviews. We conducted 25 interviews with CCMDs and their directorates. Because of time constraints, we did not interview every CCMD or every directorate. Instead, we interviewed three of the six geographic CCMDs (U.S. Central Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command) and three of the four functional CCMDs (U.S. Special Operations Command, TRANSCOM, and U.S. Strategic Command). We oversampled joint directorates that house a relatively large number of JDAL positions (e.g., J-3) and emphasized directorates that are likely heavy in joint educational requirements (J-5 and J-8). We also conducted interviews with seven directorates of the Joint Staff, all six OSD offices, every joint educational institution, and three former defense officials and joint leaders.

Data Analysis

All interviews were conducted by at least two members of our team: One member served as facilitator, and one team member took transcript-style notes. After each interview, both team members reviewed the notes for clarity and accuracy.

Table B.1
Organizations Interviewed by the RAND Team

CCMD	Deputy/ Chief of Staff	J-1	J-2	J-3	J-4	J-5	J-6	J-8	CSEL	Interviews
Central Command	1			1		1	1			4
Indo-Pacific Command	1		1	1		1				4
European Command	1	1			1			1 (J-5/J-8)		4
Special Operations Command	1			1		1		1	1	5
Strategic Command	1		1	1			1			4
Transportation Command	1	1			1 (J-5/J-4)			1		4
Joint Staff	J-1	J-2	J-3	J-4	J-5	J-6	J-7	J-8		
Director, deputy director, others	1	1	1	1	1		1	1		7
OSD	A&S	R&E	Policy	Intelligence	P&R	Comptroller				
Principal DAS, others	1	2	1	1	2	1				8

Table B.1—Continued

Institutions	NDU	NWC	ES	JFSC	CIC	CISA	JSOU	INSS	
President, provost, commandant, or dean	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Service joint detailing offices	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps					
	1	1	1	1					4
Former defense officials and joint leaders									3
Total interviews									55

NOTE: CSEL = Joint Command Senior Enlisted Leader; DAS = deputy assistant secretary; INSS = Institute for National Strategic Studies; JSOU = Joint Special Operations University.

We coded our interviews thematically using Dedoose, a qualitative analysis software. We developed our codebooks to align with the sections of our interview protocols. We used three codebooks: one to code interviews with joint leaders; another to categorize the responses for former defense officials, former joint leaders, and joint detailing officers (based on the protocol for joint leaders); and a final one to code interviews with education leaders (based on the protocol for educational leaders). The coding was straightforward because the interview protocols guided the codebook development. We divided interview transcripts between two team members, who coded each one independently. However, to start, both team members independently coded the same transcripts. They then reviewed their coding decisions together, resolved any discrepancies, and clarified codebook rules. We did not conduct a formal inter-rater reliability evaluation because the coders largely agreed with one another, and the coding was straightforward. After the interviews were coded, one team member read through the Dedoose results for each code to document and synthesize themes. The full team confirmed the themes and used them as the basis for its continuing analysis of the interviews. The team also extracted particularly descriptive or succinct quotations to be used in the final report.

Interview Protocols

This section contains the interview protocols used in this study. We used three protocols in this study: one for former joint leaders and defense officials, one for current joint leaders, and one for leaders of joint educational institutions. The content that follows has only been lightly edited for clarity.

Former Joint Leaders and Defense Officials

Reforming JPME has been a topic of substantial discussion in recent years, including in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Furthermore, the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently codified and committed to a vision for 21st century joint leader development, which involved updating educational policy documents, specifically

the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F. That vision and instruction have specific implications for DoD's educational mission. To help us understand how these changes might be best implemented and leveraged throughout the Department, we would like to get your broad perspectives on JPME.

1. Overall impressions
 - a. What should the ultimate goal of JPME be?
 - b. Does the current system fulfill that goal?
 - c. What do you believe are the primary adequacies and deficiencies of JPME programs?
 - d. What changes could be made to JPME to better serve the nation's needs?

2. Personal experiences
 - a. In your experience, did you find that JPME helped prepare you (or those who served under you) to perform successfully in joint assignments? Why or why not?
 - b. In your experience, did you find that JPME helped prepare your peers and subordinates to perform successfully in joint assignments? Why or why not?
 - c. As a leader, were you ever involved in specifying performance requirements for your joint officers? Did you ever provide feedback to educational institutions to aid in refining or updating their curriculum?

3. Linkage to talent management
 - a. The linkage between TM and JPME is complex, given a wide range of equities. Going back to your comments on the goals of JPME, what are your thoughts on how they can be successfully linked?
 - b. JPME institutions are now charged with identifying students with "high potential for strategic thinking." How would you approach assessing students for such a designation?

4. Other considerations
 - a. What are other considerations that might pose challenges in making changes to JPME?
 - Prompts: Congress, seeking change in military educational institutions, service equities and culture?
 - b. What should we have asked, but did not?

Current Joint Leaders

The Chairman and Joint Chiefs recently codified and committed to a vision for 21st century joint leader development. In parallel, the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F, was updated. That vision and instruction instituted several key changes that: (1) shift JPME to an outcomes-based education approach (OBME); (2) create a more direct linkage between JPME and TM; (3) require mission-unique program learning outcomes; and (4) more closely link institutional accreditation to achievement of JPME program outcomes. The goal of these and other actions will be a fully aligned JPME and TM system that identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically minded, critically thinking, and creative joint warfighters who can “apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.”¹

General themes to be addressed in our discussion include:

1. educational and experiential prerequisites needed for selection into your joint assignments
2. performance outcomes that need to be demonstrated in successful conduct of your joint assignments
3. sufficiency of Joint Learning Areas as basis for stating performance outcomes
4. perspectives on valid and repeatable measures of joint performance outcomes

¹ JCS, 2020a, p. 1.

5. considerations to facilitate implementation of performance measures
6. means to provide feedback to individual officers and educational institutions
7. drivers to inform sequencing for accomplishing educational program and joint assignment
8. ways to balance JPME and TM policies and programs to overcome competing priorities.

Discussion Materials

Materials for discussion include:

- a slide noting the focus of our study on O-5s and O-6s in JDAL positions
- JDAL positions for the interviewee's directorate or office
- detailed description of the six Joint Learning Areas.

Specific Questions for Discussion

1. Qualification prerequisites
 - a. Who within your organization is the primary interface on matters related to joint education and its requirements? Joint TM, its requirements, and performance outcomes?
 - b. What educational and experiential prerequisites exist for selection into each of your joint assignments (or groupings of your assignments)? [Provide listing of JDAL positions.]
 - Prompts: specific skill set (logistician, planner), specific educational institution graduate, knowledge, values, skills, creativity, strategic thinking (even if beyond the purview of the JPME system)
 - c. How are these requirements determined or updated and communicated to the responsible office within your organization?
 - Prompt, if not covered: What input do you have in determining these prerequisites?

- d. To what extent do these prerequisites enter into the decision for determining who is slotted into your JDAL positions?
2. Performance outcomes needed to be successful
 - a. What performance outcomes do you expect of successful officers in either individual JDAL positions or groupings of positions?
 - Prompt: Joint Learning Areas, other concepts not captured by JLAs
 3. Sufficiency of Joint Learning Areas
 - a. How sufficient are the six JLAs in capturing your performance expectations for your JDALs?
 - b. What aspects of successful performance outcomes are not reflected in or captured by the JLAs?
 - c. If there are aspects of performance outcomes currently not captured by JLAs, what are your thoughts on how such outcomes are primarily developed (JPME, PME, on-the-job training, innate)?
 - d. Referring to your list of JDAL positions, how do such performance outcomes—as defined by the six JLAs—vary across your positions (or groupings of positions)?
 4. Measures of joint performance outcomes
 - a. Based on what measurements you currently execute, what thoughts or ideas do you have about how performance outcomes could be assessed in the future?
 - Prompt: for example, a separate joint fitness report consistent with JLA dimensions
 5. Facilitate implementation of performance measures
 - a. What should be the driving characteristics to aid in the development and selection of such potential future performance outcome measures?

- Prompts: accurately reflect job performance, not overly burden leadership with additional data collection requirements
 - b. Are there any factors that would significantly and negatively impact implementation?
- 6. Providing feedback
 - a. How do you currently provide feedback on performance outcomes to individual officers?
 - b. How do you currently provide feedback on performance outcomes to educational institutions so that refinements or updates may be made to curriculum based on graduates' performance?
- 7. Sequencing of education and assignment
 - a. To what extent do you see JPME-II as a strong determinant of performance in your JDAL positions?
 - b. Do you use JPME-II graduates in different roles and responsibilities from nongraduates?
 - c. Based on these observations, is it essential that education precede assignment?
 - Interviewer note: Refer to the JDAL list and note how this sequencing may vary by assignment.
 - d. What, if any, differences do you perceive in assessing performance between graduates and nongraduates of JPME-II programs?
- 8. Balancing JPME and TM
 - a. Understanding that the services predominantly control the TM process, what thoughts do you have about achieving better balance between service and joint requirements, officer development, personnel assignment, and performance feedback?
 - b. Are there levers under your control as a joint force stakeholder that could contribute to easing competing priorities for officers' skills and career time?

- c. How would you utilize graduates identified with “high potential for strategic thinking” as required by the OPMEP?
 - d. In general, where in the distribution of officer cohorts from the services do you think you typically draw from?
 - About average, below average, above average, near the top?
9. Concluding remarks
- a. What topics have we not addressed that warrant consideration, or that you would like to mention?
 - b. Do you recommend that we speak to anyone else in your organization for more-detailed information or further responses to these questions?

Joint Educational Institution Leaders

As you know, the Chairman and Joint Chiefs have codified and committed to a vision for 21st century joint leader development, which involved updating educational policy documents, specifically the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F. That vision and instruction have specific implications for your educational mission. While the OPMEP changes have implications for three types of outcome assessments—that is, student outcomes that impact TM, course outcomes that guide course revisions and faculty development, and programmatic outcome—that should inform graduates’ performance in follow-on joint assignment, our study focuses primarily on the latter, programmatic outcomes.

- 1. Overarching questions
 - a. Why does JPME need to be reformed?
 - b. What specific evidence supports the development of reform initiatives?
- 2. Current status
 - a. Where is your institution in terms of transitioning to address these reform areas and new initiatives outlined in

the OPMEP and the JPME-TM vision and guidance (e.g., instituting OBME, informing TM, using JLAs, developing PLOs)?

- Prompt: Starting planning, beginning to make changes, etc.?
3. Processes for requirements determination (e.g., how you determine what needs to be taught)
 - How did your institution previously determine its curriculum offerings and the processes associated with determining if changes are needed?
 - [If changed] How does your institution currently determine curriculum requirements and how will your institution determine programmatic requirements in the future?
 4. Curriculum development (e.g., how you address requirements and are responsive to change)
 - a. What were your previous and what are your current curriculum learning objectives?
 - How did you previously determine curriculum learning objectives?
 - b. [If developed] What are your PLOs? [If developing] What will your new PLOs be?
 - How are you currently determining [how will you determine] what the PLOs are?
 - c. How are you integrating or how will you integrate these PLOs in your curricula?
 - d. What other changes do you need to make to support the future accreditation process?
 5. Assessments (e.g., how you determine whether requirements are addressed, outcomes are delivered)
 - a. In the past, how and at what level have you assessed the outcomes of your educational programs?

- Prompt: internally or externally; on completion of the POI [program of instruction] or later in an officer's career; via what data collection means
 - b. In the past, how have you received information about the performance of your graduates in joint assignments, and if so, how, and at what frequency?
 - c. In the future, how will you assess your joint programs in achieving PLOs, both directly and indirectly?
 - d. How can such information aid in understanding and/or predicting the performance of your graduates in joint assignments?
 - e. What additional systematic measurements about the performance of your graduates in joint assignments would be useful? If such information were made available, how would you use it?
 - f. How will you use these assessments to inform curriculum changes?
 - g. What other assessment changes do you believe are needed to support the future accreditation processes?
6. Linkage to talent management (e.g., how outcome information is used by services)
- a. How has JPME traditionally been linked to the services' TM processes and how will it be linked in the future?
 - b. How do you anticipate the services will use this information and other performance metrics?
 - c. What linkage should student outcomes and assessments have in informing either the service or joint TM processes?
 - d. How will you identify students with "high potential for strategic thinking" as required by the OPMEP?
7. Challenges and benefits of OBME
- a. Both from the perspectives of the services and the various educational communities, what do you think will be the benefits in implementing these policy changes?

- b. Both from the perspectives of the services and the various educational communities, what do you think will be the greatest challenges in implementing these policy changes?
- 8. Concluding remarks
 - a. Who would you recommend we speak to in your organization for more-detailed questions?

Position Method and Detailed Findings

This appendix details the quantitative analysis used to support our findings in the main body of the report. It begins with details on the quantitative analysis of JDAL positions, explains our analysis of job skill prerequisites specified in joint position descriptions, and presents detailed characteristics of officers currently serving in JDAL positions.

Joint Duty Assignments

We analyzed JDAL position information from two sources: the JDAMIS and FMTS. We also used the Active Duty and Reserve Master files to obtain member-level service experience information.

We included only O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL-authorized positions as of January 1, 2020, although it is possible that positions might be filled by officers in other grades. We limited our data collection and analysis to three primary joint organizations: OSD, the Joint Staff, and CCMDs. Furthermore, positions that had not been recorded as filled since January 2000 in the SJDA file by the services were excluded. JDAL position positions not listed in the SJDA file were also excluded.

From these data, we formed three data sets for analysis:

1. The first data set contained detailed information on each JDAL position belonging to OSD, the Joint Staff, and CCMDs. This data set included 3,733 JDAL positions. We used the unit (down to directorate-level), service, grade, job skill, and posi-

tion description information from this data set in our analyses. Classified position descriptions (but not the position titles) were excluded. OSD position descriptions were unavailable.

2. The second data set contained information on education and training requirements for some (but not all) JDAL positions. Each observation corresponded to one training or education requirement. This data set contained 2,796 training and/or education requirements for 1,214 JDAL positions (of the 3,733 total JDAL positions). Education and training requirements were not available for any OSD positions or for multiple CCMDs. We used the unit (down to directorate-level), service, grade, job skill, and education/training requirement information from this data set.
3. The third data set contained information on 3,035 individuals who were filling JDAL positions as of January 2020. This includes data from the SJDA file, JPME file, and Active Duty and Reserve Master files. As mentioned previously, although only O-5 and O-6 positions were included, individuals below O-5 might be filling a small number of these positions.

We examined manning for different joint organizations. Table C.1 provides the fill rates for OSD, the Joint Staff, and each CCMD as of January 2020. OSD has the highest percentage of filled JDAL positions at 91 percent. Although the Joint Staff's fill rate is near the center of the distribution, it does have the largest number of authorized and assigned positions.

Table C.2 shows the graduation status of officers in JDAL assignments. Of the 3,035 serving officers, 47 percent are JPME-II graduates. In the aggregate, OSD has the highest percentage of graduates (57 percent), and the CCMDs have the lowest (45 percent).

Looking exclusively at the 1,439 JPME-II graduates, Table C.3 shows the type of institution from which they graduated. Fifty-seven percent completed their programs at JCWS, 25 percent graduated from one of the joint senior schools, and 18 percent from the senior service schools. Of those JPME-II graduates serving in CCMD and Joint Staff positions, 62 percent and 49 percent graduated from JCWS, respec-

Table C.1
JDAL Fill Rates, by Joint Stakeholder

Command	Assigned	Authorized	Percentage Filled
OSD	245	269	91%
European Command	242	271	89%
Northern Command	202	227	89%
Indo-Pacific Command	289	333	87%
Strategic Command	191	225	85%
Central Command	191	229	83%
Special Operations Command	566	682	83%
Africa Command	149	183	81%
Joint Staff	640	786	81%
Cyber Command	45	57	79%
Southern Command	112	146	77%
Transportation Command	125	175	71%
Space Command	38	54	70%
Total	3,035	3,637	83%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active duty or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMFS data.

tively. Currently serving officers generally graduated from a joint senior school.

Job Skill Prerequisites

We also analyzed job skill prerequisites for JDAL positions. This data set included 3,733 O-5 and O-6 joint positions from JDAMIS, each of which specifies a primary job skill (e.g., for Army positions, a Military Occupational Specialty code). We grouped all 305 job skills specified

Table C.2
Graduation Status for JDAL Assignments, by Joint Organization Type

Joint Organization	Graduates		Nongraduates	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
CCMDs	972	45%	1,178	55%
Joint Staff	327	51%	313	49%
OSD	140	57%	105	43%
Total	1,439	47%	1,596	53%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active duty or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMTS data.

Table C.3
JPME-II Graduates in JDAL Assignments by Organization Type and Granting Institution

	Joint Senior Schools		Senior Service Schools		JCWS	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
CCMDs	189	19%	183	19%	600	62%
Joint Staff	114	35%	51	16%	162	49%
OSD	61	44%	28	20%	51	36%
Total	364	25%	262	18%	813	57%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMTS data.

in the JDAL positions into four categories using information on the “specificity” of a job skill. Table C.4 shows the categorizations that we found, along with an example job from each service. To aid in classification consistency, two study members jointly categorized job fields and resolved any discrepancies. However, this categorization still depends on how services define their necessary job skills. For instance, the Army and Air Force had higher numbers of job skills in the “Specialty” category.

Position Descriptions and Requisitions

As we described in Chapter Five, we analyzed JDAL position descriptions and found that functional, joint, and staff experience were speci-

Table C.4
Job Field Specificity Categorization

Categorizations (Number of job skills)	Army	Air Force	Marine Corps	Navy
Any field (8)	Officer Generalist	Air Operations Staff Officer	Unrestricted Officer	Unrestricted Line Officer/ Special Duty Officer
Multiple fields (36)	Combat Arms Generalist	Generalist Pilot, Qualified	Unrestricted Ground Officer	Unrestricted Line Officer who is qualified in Surface Warfare
Single field (173)	Strategic Intelligence Officer	Mobility Pilot, General	Cyberspace Officer	Special Duty Officer qualified as a Foreign Area Officer
Specialty (88)	Signals Intelligence Officer	Mobility Pilot, KC-135	Electronic Warfare Officer, EA-6B Qualified	Special Duty Officer position requiring a Foreign Area Officer Code 2

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses in the first column refer to the number of unique job skills identified in that category.

fied most frequently. Also, experience was desired considerably more than education (of any sort—service or joint). In this section, we provide additional detail into prerequisites that were found in JDAL position descriptions.


Requisitions are the true source of prerequisites. They consist of the mandatory and desired qualities that the position owner believes are necessary for an officer to be successful in the position and are communicated to the service assignment teams. Although we did not have access to requisitions information, some position descriptions included information that we assumed would be similar to that in requisitions. We filtered the 3,733 O-5 and O-6 joint positions for only those that clearly defined required or desired attributes in their position descriptions. OSD positions did not have associated position descriptions, and some CCMDs and position descriptions were blank. Of the remaining 2,765 positions, only 267 position descriptions had clearly defined requirements, excluding less-relevant ones, such as having passports, security clearances, and/or the ability to travel.

The prerequisites in these 267 position descriptions tended to involve experiential requirements, educational requirements, or some other requirement. We divided the requirements portion of each position description into one of four categories: both experiential and educational requirements (mandatory and desired), experiential only, educational only, or containing only some other requirement. Figure C.1 shows this breakdown.

Table C.5 shows the number of position descriptions that had either a mandatory or desired experiential, educational, or some other requirement from the 267 position descriptions. These 267 position descriptions are not representative of the entire population that they were selected from, so results should not be extrapolated. These results can still be useful for gaining insight into the types of prerequisites that joint units are seeking. For instance, functional, joint, and staff experience appear most often in these position descriptions, stressing that these are strongly valued by position owners.

Within the educational areas, JPME-II and intermediate-level education were the most-mentioned prerequisites. At least one position description explicitly mentioned that the officer needed to be

Figure C.1
Position Descriptions with Requirements



SOURCE: O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMTS data.

NOTE: This excludes classified position descriptions and any positions that have not been filled by services since January 2000.

JPME-II-qualified before arrival because there would be no opportunity to obtain qualification during the assignment.

From this small sample, experiential prerequisites outnumbered educational ones. Additionally, 75 percent of analyzed position descriptions had at least one experiential prerequisite, compared with 70 percent of position descriptions with at least one educational prerequisite. Forty-three percent of position descriptions had more experiential prerequisites than educational prerequisites, compared with 36 percent of position descriptions with more educational prerequisites than experiential prerequisites.

Table C.5
Requirements from Position Descriptions

Requirements	Number of Position Descriptions
Experiential	
Functional	78
Joint	72
Staff	64
Planning	40
Operations	39
Command	36
Regional	12
Interagency	1
International	1
Total experiential	343
Educational	
JPME-II	113
Intermediate-level education	75
Senior-level education	34
Advanced school	28
JPME-I	23
Training	23
Academic	14
Total educational	310
Other	
Language	12
Communication	4
Total other	16


SOURCE: Data from JDAMIS educational module.

Figure C.2 shows the number of position descriptions that contained experiential or educational prerequisites. Most only had zero, one, or two educational or experiential prerequisites, suggesting openness in terms of who fills the position. Other position descriptions had up to five educational or five experiential prerequisites. Similar to the job skills findings, this hints at disparity among JDAL positions.

Detailed Characteristics for Officers Currently Serving in Joint Duty Assignment List Positions

Additionally, we analyzed specific characteristics of officers filling JDAL positions as of January 2020. These characteristics included graduation status, school location and type, and location of joint employment. Note that Tables C.2 and C.3 also provide similar descriptive information.

Figure C.2
Position Descriptions with Different Number of Prerequisites



SOURCE: Data from JDAMIS educational module.

Table C.6 shows graduation status by service. The Air Force has the highest percentage, at 54 percent, and the Navy has the lowest percentage, at 42 percent.

Table C.7 shows the colleges that graduate individuals with JPME-II by service. For all services except the Marine Corps, JCWS produced the vast majority of graduates. The Air Force has the highest percentage of senior joint school graduates across the services. The Marine Corps leads all other services in the percentage of senior service school graduates for those officers currently serving.

All school options can produce graduates of JPME-II prior to the officer arriving at their JDAL assignment. JCWS is the only educational option to produce graduates while an officer is serving in such an assignment. As shown in Table C.8, of the 1,439 JPME-II graduates serving, 213 received their JPME-II degree while in that assignment.

Table C.9 shows the graduation percentages for officers serving in each of the CCMDs. TRANSCOM has the highest percentage of graduates by a substantial margin. U.S. European Command and U.S. Special Operations Command have the lowest percentages of graduates.

Table C.6
JPME-II Graduation Status by Service

Service	Graduates		Nongraduates	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Air Force	542	54%	467	46%
Army	502	46%	590	54%
Marine Corps	107	44%	134	56%
Navy	288	42%	405	58%
Total	1,439	47%	1,596	53%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMST data.

Table C.7
School Granting JPME-II Graduation

Service	JCWS		Senior Joint Schools		Senior Service Schools	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Air Force	297	55%	175	32%	70	13%
Army	289	58%	113	22%	100	20%
Marine Corps	38	36%	28	26%	41	38%
Navy	189	65%	48	17%	51	18%
Total	813		364		262	

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMST data.

Table C.8
Timing of JCWS JPME-II Graduation

Service	JCWS Graduation Prior to JDAL Assignment	JCWS Graduation Achieved During JDAL Assignment	Total JPME-II Graduates	Percentage of Total JPME-II Graduations Achieved During JDAL Assignment
Air Force	196	101	542	19%
Army	231	58	502	12%
Marine Corps	20	18	107	17%
Navy	153	36	288	13%
Total	600	213	1,439	15%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMST data.

Table C.9
Distribution of Current JDAL Positions, by CCMD and Graduation Status

CCMD	JPME-II Graduates		JPME-II Nongraduates		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
Africa Command	63	42%	86	58%	149
Central Command	96	50%	95	50%	191
Cyber Command	22	49%	23	51%	45
European Command	93	38%	149	62%	242
Indo-Pacific Command	129	45%	160	55%	289
Northern Command	104	51%	98	49%	202
Southern Command	54	48%	58	52%	112
Space Command	18	47%	20	53%	38
Special Operations Command	221	39%	345	61%	566
Strategic Command	93	49%	98	51%	191
Transportation Command	79	63%	46	37%	125
Total	972	45%	1,178	55%	2,150

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMFS data.

For officers serving in CCMDs and the Joint Staff, we examined graduation status for the joint directorates. Table C.10 shows that the J-2 and J-7 typically have the highest graduation percentages.

Table C.11 shows the schools from which the 972 JPME-II-qualified officers working at a CCMD graduated.

Table C.10
Distribution of Current JDAL Positions by Joint Directorates and
Graduation Status

Joint Directorate	JPME-II Graduates		JPME-II Nongraduates		Total Number
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
J-0	83	49%	87	51%	170
J-1	33	41%	48	59%	81
J-2	100	60%	68	40%	168
J-3	320	47%	361	53%	681
J-4	69	50%	68	50%	137
J-5	205	47%	227	53%	432
J-6	58	46%	67	54%	125
J-7	66	60%	46	40%	112
J-8	69	48%	74	52%	143
Total	1,003	49%	1,046	51%	2,049

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMST data.

NOTE: CCMDs and Joint Staff only; not all filled JDAL assignments map uniquely into a joint directorate, and the exceptions were excluded from these analyses.

Table C.12 provides further details on the JPME-II schools for the 1,003 graduates working in a joint directorate in a CCMD or on the Joint Staff.

Table C.13 details the CCMDs where the 43 JAWS graduates are serving (as of January 2020).

Table C.14 shows the distribution of 36 JAWS graduates who are serving in one of the CCMD or Joint Staff joint directorates as of January 1, 2020.

Table C.11
JPME-II Schools for Officers Currently Serving in CCMDs

CCMD	JCWS		Senior Joint Schools		Senior Service Schools	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Africa Command	40	63%	10	16%	13	21%
Central Command	55	57%	24	25%	17	18%
Cyber Command	12	55%	8	36%	2	9%
European Command	57	61%	23	25%	13	14%
Indo-Pacific Command	68	53%	29	22%	32	25%
Northern Command	65	63%	19	18%	20	19%
Southern Command	34	63%	7	13%	13	24%
Space Command	13	72%	2	11%	3	17%
Special Operations Command	140	64%	36	16%	45	20%
Strategic Command	70	75%	10	11%	13	14%
Transportation Command	46	58%	21	27%	12	15%
Total	600	62%	189	19%	183	19%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMIS data.

Table C.12
JPME-II Schools for Officers Currently Serving in Joint Directorates

Joint Directorate	JCWS		Senior Joint Schools		Senior Service Schools	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
J-0	43	52%	13	16%	28	32%
J-1	20	61%	5	15%	8	24%
J-2	76	76%	9	9%	15	15%
J-3	173	54%	88	27%	61	19%
J-4	38	55%	24	35%	7	10%
J-5	130	63%	43	21%	32	16%
J-6	32	55%	12	21%	14	24%
J-7	41	62%	16	24%	9	14%
J-8	30	43%	24	35%	15	22%
Total	583	58%	233	23%	187	19%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMTS data.

NOTE: CCMDs and Joint Staff only; not all filled JDAL assignments map uniquely into a joint directorate, and exceptions were excluded from these analyses.

Table C.13
JAWS Graduates Currently Serving with CCMDs

CCMD	JAWS Graduates	JPME-II Graduates	JAWS Percentage of JPME-II Graduates
Africa Command	3	63	5%
Central Command	4	96	4%
Cyber Command	1	22	4%
European Command	6	93	6%
Indo-Pacific Command	10	129	8%
Northern Command	4	104	4%
Southern Command	3	54	6%
Space Command	—	18	—
Special Operations Command	2	221	1%
Strategic Command	2	93	2%
Transportation Command	8	79	10%
Total	43	972	4%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMTS data.

Table C.14
JAWS Graduates Serving in Joint Directorates

Joint Directorate	JAWS Graduates	JPME-II Graduates	JAWS Percentage of JPME-II Graduates
J-0	3	83	4%
J-1	—	33	—
J-2	—	100	—
J-3	15	320	5%
J-4	2	69	3%
J-5	8	205	4%
J-6	2	58	3%
J-7	6	66	9%
J-8	—	69	—
Total	36	1,003	4%

SOURCE: Snapshot of O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component individuals serving in JDAL positions for CCMDs, Joint Staff, and OSD on January 1, 2020, from JDAMIS and FMFS data.

NOTE: CCMDs and Joint Staff only; not all filled JDAL assignments map uniquely into a joint directorate, and the exceptions were excluded from these analyses.

Mission Statements of Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II Institutions

Each JPME-II institution has its own focus area, which can be seen in the mission statements that are provided in Table D.1. These mission statements are quoted verbatim and have not been edited.

Table D.1
Mission Statements of Joint JPME-II Institutions

Institution	Mission Statement
NDU	NDU educates joint Warfighters in critical thinking and the creative application of military power to inform national strategy and globally integrated operations, under conditions of disruptive change, in order to conduct war.
JFSC	The mission of the Joint Forces Staff College is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute operational-level joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.
JCWS	JCWS educates national security professionals to plan and execute JIIM operations. Graduates are critically thinking, operationally minded, skilled joint warfighters who can operationalize national, military, and theater security strategies into design-informed operational plans. Graduates have a primary commitment to JIIM teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.
JAWS	JAWS produces joint operational artists fully prepared to serve as senior planners, joint leaders, and advisors at OSD, the Joint Staff, or a four-star CCMD/Sub-Unified Command. The graduates are historically informed, strategically minded, skilled joint warfighters. They are critical and creative thinkers who expertly translate strategic decisions to operational and tactical actions through design-informed operational planning.

Table D.1—Continued

Institution	Mission Statement
NWC	Educate joint, interagency, and international leaders and warfighters by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy, preparing graduates to function at the highest levels of strategic leadership in a complex, competitive, and rapidly evolving strategic environment.
CIC	Educate joint warfighters and national security leaders in order to lead and advise national security institutions and advance global security within the cyberspace domain and through the use of the information instrument of national power.
ES	Educate joint warfighters and other national security leaders for strategic leadership and success in developing national security strategy and in evaluating, marshaling, and managing resources in order to execute that strategy.
CISA	Educate joint warfighters and national security leaders in creative and critical thinking for the strategic challenges of winning strategies for the contemporary security environment.

SOURCES: NDU, "Vision and Mission," webpage, undated; JFSC, "Overview," webpage, undated-b; and CJCSI 1800.01F, 2020.

NOTE: JIIM = joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational.

Options for Enhancing Relationships Among Talent Management–Joint Professional Military Education Enterprise Members

As noted in the body of this report, enhancing the working relationships between the various members of the TM-JPME enterprise could considerably improve their respective processes and have mutually beneficial outcomes. We offer a variety of options to strengthen such relationships in Figure E.1. Depending on the desired outcomes, certain opportunities for interaction might occur on a fixed time schedule, such as annually or biannually, depending on how frequently information is expected to change and how critical the relationship is. Other

Figure E.1
Modes to Achieve Enhanced Relationships

		Joint stakeholders	
		Individual joint commands	Combined discussion across commands
Joint educational institutions	A team from each institution	1. Bilaterals for habitual institutions-commands	2. Specialized or hot topical focus
	A combined team across institutions	3. “Travel” teams on focused issue	4. Big conference (idea exchange)

SOURCE: O-5 and O-6 active or full-time Reserve Component JDAL positions as of January 1, 2020, from the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) and the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (FMTS); these data exclude classified position descriptions and any positions that have not been filled by services since January 2000.

interactions might be scheduled during events, such as major revision to an organization's mission or change of command.

Based on the number of joint organizations and educational institutions that are involved, we expect that there could be a role for all four modes in practice. For example, where a specific college and command have a close linkage, they can establish a schedule of bilateral meetings (mode 1). When there is a certain topic or focus that is important to a particular educational institution but of common interest across joint stakeholders, a workshop that includes interested parties could be convened (mode 2). Another option could be to arrange a combined "travel" team, drawing members from across educational institutions to visit one organization and receive feedback on a particular issue (mode 3). Periodically, it might be worthwhile to convene a large conference or idea exchange (mode 4) where all educational institutions and joint stakeholders are represented. For such large gatherings, an agenda could be developed to include plenary sessions and smaller meetings that encompass all modes. Given the increased capability and acceptance of online communications technology, there would be options to conduct any of these interactions either in person or via video or teleconference.

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Leadership development in the military is a multifaceted process that takes place over an officer's entire career. At its most basic level, this development occurs through professional experiences and a progressive series of professional military education, of which joint professional military education (JPME) is a subset.

In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a vision statement with guidance and objectives for leadership development in the armed services. This vision calls for an outcomes-based approach that emphasizes ingenuity, intellectual application, and military professionalism. The new approach focuses on what students must accomplish rather than traditional metrics, such as curriculum content or the amount of time spent learning specific material. The JCS also emphasized the need to integrate officer talent management (TM) and JPME because these functions are so closely connected.

To support the implementation of this vision, the authors reviewed foundational, policy, and implementation documents; conducted semistructured interviews with senior representatives of relevant joint and service offices; and analyzed officer personnel data. They used these methods to (1) describe joint educational institutions' transitions to an outcomes-based approach, (2) examine performance expectations and the qualities needed in effective joint officers, (3) explore how joint performance is measured, and (4) see how challenges in TM systems and processes affect the implementation of JPME, Phase II. They also provide recommendations for how joint stakeholders and the military services can best integrate the TM and JPME processes to support the outcomes-based approach.

\$29.00

ISBN-10 1-9774-0700-5
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0700-9



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